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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
PROJECT PERFORMANCE RATING MODEL AND IPD IMPLEMEMTATION 
GUIDELINE METRIC FOR WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT 
PROJECTS 
by 
Elie G. Andary 
Florida International University, 2019 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Arindam Chowdhury, Major Professor  
The public nature of water and wastewater construction capital projects has 
rendered Design-Bid-Build (DBB) as the delivery method of choice for such projects 
over the past years. Shortcomings inherent to DBB have had a negative effect on the Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) of these projects. Numerous studies have argued that 
Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) improves the delivery performance of DBB projects. 
Project delivery performance is, however, a complex concept that is not easily measured. 
It involves several criteria with many factors that need to be accounted for. Water and 
wastewater construction projects do not have well-established overall performance rating 
models, and to date, no study has scientifically established links that correlate IPD 
principles to improvements in KPIs of DBB construction projects. The aim of this 
research is to develop a new model for rating the performance of water utilities major 
capital projects delivered using a project delivery method that combines IPD and DBB 
and use this model to find what correlation exists between the implemented IPD 
principles and the KPIs of these projects. 
vii 
 
Data for water and wastewater projects were collected from water utilities in the 
three counties of South Florida. Forty-three projects were selected from the total 
population of water and wastewater construction projects and delivered using the 
traditional DBB delivery method. Selective IPD principles that are applicable to public 
projects in the water and wastewater field were then applied to two control projects, and 
their respective performance was measured using the previously identified KPIs.     
A Project Performance Rating (PPR) Model was developed to combine the key 
performance factors of a project into one performance index for water and wastewater 
construction projects and to gauge the overall project performance. Regression analysis 
and a focus group were then utilized to determine the effect of each implemented IPD 
principle on various project KPIs. 
Results showed enhancements in the performance of the delivery of public water 
and wastewater construction projects through the implementation of certain IPD 
principles. A guideline metric was developed that can significantly help utility owners 
aiming to predict how implementation of certain IPD principles can impact various 
project KPIs.  
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                                 
INTRODUCTION 
Designed to remove biological or chemical waste products from water, water and 
wastewater treatment facilities are essential infrastructure for communities in providing 
clean water and allowing the wastewater to be used for other purposes. Water and 
wastewater treatment facilities include a network of pipes and pump stations to distribute 
water or collect wastewater from/to a municipal treatment plant which acts as a 
centralized system. Water and wastewater treatment facilities are therefore engineering-
driven, requiring a higher level of expertise during the preconstruction and construction 
phases than ordinary residential and commercial construction projects.   
The complex nature of processes in water and wastewater treatment plants, 
henceforth referred to as ‘treatment plants’ or ‘treatment facilities,’ require highly 
specialized expertise in planning, cost estimating, design, and construction of such 
facilities. This type of construction requires a highly skilled team of individuals to ensure 
a successful project undertaken by large construction firms. The design and execution of 
the infrastructure in question must consider the environmental impact of the job, the 
successful scheduling, budgeting, construction site safety, availability of building 
materials, logistics, and inconvenience to the public caused by construction delays and 
unforeseen conditions. 
The project delivery method adopted for such critical projects will greatly 
influence the factors mentioned above, which are in a way the key indicators of the 
success of a project. With the increasing number of major water and wastewater projects 
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— planned and in construction — and the availability of several project delivery methods 
for constructing those projects, guidance in rating the performance of such construction 
projects is needed to assist water utility owners and operators in meeting their 
expectations.  
For recent years, the dominant project delivery method for treatment plants has 
been the Design-Bid-Build (DBB) approach.  Some water utility owners are turning to 
the Design-Build (DB) approach to save time in the delivery process. However, the DBB 
and DB approaches have some shortcomings and pertinent issues, and need to be 
improved in order to keep up with the water utility owners’ demands and expectations. 
The past decade has also seen a large increase in the use of Integrated Project Delivery 
(IPD) as the method of choice for privately owned residential and commercial 
construction projects. This new method, which promises increased productivity and less 
waste (time and money) through aligning the interests, objectives, and practices of all 
involved parties, has been slow to be adopted or implemented in public projects, such as 
water and wastewater facilities, for several legal and procedural reasons. 
This research is developing a new model for rating the performance of water 
utilities major capital projects delivered using a project delivery method that combines 
IPD and DBB.  
Combining IPD method with the commonly used DBB project delivery method 
has the potential to improve the performance of project delivery by overcoming the 
challenges of these traditional methods in delivering treatment plant projects.  In order to 
demonstrate this, a model has to be developed first in order to measure and compare the 
performance of various water and wastewater treatment plant projects. Second, statistical 
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analysis and focus group have to be used in order to demonstrate any correlation between 
the implementation of IPD principles and any improvement in project performance as 
measured by the developed performance rating model. 
Using a combination of IPD and DBB approach will help owners of treatment 
plants get a detailed look into critical problem areas that are likely to impact performance 
rating and in promoting better performances for future projects Correlation between the 
implemented IPD principles and the KPIs of these projects can significantly help utility 
owners who are aiming to predict how implementation of certain IPD principles can 
impact various project KPIs. 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                                               
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Background 
Various types of project delivery methods are currently available to the owners 
and managers of public projects, and specifically for water and wastewater utilities in the 
United States. Each of the existing delivery methods has disadvantages and poses 
challenges that render them inappropriate for the case of large and complicated water and 
wastewater projects. A need exists to develop a new and more appropriate project 
delivery method that will overcome the challenges of the traditional delivery methods. 
Project delivery method selection depends on the preferred contractual relations, current 
laws and regulations, risk allocation, procurement procedures, and payment methods. 
Water and wastewater projects can be constructed using any project delivery method. 
Nevertheless, each construction project has unique characteristics that will render a 
particular project delivery method to be the ideal method. Integrated Project Delivery 
(IPD) methods have seen a steep rise in the recent years with the advent of building 
information modeling (BIM) (Touran et al., 2009).   
Alternative Delivery Methods in Public Projects 
Public procurement law has historically limited public entities to using only DBB 
project delivery. DBB functions as the benchmark against which all other methods are 
compared.  The current wide range of project delivery methods is a relatively recent 
development for publicly funded projects in the United States. The public procurement 
laws have limited the public entities to use the DBB project delivery method as noted in 
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the Brooks Act (Touran et al., 2009).  This strongly helped the proliferation of DBB 
delivery method in the public sector.  Moreover, numerous laws and statutes throughout 
the United States have limited the procurement of constructors in the public sector to the 
lowest responsible, responsive bidder.  
In 1996, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act explicitly authorized the use of a   
DB project delivery method for federal projects.  Subsequent to the successful 
implementation of DB in several projects, many states passed new legislation and codes 
to allow alternative project delivery methods, such as DB and Construction Manager at 
Risk (CMR). Some projects added the responsibility of operation and maintenance to DB 
projects and called the delivery method Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM) 
(Touran et al., 2009).  
For the past four decades, owners of various public and private facilities have 
been looking into different methods to improve quality, reduce cost, and reduce the 
construction schedule of their projects.  The Associated General Contractors of America 
(AGC) defines project delivery method as: “the comprehensive process of assigning the 
contractual responsibilities for designing and constructing a project. A delivery method 
identifies the primary parties responsible for the performance of the work” (AGC, 2004).  
Therefore, project delivery methods are distinguished by the way the contracts and 
relationships among the owner, the engineer, and the contractor are established.  
The management method “is the mechanics by which construction is administered 
and supervised” (AGC, 2004). This function is either retained by the owner agency or is 
outsourced by hiring an agency Construction Manager (CM) to represent the owner 
during the design and construction phases. Ideally, any management method, such as a 
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CM, may be used with any delivery method, such as DBB, DB, CMR, or IPD. 
Procurement methods are broken down into three categories: low-bid, qualifications-
based, and best value.  Descriptions of project delivery methods used in the public sector 
(DBB, CMR, DB, and IPD) are described next. 
Project Delivery Methods Used in the Public Sector  
Design-Bid-Build (DBB) 
DBB is the traditional project delivery method. In this method, a project owner 
retains a designer to furnish complete design services and then advertises and awards a 
separate construction contract that is based on the designer’s completed construction 
documents. In DBB contract documents are 100% complete prior to selecting a 
contractor and separate contracts are formed between the owner and the engineer and 
between the owner and the contractor. The owner is responsible for the details of design 
and demands the quality of the construction design documents to the construction 
contractor.  DBB has been used on projects of all sizes. 
In DBB the owner can cancel the project or modify the design, with losing the 
design cost incurred. In DBB, the owner has the opportunity to verify the maintainability 
and the quality of the design before awarding the project. DBB gives the owner the most 
control over the project.  However, as projects grow in size and complexity, oversight of 
DBB can become burdensome since the owner’s responsibilities in DBB are spread 
throughout the project lifecycle of design and construction. DBB uses a sequential 
process that makes significant schedule compression difficult due to the need to complete 
project designs prior to the award of the construction contract (Gordon, 1994).   
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This delivery method can create an adversarial relationship among the parties to 
the contract—mainly between the owner and the construction contractor (Mahdi and 
Alreshaid, 2005). Furthermore, the engineer and the contractor may assume adversarial 
roles as one is in charge of approving the other’s work.  This method typically has the 
highest occurrence of claims and disputes typically arising over authority, responsibility, 
errors and omissions, and quality.  Potential change orders and errors in design may cause 
considerable cost overruns. There is no incentive for the builder to minimize the cost of 
change orders in this delivery method (Touran et al., 2009).   
Construction Manager at Risk (CMR) 
In CMR projects a contract is signed between the owner and the CM who will 
handle the details of the entire project.   In this delivery method, the CMR is selected 
based on procurement method qualifications and final project cost and duration will be 
the responsibility of the CM. Typically, CMR contracts contain a provision in which the 
CMR stipulates a Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) above which the owner is not 
liable for payment. In public projects, the owner retains the traditional responsibility by 
having a separate design contract and furnishing the CMR with a full set of plans and 
specifications upon which all construction subcontracts are based.  The CMR will usually 
be paid for providing preconstruction services such as cost engineering, constructability 
review, and development of subcontractor bid packages, budgeting, cost estimating, and 
scheduling. 
In CMR, the CM essentially becomes the General Contractor (GC) at the time the 
GMP is established.  Most public CMR laws require competitively bidding out the 
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construction trade subcontract work packages. This delivery method is typically awarded 
with a GMP system and it allows the contractor to be involved in the design phase for 
providing current cost information.  This helps the engineer with adhering to the budget 
and helps the owner manage the project costs.   Normally in CMR contracts, there is less 
possibility for claims and disputes (Touran et al., 2009). 
The American Institute of Architects (AIA) noted that, “transparency is enhanced, 
because all costs and fees are in the open, which diminishes adversarial relationships 
between components working on the project” (AIA, 2005). The main advantages of CMR 
method are the speed of execution and locking the project cost at the early stages of the 
project lifecycle.  One of the challenges is to gauge the validity of the GMP in 
comparison with the traditional delivery methods. 
One of the disadvantages of CMR is the difficulty to agree on a GMP between the 
owner and the CMR which may affect the project schedule and increase the project costs. 
Usually, the owner the GMP can be set and agreed on at about 60% design completion 
(AGC, 2004).  Failure Also, public projects require competitive bidding; however, the 
issue with this requirement is that the CM may not be able to set a GMP until the bids 
from all the subcontractors have been submitted. This will lead the owner to cancel the 
CMR contract, pay the CMR for its preconstruction services, and put the construction 
project out for bids with the completed design. The cost associated with design errors and 
omissions is a valid risk because the owner executes separate contracts with the engineer 
and CMR. Additionally, the increase in the number of parties directly involved in the 
project and some overlaps among their duties may make the risk allocation more difficult 
(Touran et al., 2009). 
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Design Build (DB) 
DB is a project delivery method in which the owner procures design and 
construction services in the same contract from a single, legal entity referred to as the 
design-builder. A variety of approaches exist for selecting the design-builder. In public 
projects, DB generally follows Request-for-Qualifications (RFQ) or Request-for-Proposal 
(RFP) procedures to be submitted for the owner to evaluate and to award the contract. As 
in CMR, the builder has early constructability input into the design process. As the owner 
no longer owns the details of design, the owner’s relationship with the design-builder 
must be based on a strong degree of mutual professional trust (Beard et al., 2001). 
The DB method is normally chosen for large and complex projects, and it 
branches out to several methods such as Design-Build-Operate-Transfer, Design-Build-
Operate-Own, and Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM).   In these methods the 
contractor is responsible for operating the new facility after construction is complete 
based on contractual agreements for a determined duration (Kessler et al., 2007).   
According to Konchar and Sanvido (1998), DB results in faster project delivery because 
the engineer and the contractor are one entity. DB performs better than CMR in 
operations and costs and the errors and omissions cost is shifted from the owner to the 
DB contractor. According to Riley et al. (2005), having a single entity of contractor and 
engineer reduces disputes with the owner and limits responsibility for changes in cost or 
time.  From the owner’s perspective, the DB approach reduces the size and frequency of 
change orders (Riley et al., 2005). 
DB delivery method is less prone to claims and disputes, assuming a well-
structured contract.  As the design criteria is handed to the design-builder in DB while the 
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detailed design has not been completed yet, concerns about the maintainability and 
quality of the end product have been raised due to loss of owner’s control over the 
design. Additionally, because the contract is awarded before the design is complete, 
subcontractors are assuming risk for pricing work without completed construction 
documents. Also, the design-builder is assuming risk for committing to a design and a 
firm price early in the process (Touran et al., 2009).  
Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) 
Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) is a “project delivery approach that integrates 
people, systems, business structures and practices into a process that collaboratively 
harnesses the talents and insights of all participants to optimize project results, increase 
value to the owner, reduce waste, and maximize efficiency through all phases of design, 
fabrication, and construction.  IPD principles can be applied to a variety of contractual 
arrangements and IPD teams can include members well beyond the basic triad of owner, 
architect, and contractor. In all cases, integrated projects are uniquely distinguished by 
highly effective collaboration among the owner, the prime designer, and the prime 
constructor, commencing at early design and continuing through to project handover” 
(AIA, 2007).  In Australia, the construction industry has been working with IPD for about 
15 years on major infrastructure projects and they have realized the benefits of the 
process (Carbasho, 2008). 
Kim and Dossick (2011) listed five elements that contribute to the integration of 
the project delivery:  Contract Type, Integrated Form of Agreement (IFOA), Culture, 
Organization, Lean Construction and Building Information Modeling (BIM).  
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Furthermore, Kent and Becerik-Gerber (2010) used the following common principles to 
define IPD: Multi-party agreement, shared risk and reward, and early involvement of all 
parties. Kent and Becerik-Gerber (2010) also listed the most important factors for IPD 
success as: well defined contractual relationships, early definition of project goals and 
early project participants’ team formation.   
Singleton and Hamzeh (2011) defined attributes that differentiate IPD from 
traditional contracts. These attributes can be summarized as: Integrated Teams, Integrated 
Governance, High Performing Teams, Lean Construction Techniques, Lean Principles, 
Collective Risk Sharing, Painsharing and Gainsharing, Profit Pooling, Contingency 
Sharing, Goals and Incentives and Award Fees/Performance Evaluations (Singleton and 
Hamzeh, 2011). 
National Association of State Facilities Administrators (NASFA) used the 
following common principles to define IPD: Contractual Principles, Key Participants 
Bound Together as Equals, Shared Financial Risk and Reward Based on Project 
Outcome, Liability Waivers between Key Participants, Transparent Financials between 
Key Participants (Open Books), Early Involvement of Key Participants, Intensified 
Design, Jointly Developed Project Target Criteria and Collaborative Decision Making.  
NASFA also noted the IPD main behavioral principles as: Mutual Respect and Trust, 
Willingness to Collaborate, Open Communication within the Project Team, and Ability 
to Address Issues. NASFA presented different project participants’ team structures that 
can be arranged to best suit IPD projects: 
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SMT: The Senior Management Team compromises one person—typically a project 
executive, representing each of the three primary parties: owner, designer, and 
contractor. 
PMT: The Project Management Team compromises one person representing each of the 
three primary parties, and is responsible for project schedule, budget, and day-to-
day decision making. 
PIT: The Project Implementation Team is a larger group that compromises members from 
the three teams, in addition to design consultants and subcontractors (NASFA et al., 
2010).   The selection process of the design team and construction team partners in 
IPD includes two criteria: Qualification Based Selection (QBS), and Best Value-Fee 
Proposal (Touran et al., 2009).    
IPD Issues  
According to Hatem (2008), one of the more important issues in IPD is the extent 
of project design responsibility with the design professional and its engineering 
consultants. The design responsibility issue and the associated contractually defined risk 
sharing for the economic consequences of defective design, continue to be discussed and 
debated in agreements for IPD projects. Hatem (2008) also questioned whether multiple 
parties can share design responsibilities or that one entity should be responsible for the 
entirety of the project design. Another related issue is whether the professional liability 
insurance industry should develop "wrap-up" coverage for design risk exposures for all 
design related project participants in IPD, or that the conventional professional liability 
insurance coverage is adequate.  
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Hatem (2008) noted three principle areas of concern surrounding design responsibility in 
IPD: 
- Defining public law requirements, 
- Developing appropriate contractual risk allocation terms, and 
- Developing adequate insurance coverage for design responsibility exposures by 
working with the professional liability insurance industry. 
Ilozor and Kelly (2012) have covered significant issues in IPD including 
guidelines for implementation, contracting forms and structure, cultural and interpersonal 
issues, and process changes resulting from implementation.  Another issue with IPD is 
that liability management standards, and the resulting practices currently used, discourage 
integration of project information for numerous reasons, including the reluctance to share 
unresolved or incomplete information prior to formal release (The Construction Users 
Roundtable, CURT, 2004). 
Based on a survey by Kent and Becerik-Gerber (2010) that was designed to target 
a wide range of professionals in the construction industry, the biggest concern for 
participants in IPD projects was risk allocation and insurance, 43% of experienced 
respondents indicated that there is not enough evidence that these concerns have been 
addressed.  Survey groups also noted that cultural barriers and technology limitations are 
the most common obstacles for IPD (Kent and Becerik-Gerber, 2010).  
  In IPD, the designers and the contractors are in very different positions with 
different risks that need to be tackled.  A poorly managed contract can easily turn an IPD 
project into a disaster. In IPD projects, the elements of trust must be taken to a higher 
level for the delivery to be a success (NASFA et al., 2010).  
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IPD Benefits 
In order to achieve the desired outcomes, owners must collaborate through 
information sharing early in the project process. These desired outcomes range from 
speedy completion and efficiency to effectiveness and cost-bound buildings. Such 
collaboration shifts the bulk of analysis, design, and decision making to be done earlier in 
the design process, giving the collaborators the maximum opportunity for good decisions 
(CURT, 2004). 
Based on survey results administered by experienced respondents on a specific 
IPD project, 70.3% of respondents noted that IPD projects had fewer change orders, 
70.3% noted that IPD projects had shorter schedule, and 69.4% noted that IPD projects 
had fewer RFIs (Kent and Becerik-Gerber, 2010). 
Baiden and Price (2011) stated that project participants’ team integration is a very 
important tool in improved project delivery. It requires a spirit of cooperation to 
overcome the traditional adversarial attitudes and barriers.  IPD and Lean Construction 
offer significant improvements in all three areas of construction: project organization 
(integrated, high performance team), operating systems, and commercial terms (minimize 
waste, add value, improve reliability and foster collaboration) (Thomsen et al., 2009). 
Collaboration through IPD made redundant detailing unnecessary, and in many 
cases, eliminated all shop drawings. IPD also allowed the design team to spend more time 
on the construction site and less time processing RFIs and submittals. The projects 
studied by AIA all met or exceeded the owner’s expectations with regards to cost, time, 
design quality, and sustainability. Interviews with the participants showed enthusiasm 
about IPD and willingness to use it again. IPD requires a significant amount of effort in 
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the planning stages, which in turn makes execution easier. By comparison, DBB focuses 
more on design and less on planning, primarily because proponents of this method have 
no idea who is actually going to deliver and operate what they are designing (AIA, 2010). 
Misguided design decisions, unreliable cost estimates, value engineering rework, 
poorly coordinated drawings, withheld documentation, an inefficient RFI/shop drawing 
process, and costly claims and disputes are some of the factors that plague traditional 
project delivery practices. IPD was a response to affecting change in the current system 
(Lancaster and Tobi, 2010). 
Success and Reliability of IPD  
Based on the previously mentioned definitions and characteristics, it is clear that 
every delivery method has advantages and limitations.  However, IPD has shown to be 
the most promising delivery method and hence a detailed research will be needed to 
reveal more of its characteristics.   The intent is to combine IPD principles with the 
commonly used DBB delivery method to improve the performance of water and 
wastewater projects.   
IPD and Collaboration Levels 
 More than any other stakeholder or project participant, owners pose the most 
influence on the degree of collaboration they receive on their projects.  This influence 
comes early in projects in the form of their procurement and contracting process (NASFA 
et al., 2010). 
Collaboration, according to NASFA, is divided into three levels:   
- Collaboration Level One is typical and is not required contractually.  
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- Collaboration Level Two is more enhanced and requires some contractual 
collaboration.  
- Collaboration Level Three requires collaboration from multi-party contract.  
NASFA et al. (2010) also divided IPD into two areas based on levels of collaboration.   
1- IPD as a Philosophy. This does not require multi-party contracts; Collaboration 
Levels One or Two.  This is also known as IPD “Lite” or “IPD-ish”, Non-Multi-
party IPD or Hybrid IPD.  
IPD as a Philosophy is suitable for owners who are not able to use a multi-party 
contract, but who try to improve the collaboration level.  In this case, owners can 
apply integrated practices to more traditional delivery approaches such as CMR, 
DB or DBB, where the owner is not a party to a multi-party contract.  
2- IPD as a Delivery Method. This requires multi-party contracts; Collaboration 
Level Three.  This is also known as “Pure” IPD; Multi-party IPD; Lean Project 
Delivery; Relational Contracting or Alliancing. IPD as a Delivery Method (“Pure” 
IPD or Multi-Party IPD) is when the owner chooses to sign a multi-party contract 
with the engineer, contractor and/or other key members of the project team.  
NASFA et al. (2010) noted that IPD as a philosophy with Level Two Collaboration has 
proven capable of being more successful. Project participants can work more 
collaboratively to achieve less cost, shorter duration, and more efficient change 
management. Level 2 projects have demonstrated the ability to encourage project 
participants to focus on optimizing the whole, rather than optimizing their own best 
interests. This leads to higher quality, satisfied clients, and overall better value.  
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NASFA et al. (2010) noted that Level 3 IPD has a relational multi-party contract, 
in which one agreement is signed by the Owner, Engineer and Contractor. Decisions are 
made by collaboration with the stakeholders and are geared to the best interest of the 
project and not necessarily in favor of any one party. The principles of implementing IPD 
include early involvement of all key participants, joint project management, zero 
litigation, and joint risk sharing. 
The Division of Capital Common Asset Management (DCAM) of the common 
wealth of Massachusetts applied IPD “Lite” in its CMR process.  DCAM uses a 
collaborative approach, uses BIM, develops work plans and decision-making structure 
early in the project, and holds face-to-face meetings. NASFA et al. (2010) suggested 
other IPD principles that can be applied by DCAM under current laws such as: basing the 
selection of the engineer on its experience with IPD and willingness to work 
collaboratively, providing bonuses for certain achievements and conditions, identifying 
desired IPD-type services to be provided by engineers and CMs, forming contracts to 
reimburse the project participants for the extra work, and co-locating project team. 
Single Purpose Entity (SPE) has “Level 4” collaboration where all the key 
project participants including the owner, designer, contractor and CM, are under a legal 
entity such as a limited liability company for the purpose of a specific project (NASFA et 
al., 2010). 
IPD and Public Projects 
In public projects the owner is a public entity such as the state, federal 
government, county, municipality, or even the army. Public projects are different from 
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private projects in the way they are managed, the way they are procured, and the way 
they are funded; they therefore need to be addressed separately. 
Aldrich (2011) mentioned the challenge to IPD in public projects where local 
government procurement laws have competitive bidding requirements. The winning 
contractors and subcontractors may or may not have worked together before and they 
certainly would not be coming in on the project toward the beginning because of the 
DBB nature of delivery (Aldrich, 2011). 
Public agencies, whose procurement policies are often constrained, can get some 
of the benefits of IPD.  New forms of public agency contracts should be explored, 
including modified DB contracts, and contracts with single purpose entities (AIA, 2010).   
NASFA et al. (2010) noted that many public owners do not have the authority to 
enter into multi-party agreements, to bring subcontractors into the design process, and to 
use insurance policies that do not meet current statutory requirements.  However, to take 
advantage of IPD-type delivery, contract provisions and project procedures can be 
modified to obtain additional benefits by applying principles and practices with IPD as a 
philosophy. These principles and practices include: 
- Using BIM, 
- Bringing the CM into the project early during design phase,  
- Co-locating team staff, 
- Establishing a collaborative decision-making process and structure, and 
- Resolving issues in a timely manner and at an appropriate level. 
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According to NASFA et al. (2010), owners who do not have the authority to 
implement true IPD projects can still enhance collaboration and benefit from many 
features of these collaborative models such as:  
- Including key elements of Level 2 collaboration in DB contracts (co-location 
of team members, involvement in performance incentives, participation in 
risk sharing, and construction team incentivized for productivity); and  
- Selecting project team members to have experience with IPD and 
collaborative projects.   
According to NASFA et al. (2010), public owners are often unable to share in the 
risk or the reward except if it was done under traditional collaborations. Owners may 
select one project and get special permission to apply some levels of IPD on that 
particular project. It is recommended to try IPD expeditiously rather than trying to change 
applicable rules, regulations, or legislation. NASFA et al. (2010) noted that both public 
and private owners are taking a more proactive approach in establishing integrated teams 
and ensuring that they receive the desired level of integration. 
Darrington (2011) noted that DB has a longer track record than IPD and its use on 
public projects is growing at a significant rate; therefore, DB contracts could be a 
gateway to embracing IPD.  Also, Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011) studied case 
studies in the public sector and concluded that contracts in the public sector utilized 
design-build with IPD principles.  The transportation project sector is observing an 
increased usage of integrated project delivery methods. The DB approach has become 
one of the most popular alternatives (Gibson et al., 2008). 
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Currently, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) does not permit the 
government to participate in IPD-related financial incentive techniques such as risk 
sharing, profit pooling, or contingency pooling.  The FAR also does not allow for 
relational contracts or multiparty agreements and required competitive bidding for 
construction contracts with limited exceptions (Singleton and Hamzeh, 2011). 
According to Aldrich (2011), IPD has been used in Europe for decades whereas 
most American designers have never played a part in IPD. Another challenge to IPD is 
the local government procurement laws in many states where the emphasis is on 
competitive bidding requirements. Aldrich discussed a method of suggesting a 
construction management firm to act as an owner’s advocate to provide the 
constructability input during the design phase.  This is in lieu of the contractor’s 
participation in the design phase by each of the trades.  The CMAR (construction 
manager at-risk) commits to deliver the project within a GMP and can then act as an 
advisor to the owner through the development and design phases of the project. However, 
without a contract in place that takes into account the IPD principles, an imbalance of 
power between the CM and the architect can be created (Aldrich, 2011). 
Water and Wastewater Related Projects 
The consulting firm AECOM used Building Information Modeling (BIM) to 
design a new water and wastewater treatment facility for the town of Davie Florida. 
AECOM utilized Autodesk BIM technology with the DB project to collaborate 
effectively among multiple architectural, engineering, and construction teams. BIM was 
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helpful in producing a more comprehensive design, identifying design conflicts, and 
communicating what the project was going to resemble (Stitt, 2011). 
According to Hoover (2013), waterworks projects are complex and have long-
term durations, which lead them to collaborative delivery methods. The Water Design-
Build Council, www.waterdesignbuild.org, Washington, D.C., states that 70-80% of all 
water and wastewater projects are still traditional DBB-type contracts.  Several successful 
water infrastructure projects have incorporated the concepts of collaboration and 
accountability through new technologies.  Signs of change are already visible today and 
industry stakeholders are showing a tendency toward creative, non-traditional solutions 
(Hoover, 2013). 
In an attempt to research delivery methods related to water and wastewater 
projects, the Water Design-Build Council (WDBC) was founded in 2006 to promote DB 
and CMAR best practices to facilitate relationships between owners and service 
providers.  WDBC tries to use the DB and CMAR methods of project delivery to improve 
the nation’s municipal water and wastewater systems development (WDBC, 2013).   
DB and IPD 
The difference between IPD and DB is that IPD uses relational contract, and 
subcontractors and suppliers are contractually involved as project participants in the 
design phase (Kim and Dossick, 2011). 
Darrington (2011) mentioned that not all owners are legally allowed or 
institutionally prepared to enter a three-party relational contract. Another option would be 
a DB contract format. A DB contract can be structured as a relational contract in order to 
22 
 
more fully implement IPD.  It can be structured as a transactional contract using a 
traditional DB form in which the supply chain chooses to implement Lean IPD principles 
without an owner mandate. Darrington (2011) discussed two major alternatives in using 
DB contracts to implement IPD: (1) a relational DB contract that allows for full 
implementation of IPD. It would look quite similar to a three-party relational contract. 
The major difference would be that contractual rights and lines of communication flow to 
and from the owner and the DB entity.  However, other rights and obligations could still 
flow down to project team members through the design-builder. Many major features of 
the Integrated Form of Agreement (IFOA) could still be utilized in this two-party context. 
(2) A transactional DB contract (traditional contract) where IPD is implemented within 
the supply chain and not through the owner’s mandate. Darrington (2011) believes that it 
is possible for a project team to largely implement IPD using a transactional DB contract 
and using many of the key elements of IPD such as early and intensive involvement of 
major trades in design, increased collaboration, implementing Lean methods, and 
optimizing the whole project.    
Where project participants are implementing IPD under a traditional DB 
agreement, they may consider addressing the above points using contractual language in 
their joint venture agreement and/or agreements between the design-builder and the 
major design and trade partners. Such agreements could also include liability limits or 
waivers, or set aside an incentive fund (Darrington, 2011). 
In a case study by Singleton and Hamzeh (2011) for Orlando Utilities 
Commission, the North Chiller Plant project studied was not a pure IPD project.  The IPD 
team signed a relational contract wand bid the project as a design bid entity. The owner 
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was not part of the relational contract agreement. The study shows that the project 
demonstrated that IPD can be highly beneficial even if the owner is not part of the 
relational contract agreement. Thomsen et. al. (2009) noted that an owner could choose to 
use a traditional approach, contracting with designers and builders independently but still 
use some of the aspects of IPD.   
How Risks and Rewards are Distributed in IPD 
IPD, just as any other delivery method, has both risks and rewards. Carbasho 
(2008) stated that in relational contracts, potential savings would be shared among the 
IPD team. An incentive pool could be established strictly with money saved on 
contingency and/or labor costs. The IPD team may set up the incentive pool at the 
beginning and it will be placed at risk. The incentive pool is made up of the profits of the 
IPD contingency or a percentage of the profits for the IPD team (designers, contractors, 
and the major subcontractors). The pool is the maximum amount for which the parties are 
at risk. If the IPD team can make cost savings, the IPD team can increase its profits and 
the amount in the pool would get bigger. If any team member loses money or if any team 
member depletes the pool, the entire IPD team shares the losses. Teams do not go down 
as independent companies, and that is what establishes the integration (Carbasho, 2008).  
In an IPD case study for Autodesk Inc. AEC Solutions Division Headquarters in 
Waltham, Massachusetts, it was noted that, in conceptual design, everyone should work 
at cost until all parties achieve a deep understanding of the project and a level of comfort 
around the program and budget. Contingency can create problems and could be 
eliminated. Because of the financial incentives in IPD, the IPD team would want to treat 
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every change as a change of scope instead of an item to be subtracted from the 
contingency.  This would create some sense of discomfort and unwelcome changes in 
behavior.  
In an IPD case study for Sutter Health Fairfield Medical Office Building Fairfield, 
California, it was noted that financial incentives should be flowing down to the 
subcontractors’ level and would be critical to separate profit from fee. That way, as the 
team would continue to decrease the cost, and the actual return as a percent of revenue 
would increase.  
In an IPD case study for Cardinal Glennon Children’s Hospital Expansion in St. 
Louis, Missouri, it was noted that financial incentives were the key to the success of the 
IPD team. Financial incentives whether they are used to reward or punish are 
controversial.  While some believe that financial incentives are essential to insure the 
alignment of goals for the benefit of the project, others consider these incentives to be in 
conflict of interest when they are based project cost and duration.  From the lessons 
learned in this IPD case study, it was noted that owners are not ready to commit to taking 
responsibility equally with designer and contractor and taking some risk themselves. The 
owner has to be involved, the study concludes, for the IPD to be successful. The old-
fashioned relationships lean more towards the idea of, “How can I shift that risk to the 
other two parties?” However, when a team is willing to take responsibility and perform as 
needed, the end result is that the risk goes down for everybody (AIA, 2010). 
In a survey conducted by Kent and Becerik-Gerber (2010) on IPD projects, 45.8% 
of experienced respondents noted that they shared risk and reward based on value, which 
incentivizes the project team by offering a bonus linked to adding value to the project.  
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Of the respondents, 25.2% selected “incentive pool,” which reserves a portion of the 
project team’s fee into a pool, and 17.8% selected “performance bonus,” which provides 
an award based on quality. 
Insurance 
With respect to insurance, umbrella project policies are most appropriate for IPD 
projects, but they are pricey policies. Because IPD is expected to have fewer number of 
claims among project participants, the insurance industry needs to provide affordable 
project policies for IPD projects which have inherently lower risk profile. In the IPD case 
study for Sutter Health Fairfield Medical Office Building, Fairfield, California, the 
owner, designer, and contractor agreed to indemnify each other and to carried standard 
general and professional insurance, at limits established in the IFOA. (AIA, 2010). 
Disputes 
Many IPD projects use dispute resolution processes. If project stakeholders can’t 
resolve the dispute, it may go to a group of senior executives from each of the disputants.  
Then disputes may escalate to a third-party neutral for investigation and 
recommendations, mediation or both. Then arbitration or litigation would be the forum of 
last resort to resolve the problems. Very few IPD projects make it to litigation between 
the parties.  Many IPD projects provide constraints on the players’ abilities to sue one 
another, which make the players focus more directly on meeting the owner’s objectives 
rather than on protecting their balance sheets. (Thomsen et. al., 2009) 
In IPD case study for Sutter Health Fairfield Medical Office Building, Fairfield, 
California, there was not a “not to sue” agreement. Alternative dispute resolution was 
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agreed to be used among the parties: first it starts with the Core Team, then relying on an 
expert third party for resolution, and last to mediation if needed. In IPD case study for 
Cardinal Glennon Children’s Hospital Expansion in St. Louis, Missouri, there was not a 
“not to sue” phrase in the IFOA. Every team provided standard general and professional 
liability insurance (AIA, 2010).  IPD requires an established mechanism and setting 
procedures for dealing effectively with problem solving and dispute resolution (Ghassemi 
and Becerik-Gerber, 2011). 
Building Information Modeling (BIM) and Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) 
The use of BIM is not necessarily required to adopt IPD.  IPD indicates that full 
collaboration and participation of contractors, estimators, designers, and the owner in an 
ongoing information sharing process, can save time and increase the value of the project 
more than that possible under the traditional process. Also, sharing a BIM model 
promotes a continuous participation in the process by all parties (Lancaster and Tobi, 
2010). 
NASFA et al. noted that BIM facilitates the process by recording and sharing 
project information (NASFA et al., 2010). BIM is “a tool, not a project delivery method, 
but IPD process methods work hand-in-hand with BIM and leverage the tool’s 
capabilities,” as defined by AIA. The AIA’s commentary does not regard IPD as a 
vehicle of BIM implementation (AIA, 2007). A BIM model improves the design, 
improves coordination, reveals construction problems, and helps the IPD team optimize 
both product and process (Thomsen et al., 2009). 
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Adopting New Approach 
Adopting a new approach to procure services for delivery of construction projects 
for any organization requires significant organizational changes, including significant 
modifications to both their work processes and existing organizational structures. 
Research at the Center for Construction Industry Studies is investigating the adoption of 
integrated project delivery methods within the transportation project sector to better 
understand the dynamics of this change (Gibson et al., 2008). 
In order to implement IPD, owners need to get their organization ready once they decide 
that IPD is the desired direction for a change. Selling the concept of IPD to facility 
managers, legal staff, and purchasing departments may be a huge challenge (NASFA et 
al., 2010). 
Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011) indicated through case studies that some 
owners established a continuous IPD learning plan for training purposes by using internal 
and external resources. Training was conducted to ensure that all team members were 
comfortable with the methodology and with their commitment to the project. The authors 
stated that project participants needed to build confidence in each other in order to 
overcome the cultural barriers. The case studies by the authors demonstrated that trust is 
either preexisting or forced. Achieving successful transitioning to IPD is crucial. A 
successful transition requires companies to have the procurement ability and to be 
inherently structured to implement IPD.   
The current traditional project organization is structured such that operational 
silos exist between design, procurement, construction, and ownership, creating a barrier 
to collaboration.  This is the case because each participant works for its own interest, 
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rather than that of the overall project, and project information remains in individual silos 
and does not effectively cross boundaries (CURT, 2004). 
Project Performance Rating (PPR) 
  Success factors of a construction project are a number of conditions and parameters 
that if fully satisfied can lead to the successful completion of the project. Chan et al. 
(2001) identified a set of critical success factors in design and build construction projects 
and examined the relative importance of each of these factors on project outcome. 
Examined factors included: client capability for managing the project, understanding of 
end users’ needs, prequalification of tenderers, satisfaction of financial return from the 
projects, acceptance of risk and legal liability, and adequacy of channel of 
communication. Such factors were overly narrow in scope and not as encompassing as 
IPD. Odeh and Battaineh (2002) examined the factors necessary for a project to be 
completed on time and concluded that labor productivity, adequate contractor experience, 
and absence of owner interference were among the most important factors. Other studies 
focused on predicting the performance of DB and DBB projects using multivariate 
regression analysis. Gross floor area and the contractor’s design capability are two factors 
used to predict the delivery speed of DBB projects. (Ling et al. 2004).  
Previous research attempted to develop models and frameworks to quantify project 
success at three different levels: (1) construction industry, (2) company, and (3) project 
(Elyamany et al., 2007). Yang et al. (2010) summarized the major frameworks for 
performance measurement in the construction industry at the organizational and project 
level. They included the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) 
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excellence model, Balanced Scorecard (BSC) model, and Key Performance Indicator 
(KPI) model. According to Yang et al. (2010), further studies are needed for each 
framework presented in their study to establish a more comprehensive and applicable 
performance measurement method. Several studies proposed methodologies to assess the 
performance of construction companies (Elyamany et al., 2007 and Yu et al., 2007). 
Kangari et al. (1992) developed a model using multiple linear regression analysis to 
analyze the financial performance of construction companies.  The model determines a 
performance grade, G, which is defined as the percentage of construction companies that 
have performance measures lower than that of the company under consideration. 
On the project level, various studies developed lists of criteria that can be used to 
evaluate the performance of construction projects in general or based on delivery 
methods. For example, Cha and Kim (2011) developed a system for measuring the 
performance indicators for building construction projects and suggested a new 
quantification method on three levels: performance category, performance indicator, and 
performance score. A survey, in which construction experts in project assessments 
participated, was used to weigh the performance categories and examine the 
measurability and representativeness of the indicators. The performance score value was 
based on the probability of a normalized performance level. The amount of data collected 
through surveys was, however, not sufficient to generalize the findings. The study 
therefore could only suggest a performance score calculation process to quantify the 
project performance. Alarcon and Ashley (1996) presented a methodology for the 
evaluation of project performance based on construction experts’ knowledge and 
experience, decision analysis, and cross-impact analysis. The study presented a 
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conceptual general performance structure that combines concepts to perform probabilistic 
inference that measures cost, schedule, value, and effectiveness. The many assumptions 
used in the study limit the validity of assessments made for the model.  
Lam et al. (2007) developed a project success index for benchmarking the 
performance of DB projects based on 92 survey responses of the Hong Kong construction 
industry.  The performance measures are in terms of time, cost, quality, and functionality. 
Liu et al. (2015) developed a conceptual model that can be used to monitor and improve 
the performance of public-private partnerships while the project is still under 
construction. The model’s five measurement facets are: (1) Stakeholder satisfaction, (2) 
Strategies, (3) Processes, (4) Capabilities, and (5) Stakeholder Contribution. However, no 
validation of the model was conducted in the study for the developed framework.  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) utilizes an award fee 
contracting guide for their award fee contracts, which contains clearly defined 
performance requirements.   The factors evaluated by NASA are: Technical Performance, 
Project Management, and Cost Control (O’Toole, 2001). Mohamed (2003) examined the 
relationships between risk and success factors and the performance of international 
construction joint ventures.  
Kim et al., (2009) presented a model of 64 variables that predicted the performance of 
an overseas project by utilizing structural equation modeling (SEM), which combines 
multiple regression analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and path analysis. The 
performance categories were: (1) condition of host country and project owner, (2) 
bidding process, (3) project characteristics and contractual conditions, (4) characteristics 
of organization and participants, and (5) contractor’s ability. Other studies developed a 
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system for measuring the performance in construction projects at the process level 
(Haponava and Al-Jibouri, 2012). The proposed system was, however, not designed to 
produce accurate performance measurements that would provide management with 
guidelines on how to monitor performance by focusing on critical issues.  
Generally, it is not sufficient to deem that a given project is successful assuming it is 
completed on time and within budget. Hanna et al. (2014) used the rating method of the 
quarterback position on American football teams, which combines key sports metrics to 
compare quarterbacks’ performances, as an approach to assess the performance of 
construction projects. In comparing IPD and non-IPD projects, El Asmar and Hanna 
(2016) used a project quarterback rating model to combine seven performance areas, into 
one comparable score for each project. These seven areas are: (1) customer relations, (2) 
safety, (3) schedule, (4) cost, (5) quality, (6) profit, and (7) communication. A survey was 
used to collect project performance data from industry participants, with various delivery 
systems and mostly related to private sector projects. More recently, Francom et al. 
(2016) used pipeline construction projects to develop a baseline of performance metrics 
and compared the cost and schedule performance metrics of construction manager at risk 
to the DBB delivery method.   
Table 2-1 presents a comparison of existing models showing their main advantages and 
main criticisms.  
Table 2-1: Comparison of Existing Performance Models 
Model Reference Main Advantages Main Criticisms 
Performance 
Measurement of 
Public Private 
Partnerships 
Liu, J. et al. 
(2015) 
• Provides specific 
performance rating 
for public private 
partnerships 
• Conceptual framework 
• Framework was not 
tested or validated 
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• Monitors dynamic 
lifecycle for 
different phases of 
project 
 
• Framework was not 
implemented on case 
studies; authors suggest 
using case studies for 
future research 
• Lack of practicability of 
the framework 
• Lack of mathematical 
formulation to measure 
the performance  
• No projects dataset was 
used in the framework  
• Difficult and time 
consuming to 
implement in large 
projects 
Quantitative 
Approach for 
Project 
Performance 
Measurement 
Cha, H.S. and 
Kim, C.K. 
(2011)   
• Covers several 
performance areas 
• Used a survey 
with experts to 
validate the model 
structure  
• Provides a tool to 
benchmark project 
performance  
 
• According to the 
authors, the data used is 
cross-sectional and data 
collection was not 
extensive 
• No significance to the 
model result score.  The 
score is only useful to 
be compared among 
different projects  
• Strong relationship 
exists between the 
model categories, which 
may significantly 
influence the outcome 
• The model is not very 
useful in the industry as 
it does not cover a 
specific target project, 
such as commercial, 
residential, industrial, 
etc. 
• A survey with experts 
was used to weigh the 
performance categories 
and examine the 
measurability and 
representativeness of 
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the indicators leaving 
no flexibility for the 
end users.  
• Some KPI measurement 
cannot be calculated 
practically. 
• The model was not 
tested or validated. 
Modeling 
Project 
Performance for 
Decision 
Making 
Alarcon, L. 
and Ashley, D. 
(1996) 
• Measures cost, 
schedule, value, 
and effectiveness 
• Shows relationship 
between the 
different indicators 
• Conceptual general 
performance model 
• Model is based on 
assumptions used by 
experts 
• Limit of validity of 
model due to expert 
assumptions  
• Complicated and 
difficult in terms of 
implementation and 
assessing indicators 
• Vague in the area of 
scoring mechanism and 
strategies 
 
Award Fee 
Contracting 
Guide 
 
O’Toole, T. 
(2001) 
• Provides specific 
performance rating 
for NASA projects 
• Measures cost, 
schedule, quality, 
and project 
management 
factors 
• Calculates a single 
score to compare 
with previous 
projects 
 
 
• Only the framework of 
the model was 
presented 
• Does not include 
detailed data analysis 
showing normalization 
or other statistical 
analysis  
• Validation was not 
discussed in the paper 
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Summary of 
major 
frameworks for 
performance 
measurement  
Yang et al. 
(2010) 
• They included 
European 
Foundation for 
Quality 
Management 
(EFQM) and Key 
Performance 
Indicator (KPIs) 
model.  
• Performance at the 
organizational and 
project level 
• Further studies are 
needed for each 
framework presented in 
their study to establish a 
more comprehensive 
and applicable 
performance 
Measuring the 
performance in 
construction 
projects at the 
process level 
Haponava and 
Al-Jibouri, 
2012 
• Provides 
management with 
guidelines on how 
to monitor 
performance by 
focusing on 
critical issues 
• A proposed system that 
needs to be further 
developed. 
• Not designed to 
produce accurate 
performance 
measurements 
 
Model Validation 
A review of model validation literature shows that there are no established 
definitions of model validity and validation or basic established validity tools. The 
validation process of a model ultimately entails the validity of its purpose too (Barlas, 
1996). 
According to Barlas (1996), models can be classified in two types: 
1- Correlational (purely data driven).  If the model’s results match the expected 
output within a predefined range of accuracy, then the model is considered to be 
valid. This type of output validation is referred to as a classical statistical testing 
problem.  
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2- Causal Descriptive (theory driven). These models are focused on how real 
systems actually operate in some aspects. In this case, what is critical is the 
validity of the internal structure of the model and not the output behavior.  
Validation of causal descriptive models is much more complicated than that of 
correlational models because formal tests are not established, such as statistical 
hypothesis tests, to be used in comparing the structure of a proposed model to the “real” 
structure. There are two types of validations: structure validation and behavior validation.  
The typical order of validation is to first test the validity of the structure, and then to test 
the behavior accuracy. 
Structure validation assesses the validity of the model structure, by comparing the 
model structure or the model equations with generalized knowledge about the real 
system.  The information needed for structure validation is highly qualitative in nature. 
Most methods that are suggested for structure validation are informal such as specialist 
reviews, assessments, walkthroughs, data flow analyses, reliability checking, etc.  
The second general category of validation is behavior tests, which assess the 
validity by applying certain behavior tests on model-generated behavior patterns. These 
tests involve simulation and can help the modeler uncover potential structural defects. 
Modified-behavior prediction can only be accomplished if data about the behavior of a 
modified version of the real system is available. The test consists of comparing the 
“expected” behavior under specific test conditions with actual simulation results. The 
model passes the test if the experiments show that both results are statistically similar 
(Barlas, 1996). 
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Focus Groups 
Introduction 
A focus group, also called a group depth interview or a focused interview, is an 
established method that involves collecting data through a dynamic and interactive group 
discussion led by a moderator (Leung and Chan, 2012). A focus group targets to obtain 
perceptions, feelings, and experiences, on specific topics in a certain environment or the 
area of interest (Leung et al., 2014). 
The focus group technique has become the subject of many methodological 
discussions and it is now considered a very innovative research method. Focus groups 
have two main goals: (1) to create interaction among participants, and (2) to maximize 
the collection of high-quality information in a short time frame. Well-run focus groups 
reveal issues and provide richer sources of information than personal interviews or 
surveys (Acocella, 2011).   
The focus group method is normally chosen as the method of research for the 
following reasons (El-Gohary and El-Diraby, 2010):  
1- It is a fast and cost-effective method for obtaining the required information,  
2- It can collect information that is difficult to capture with other research methods,  
3- It explores the reasons behind what participants think, and 
4-  It facilitates targeting a particular type of participants with a predefined selection 
criterion. 
Format of Focus Groups 
There are three types of focus groups: exploratory, confirmatory, or a 
combination of both (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999). 
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Exploratory focus groups: 
- Explore how a group identifies a problem, 
- Help in brainstorming for potential solutions, 
- Identify areas of further investigation or action, 
- Help design surveys for wide distribution, 
- Help interpret unclear information, and 
- Tend to use open-ended questions. 
Confirmatory focus groups: 
- Evaluate solutions already enacted, 
- Assess opinions on proposed efforts, 
- Confirm and expand results from a survey or other data collected, and 
- Tend to use closed-ended questions. 
Groups are guided by the researcher who is referred to as a moderator or 
facilitator.  The moderator serves as a conversational catalyst to monitor the exchange of 
views and ideas among participants (Hutt, 1979).  The main roles of the moderator are to 
clearly state the purpose and the expectations of the group, facilitate interaction by 
outlining the topics to be discussed, control the direction of the conversation, promote 
open debate by using open-ended questions, probe deeper into the subject, and ensure 
that the conversation does not drift but stays focused on the key topics of interest 
(Blackburn, 2000; Gibbs, 1997).  
The moderator will launch a discussion topic and allow the participants to interact 
freely, rather than asking questions to each participant. The moderator will also 
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encourage a group discussion rather than a group interview by avoiding asking questions 
related to attitudes, motivations, or individual experiences (Acocella, 2012).   
Question development is a major step in preparing for the focus group interview.  
Questions should be formed in a way that encourages participants to respond and that 
helps the moderator collect the information needed from the group. Questions are 
conversational, natural, short, open-ended, and include one question at a time.  
The average number of questions in focus groups is four or five. The number of 
questions depends on how time consuming each topic is estimated to be. Questions 
should be generated ahead of time and aligned with the purpose identified for the focus 
group. Types of questions include (Krueger and Casey, 2008):  
1- Behavior: what participants do or have done, 
2- Knowledge: what participants know based on experience, and 
3- Opinions and feelings: what participants think or feel. 
The typical duration of a focus group can be one to two hours (Gibbs, 1997).   
Full information on the purpose and objectives of the study will be given to the 
participants beforehand (Gibbs, 1997).  For collecting reliable qualitative data, the focus 
group session will be audio taped and immediate note taking will be used in the 
discussion.  (Blackburn, 2000; Ouimet, et al. 2004).  The confidentiality of the 
participants will be ensured by not identifying individuals in any publications (Blackburn, 
2000). 
The moderator encourages the participants to freely express both positive and 
negative opinions. In addition, the moderator will be seated as one of the group members 
whether in a circular seating pattern or in a conference table pattern.   This enhances 
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group environment and promotes informality, which is a prerequisite for an effective 
focus group. The moderator will mention that conflicts of opinion are normal in focus 
groups (Hutt, 1979). 
Future Research as Recommended by Other Researchers 
Singleton and Hamzeh (2011) discussed the creation of a step-by-step process for 
executing IPD techniques. They defined a process checklist, which could be used to 
manage IPD implementation to standardize the process and ensure that IPD techniques 
are receiving the required level of attention. Further research should be conducted to 
verify if IPD techniques affect the workload of employees. The author also mentioned 
that further research exists in the area of public sector IPD.   
Ilozor and Kelly (2012) noted that some critical future research ideas need to be 
investigated as “the concept of one virtual database versus linked information; 
coordination with sustainable design; rethinking of IPD as a method to promote BIM; 
educational ramifications, and management issues throughout the life cycle of the 
project.” They also recommended that further study is needed to better understand the 
relationship between IPD adoption and project performance such as rate of return, cost, 
schedule, and safety measures. More research utilizing quantitative methods applied to 
actual project data is required to properly measure and evaluate the effect of both 
technologies on the industry. 
Ilozor and Kelly (2012) also noted that the literature is very optimistic with 
respect to the positive potential of BIM and/or IPD.  Several research problems arising 
from the deficiencies identified are as follows: 
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1- The effect IPD adoption on labor productivity, 
2- The effect of IPD adoption on the frequency of lost time accidents, 
3- The relationship between IPD adoption and construction cost, and 
4- The effect of IPD adoption on contractor profits.  
Distinguishing Characteristics of Water and Wastewater Projects 
Large Variety in Size, Scope, and Cost 
There is a wide range in the variety of water and wastewater projects, and they are 
characterized by having both horizontal and vertical types of projects.  These projects 
have a wide range of costs where megaprojects can be worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars. The construction might consist of maintenance and rehabilitation of existing 
treatment facilities, expansion of existing treatment facilities, or new treatment facilities.  
High Level Security 
Security consideration is another important characteristic of water and wastewater 
projects. Water and wastewater treatment facilities contain chemicals such as chlorine 
gas, which is highly toxic and deadly in case of a chlorine gas leak.  Water treatment 
facilities are highly secured to avoid attempts of water contaminations, which will affect 
the population receiving that water.  Construction activities occurring in the secured 
zones are time consuming and their cost is 15 to 25% more than the cost of similar 
construction in non-secured area (Adrem et. al., 2006). Workers must obtain special 
security badges to enter the plant. This requires specific training in case of a chlorine leak 
and completion of a security clearance process, which is time consuming. Every day, the 
workers are required to enter the secured site via static security checkpoints. All of these 
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issues reduce the daily production rate of construction, adding time and money to the 
project. 
Construction during Facility Operation 
Water and wastewater projects are usually executed while facility operations are 
ongoing. Because of this, it is important to manage design and construction in a way that 
minimizes impact on the plant operations. For example, shutdowns of existing facilities 
for tie-in purposes occur during low flow rates incoming to the wastewater facilities. This 
forces some of the construction to occur at night.  In large projects, a multi-phased 
scheduling approach is adopted that divides the project into phases to minimize the 
interference with the plant operation.  
Complexity of Water and Wastewater Projects 
Water and wastewater projects are often complex with special systems. Some of 
these systems include very large pumps and pipes, tunnels, sophisticated equipment that 
is not typically used anywhere else such as belt presses, reverse osmosis membranes, and 
sophisticated electrical and data systems. In addition to water, treatment facilities include 
chemicals and gasses such as methane, chlorine, sodium hypochlorite, oxygen, etc. Also, 
water and wastewater treatment facilities usually add or remove structures in existing 
facilities instead of building new facilities. These projects require increased coordination 
for ensuring that new structures are designed to be compatible with existing structures in 
terms of architecture, quality, and material. The goal is to integrate the new and old 
structures within the facility in an effective way.   
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Public Projects Funding and Legality of Delivery Methods 
Water and wastewater treatment plant financing comes from federal assistance, 
state assistance, bond sales, and water and wastewater treatment plant cash and revenue 
funding. Using any of these funds imposes regulations like competitive pricing of 
construction facilities and includes Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) firms. 
DBB has been traditionally used all over the United States, and all state codes give 
authority to apply DBB in public projects. Alternative delivery methods do not have this 
clear statutory support. Other states have imposed limitations on the application of 
alternative delivery systems. 
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                                                  
AIM, OBJECTIVES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
A variety of project delivery methods are available to the developers of public 
projects in the United States. Design-Bid-Build (DBB) is the most prevalent delivery 
method for construction projects in the United States’ construction industry and 
specifically in water and wastewater projects. While the traditional DBB remains the 
most commonly used delivery method, there is significant interest on water utility owners 
in alternative delivery methods, for saving money and time. 
The aim of this research is to develop a new model for rating the performance 
of water utilities major capital projects delivered using a project delivery method that 
combines Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) and Design-Bid-Build (DBB) and to find 
what correlation exists between the implemented IPD principles and the Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) of these projects. 
 The project delivery method is the process by which the contractual 
responsibilities for designing and constructing a construction project are comprehensively 
identified for an owner including all the contractual relations, roles, and responsibilities 
of the entities involved in a project and assigning the contractual responsibilities for 
designing and constructing a project.  
Hence, the various project delivery methods are perceived by the way the 
contracts among the owner, the engineer, and the contractor are formed and the technical 
relationships among the groups within those contracts. With the fast improvements in 
construction services in the private sector, public owners are acquiring unconventional 
project delivery methods such as CMAR, DB, IPD, and other hybrid systems. 
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In order to achieve the aim of this research as mentioned above, a series of 
objectives are set forth as intermediate steps necessary to attain the desired aim.  
The first objective of this research is to identify KPIs that measure, directly or 
indirectly, the success of a construction project. The KPIs of success of a project delivery 
method are identified in parameters for benchmarking projects in order to achieve and 
compare a good performance.  
The second objective is to collect data from various water utility owners to gather 
related information on the KPIs of the construction projects of their respective facilities 
that were delivered using DBB. This objective is key to assessing current and traditional 
delivery methods. The collected data is evaluated and used for benchmarking the KPIs.  
The third objective is to identify which aspects of IPD can be used and 
implemented in treatment plants, and which of these can be implemented in this research. 
Due to regulations and limitations of public projects, not all IPD principles can be 
integrated in the delivery of public projects.  Therefore, selective principles and practices 
that can be integrated with DBB need to be identified in this step. 
The fourth objective is to implement the full range of IPD principles in control 
projects and measure the KPIs identified per the first objective.  
The fifth objective is to compare the results obtained from measured KPIs of the 
control projects obtained in Objective 4 with the KPIs of past projects obtained from 
Objective 2. This comparison will form the basis for measuring any improvement in the 
delivery of treatment plants through the implementation of IPD principles in the fourth 
objective.  This will in turn validate the aim of assessing the performance of projects that 
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integrate certain aspects of IPD with DBB principles in the delivery of such projects. This 
methodology approach is illustrated visually in the flowchart shown in Figure 3-1. 
The sixth objective is to develop a project performance rating model that can 
combine the performance factors (PF) of a project into a single number, rating, or index 
which represents the performance of a given project and that owners can use to realize 
the benefits of implementing various IPD principles.  
The seventh objective is to utilize regression analysis and a focus group on the 
collected and measured data to determine what correlation exists between the 
implemented IPD principles and the KPIs of these projects and to develop a guideline 
metric for owners to predict how implementation of certain IPD principles can impact 
various project KPIs. 
The significance of this research lies in the ability of this new model to rate the 
performance of treatment plants’ major capital projects delivered using a combination of 
IPD and DBB approach to help owners of treatment plants get a detailed look into critical 
problem areas that are likely to impact performance rating and in promoting better 
performances for future projects through lower costs, fewer Change Orders (COs), 
shorter schedules, fewer Request for Information (RFIs), fewer error and omission COs, 
fewer construction claims, faster response time to RFIs, less field rework and fewer 
owner requested COs, performance factors to the success of a construction project. 
Correlation between the implemented IPD principles and the KPIs of these projects can 
significantly help utility owners who are aiming to predict how implementation of certain 
IPD principles can impact various project KPIs. 
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Figure 3-1: Research objectives. 
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CHAPTER 4                                                                                                        
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Design-Bid-Build (DBB) is the traditional project delivery method.  In DBB the 
owner has the opportunity to cancel the project or alter the design and scope. Also, the 
owner can check the maintainability of the finished design and can ensure the quality of 
the design of the end product before awarding the project. This is very critical in 
treatment plant projects due to the nature of complexity of these projects and due to the 
high level of details involved and required.  These include and are not limited to the 
various types of material to be used, the various equipment selection and brands, the 
owner’s preference to use a certain supplier or manufacturer, the satisfaction of 
regulatory agencies provisions, etc. 
DBB gives the owner the most control over the project, which is a great 
advantage for treatment plants.  Furthermore, the researcher’s field experience in 
treatment plants with different delivery methods applied shows that DBB is the most 
promising while providing the most satisfaction to the owners.  The researcher’s 
discussions with water and wastewater owners, engineers, and contractors also show the 
preference of DBB over other delivery methods.   However, some improvements are 
needed for the KPIs of DBB, and IPD has the most promising aspects to improve these 
KPIs. 
The approach, therefore, is to integrate the key principles of DBB and IPD project 
delivery methods and measure the performance of DBB project delivery method for 
treatment plants projects.  The study implemented this integration by applying a full array 
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of IPD principles to control projects that were being constructed through a DBB delivery 
method. The data from these KPIs obtained by implementing this integrated approach 
was then compared to the same KPI’s data from similar size projects in which the 
traditional DBB delivery method was used. 
A Project Performance Rating (PPR) Model is developed to combine the key 
performance factors of a project into one performance index for water and wastewater 
construction projects and to gauge the overall project performance. Regression analysis 
and a focus group were then utilized to determine the effect of each implemented IPD 
principle on various project KPIs.  A guideline metric is developed that can significantly 
help utility owners aiming to predict how implementation of certain IPD principles can 
impact various project KPIs. An overall research methodology chart is shown in Figure 
4-1.  
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Figure 4-1: Overall research methodology. 
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Identifying Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
The KPIs of a successful project delivery method are identified as parameters to 
benchmark projects for performance comparison. These indicators provide objective 
framework criteria that are quantifiable and measurable. In order to eliminate any bias 
resulting from the project size, KPIs were normalized by the total project cost.  The 
parameters used in this research consist of nine performance indicators, listed below and 
described briefly in the following sections. 
- Cost Overrun as a Percentage of the Total Project Award Price, 
- Change Order Cost as a Percentage of Total Project Cost, 
- Time Overrun as a Percentage of the Original Project Schedule, 
- Number of RFIs per Unit Price, 
- Error and Omissions Change Orders Cost as a Percentage of Total Cost of 
Change Orders,  
- Total Claims Cost as a Percentage of the Total Project Cost, 
- RFI Response Time per Project Cost, 
- Cost of Field Rework as a Percentage of Total Project Cost, and 
- Owner Requested Change Orders Cost as a Percentage of Total Cost of COs.  
Cost Overrun as a Percentage of the Total Project Award Price 
A cost overrun involves unexpected costs incurred in excess of the contract 
amounts. Value engineering has the ability to control and adjust the project contract costs 
and cost reductions. The main consideration when evaluating project cost is the 
measurement of the contractor's performance against the bid cost of the contract. Cost 
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overrun is relatively easy to track because project teams keep useful records of several 
cost items for different project phases. Cost overrun amount presented in this study as a 
KPI is calculated as a percentage of total project cost in order to normalize the cost 
overrun amount based on the project cost. This will eliminate any bias in the comparison 
due to project size. 
Change Order Cost as a Percentage of Total Project Cost 
A change order is work that is added to or deleted from the original scope of work 
of a contract.  COs may alter the original contract amount and/or the completion date of 
the projects. AIA (2007) defines contingency as a predetermined amount or percentage of 
the contract held in a separate account to financially prepare owners for addressing 
changes within the project. Contingency not managed properly during construction can 
result in cost overruns and unnecessary losses.   
Common causes for change orders are: 1) design errors and/or omissions, 2) unforeseen 
conditions that are realized on site during construction, and 3) owner’s request 
substitutions or changes. However, most common causes for change orders can lead to 
legal issues, disputes and arbitration. A project with a large number of COs indicates 
design negligence, lack of pre-construction coordination, lack of owner’s involvement 
during design, or lack of collaboration among the parties during construction.   
Time Overrun as a Percentage of the Original Project Schedule: 
Construction project delay is when a project is completed later than the planned 
duration of execution to which all the concerned parties agreed.  Project delay is an issue 
commonly faced on construction projects. These delays can be costly to all parties 
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concerned in the project, and can often result in cost overrun and claims. The main 
factors affecting the duration of a construction project are the involvement and 
performance of parties, contractual relations, design errors and omissions, environmental 
and site conditions, resources availability, and others.  On-time completion of a project is 
an indicator of many successful aspects of the project delivery, such as efficiency, proper 
project management, and good contract management. Therefore, a project completed on 
or ahead of its scheduled completion date is a good indicator of efficient involvement and 
performance of parties, good contractual relations, adequate design, and sufficient 
resources availability. 
Number of RFIs per Unit Price  
The RFI process is one in which contractors and subcontractors formally request 
clarification of information regarding the contract documents supplied.  This process is 
very common but inefficient due to the non-value-added delays, which occur in obtaining 
the necessary information.  In DBB, the design and contract documents provided for 
construction projects are expected to be complete, precise, and unambiguous. 
Unfortunately, this is rarely the case, and quite often contractors are supplied with 
contract documents that are incomplete, conflicting, or erroneous, thereby requiring 
revisions and clarifications to be provided by the designers.    
A project with a high number of RFIs indicates low quality of the design and 
construction documents. Such low-quality construction documents are a symptom of low-
quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) on part of the design team, and lack of 
coordination among the project participants.   
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Error and Omissions Change Orders Cost as a Percentage of Total Cost of Change 
Orders 
Errors and omissions are common during the design process due to the unique 
nature of human beings. A design error is an instruction in the plans and specifications 
that, if followed by the contractor, will require replacement or correction, or it could 
result in a construction failure. On the other hand, an omission occurs when the plans and 
or the specifications are missing a detail or a description that is needed to complete a 
certain activity.   
Total Claims Cost as a Percentage of the Total Project Cost 
Construction claims are common in construction projects and can typically arise 
from many root causes related to schedule and cost overruns. Disputes often arise 
between contractors and owners based on project performance of involved parties, scope 
discrepancies, and quality of work performed and materials delivered. Therefore, the 
number and nature of construction claims is a KPI that provides insight into the team’s 
relationships and their ability to resolve disputes before escalating to claims. A high 
number of claims on a project reflects poor working relationships between involved 
parties, lack of a team approach to project gains and losses, and disintegration of 
communication lines.  
RFI Response Time per Project Cost  
Delays in response to RFIs cause adverse impact on project productivity.  Project 
participants shall follow RFI tracking and monitoring systems to efficiently manage the 
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RFIs, maximize control of the RFI process, and mitigate the potential for negative 
impacts arising from the delay in responding to the submitted RFIs. 
Cost of Field Rework as a Percentage of Total Project Cost 
Unsurprisingly, defects are one of the major causes of disputes and construction 
litigation. The Construction Industry Institute (2001), defined rework as: “activities in the 
field that have to be done more than once in the field or activities that remove work 
previously installed as part of the project”.  Field rework could be as a result of the 
following four components: 
1- A design that fails to meet the Professional Standards;  
2- The failure of the contractor to execute the work in accordance with the plans 
and specifications;  
3- The failure of the contractor to execute the work in accordance with the 
acceptable standards of workmanship in the construction industry; and/or  
4- The improper installation of systems, equipment, or materials that are of a 
lesser quality than required by the plans and specifications.  
A high number of construction defects indicates that the project delivery method may 
suffer from inadequate project supervision on the part of the general contractor, 
inadequate design specifications, lack of proper inspection by the designer, and others.  
Owner Requested Change Orders Cost as a Percentage of Total Cost of COs 
Change orders can lead to legal issues, disputes, and arbitration. A project with a 
large number of owner requested COs indicates lack of pre-construction coordination 
with the owner and lack of owner’s involvement during design.    
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Collection of Project Data 
For this study several water utility facilities and consultants in South Florida were 
contacted to obtain data on completed projects delivered via a DBB project delivery 
method.  The data collected measured the KPIs of these projects, in an effort to compare 
their performance to that of the control projects where IPD principles are combined with 
DBB delivery method in the water and wastewater industry.  
Identification of IPD Principles that can be Used and Implemented in Public 
Treatment Plant Projects 
This study applied certain IPD principles that are applicable to public projects in 
the water and wastewater field and measured the performance of the projects in terms of 
the five success criteria. 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Literature Review, there is no agreement in the 
literature on a single set of project delivery practices that comprise the IPD principles. 
For example, some researchers considered BIM as an IPD principle while others consider 
BIM as a practice that only facilitates the IPD process by recording and sharing project 
information and helping the IPD team optimize both product and process (Thomsen et al., 
2009, NASFA et al., 2010). While the AIA published IPD principles are the most 
commonly accepted and used in the industry, several researchers, as listed in Table 4-1, 
have identified other principles that distinguish IPD from other delivery methods.  
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Table 4-1: IPD Principles 
Authors IPD Principles 
AIA (2007) 
Mutual respect and trust, mutual benefit and reward, collaborative 
innovation and decision making, early involvement of key 
participants, early goal definition, intensified planning, open 
communication, appropriate technology, organization and leadership 
AIA (2010) 
Early involvement of key participants, shared risk and reward, 
multiparty contract, collaborative decision making and control, 
liability waivers among key participants, jointly developed and 
validated project goals 
Forbes & Syed 
(2011) 
Multiparty contract, close team collaboration for optimizing the 
project 
Kent & Becerik-
Gerber (2010) 
Multiparty agreement, early involvement of all parties, shared risk and 
reward 
Kim & Dossick 
(2011) 
Integrated form of agreement (IFOA), lean construction and using 
BIM 
Matthews & 
Howell (2005) 
Multiparty contract, shared risk and profit 
NASFA et al. 
(2010) 
Multiparty agreement, trust and mutual respect, mutual benefit and 
reward, collaborative decision making, early involvement of key 
project participants, early goal definition and intensified planning, 
open communication within the project team and ability to address 
issues, liability waivers between key participants, jointly developed 
project target criteria, key participants bound together as equals, 
shared financial risk and reward, transparent financials between key 
participants 
Singleton & 
Hamzeh (2011) 
Integrated teams, lean construction techniques, lean principles, 
collective risk sharing, painsharing and gainsharing, profit pooling, 
contingency sharing, goals and incentives, and performance 
evaluations 
 
Not all these principles are applicable to public projects and, more specifically, those 
using DBB project delivery method.  Some principles are not applicable to public 
projects, but can be modified to allow their integration in public projects.  The IPD 
principles that cannot be applied to public projects and cannot be modified include: 
1- Multi-party Agreement 
57 
 
This means the owner, the engineer, and the contractor shall all sign a single 
agreement.  In public projects, owners are not capable of signing multi-party 
agreements; separate single contracts are the norm for public projects especially 
with the contractors, where competitive bidding is required such as in DBB 
delivery method;  
2- Liability Waivers between Key Participants;  
3- Transparent Financials between Key Participants (Open Books);  
and  
4- Key Participants Bound Together as Equal.  
These four principles are also not applicable to public owners and not all 
liabilities can be waived among key participants. The project participants are still 
liable for damage inflicted on third parties and for willful default, which occurs 
when, a party abandons the project. Job site safety, structural collapse, or other 
liability concerns must still be addressed. Moreover, the nature of the bidding 
process and competition among contractors put them in a situation where the 
winning contractor cannot have financial transparency, to waive liabilities with 
key participants, or to be bound as equal with key participants. These three 
principles need prior negotiations, discussions, and agreements among all key 
participants before executing the construction contracts, which is not practical in 
the DBB delivery method.   
Selective principles applicable to DBB public projects are discussed in the following 
section. 
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IPD Implementation with DBB Public Projects 
DBB offers the owner the market advantage of open competition through a design 
phase followed by separate bid and construction phases. The competitive nature of DBB 
delivery method results in a process that lacks integration. Therefore, DBB does not 
naturally lend itself to integration with IPD principles and offers the least possibility for 
integration. However, to take advantage of IPD-type delivery, contract provisions and 
project procedures can be modified to obtain additional benefits by applying principles 
and practices with IPD as a philosophy.  Due to public projects regulations and 
limitations discussed in Chapter 2, not all the IPD principles can be integrated with public 
projects. Therefore, selective principles and practices that can be integrated with DBB in 
public projects are defined below.  
1- Early Involvement of All Parties  
The main characteristic of IPD is early involvement of all the primary project 
participants. Under a traditional DBB process, the contractor is not involved until after 
the design is complete. Public projects dictate that “open bidding” be used in public 
construction projects, thus prohibiting the early involvement of the prospect constructor 
in the design process. This can be resolved by bidding the project at the earliest stage 
possible and the owner and the engineer would express their intent and desire to proceed 
in an integrated team upon acceptance of bids.  In this case the project could be bid with 
less complete design than is the case with traditional DBB projects. This early bid 
process allows the owner to obtain the benefits from integration by allowing the 
constructor to bring its constructability expertise to participate at a much earlier stage in 
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design.  This will also lead to developing a strong team, improved communications, and a 
willingness to resolve disputes by avoiding adversarial mentality (AIA, 2010). 
To avoid loss of accuracy and the receipt of bids containing large contingencies, bids 
could be allowed to be adjusted following the constructors’ contribution to developing 
more complete implementation documents. Another way to allow early involvement of 
all parties is to bring the Construction Manager (CM) into the project early during design.   
2- Integrated and Collaborative Teams 
For a successful integrated and collaborative process, owners need to steer the 
process and guide the team in the collaborative direction, by working as a team member 
not as an adversary. This process can be applied to DBB by requiring more staff time 
than traditional DBB process. Staff needs to be empowered to make decisions at meetings 
with the project participants. Chemistry among all the key project participants shall exist, 
and owners shall recommend if staff or members’ changes are needed to ensure that the 
goals for collaboration are met. 
3- Pain and Gain Cost Sharing, Profit Pooling and Contingency Sharing 
This involves a major commitment to providing pain and gain cost sharing for all 
parties. Some public owners have legal restrictions that limit the extent of owner’s ability 
to share risk of cost overruns and profit sharing. However, owners can implement some 
type of bonus program for contractors and may include designers by involving additional 
creative approaches. According to NASFA, painsharing and cost sharing can be 
implemented in DBB where the parties execute separate contracts with the owner, such as 
through the establishment of incentive pools. The non-owner participants will or will not 
receive any corporate overhead or profit depending on the project’s success. The 
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project’s success is determined by comparing the direct costs with the anticipated target 
costs. Owners also include a gain share bonus if the project exceeds its goals.  The non-
owner participants never place their direct costs at risk.  The contract shall include a 
formula for gain and painsharing and shall consider the parties’ respective contributions, 
rather than a general percentage of costs.  
4- Lean Principles  
To maximize the efficiency of lean principles, they shall be applied during the design 
process of the DBB contract and shall be focused on maximizing value and elimination of 
waste. Adhering to the construction project schedule can also increase the efficiency of 
the lean principles.  Monthly progress schedule updates lead to a more detailed schedule 
that clearly and accurately displays all the links to the activities that must occur during 
that particular month. The continuous process of targeting flawlessness, eliminating 
waste, meeting or exceeding all project expectations, focusing on the entire value, and 
streaming the execution of a construction project are a natural fit for IPD projects. 
5- Using Building Information Modeling (BIM) 
The tool of BIM can significantly enhance collaboration, sharing of information, and 
streamlining of project design and construction. For large public projects such as water 
utility projects, where facility operations depend on construction data to run the water or 
wastewater facility, owners need to save important project information for their use after 
construction such as long-term facility management.  Most owners have difficulties doing 
so and they depend on consultants to collect, organize, manage, and store the varieties of 
the required information. BIM also saves time and money by allowing the project 
participants to communicate better and to design what will be built instead of designing 
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for intent. The BIM model assists in creating 2-D or 3-D drawings needed for the 
fabricator and for review by the Architect/Engineer (AE) team.  BIM assists in making 
the shop drawing process concurrent with design, eliminating waste, and saving time and 
duplication of effort. 
6- Co-location of Teams  
Co-location increases opportunities for collaboration and innovation and helps in 
meeting project goals and commitments.  In DBB, co-location can involve the design and 
construction project participants, including trade contractors and suppliers. This can be 
achieved after the contract is awarded as the earliest involvement of all parties.  Both the 
owner and engineer can have a direct relationship with subcontractors during 
construction and during final design. In large public projects the owner can provide space 
on the construction site to allow for physical space for all parties onsite. 
7- Performance Evaluations  
Performance evaluation measures the positive project outcomes based on the 
resources invested.  Evaluation is useful to determining defects in a program and 
providing information necessary to improve the current performance.  Evaluation can 
help improve the project’s effectiveness and improve the program.  
8- Jointly Developed Project Target Criteria  
Carefully defining project performance criteria early in the design phase with the 
input, support, and acceptance of all project participants ensures that maximum attention 
will be paid to the project. The IPD team will establish a Target Cost and a Target Value 
design plan to focus on delivering value to the owner through the design process.  
 
62 
 
9- Mutual Respect and Trust  
A team culture based on risk sharing and trust is required to tie the parties together in 
order to have a successful project within the contractual relations.  For a successful IPD 
project, a level of trust needs to be developed among the parties so that the participants 
will not be taken advantage of during the project. Owners play a big role in aligning the 
goals appropriately to ensure project success by encouraging respect and trust.  In DBB, 
owners do not have the ability to select a team that will treat the owners fairly.  This can 
be sought after in a DBB project but cannot be guaranteed.  
10- Open Communication within the Project Team and Ability to Address Issues  
IPD promotes greater communication among all project participants. Essential team 
meetings and collaboration among parties help in opening venues for more 
communication. Nonetheless, there is still a need to document decisions taken in these 
meetings.  
A summary of the IPD principles, their applicability to treatment plant public 
projects, and those that are used in conjunction with DBB in the control projects is shown 
in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2: Summary of IPD Principles Applicability to Public Projects 
 
IPD Principles 
Can be 
Implemented  
Require 
Modifications 
to be 
Implemented  
Cannot 
be 
Implemented 
Multi-party Agreement   √ 
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Early Involvement of all Parties  √  
Key Participants Bound Together 
as Equals  
  √ 
Liability Waivers between Key 
Participants  
  √ 
Transparent Financials between 
Key Participants (Open Books)  
  √ 
 Painsharing and Gainsharing 
(Shared financial Risk and 
Reward Based on Project 
Outcome) 
 √  
Profit Pooling   √  
Contingency Sharing   √  
Lean Principles  √   
Using Building Information 
Modeling (BIM) 
√   
Co-location of Teams √   
Jointly Developed Project Target 
Criteria and Collaborative 
Decision Making 
√   
Performance Evaluations  √   
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Integrated and Collaborative 
Teams 
√   
Mutual Respect and Trust  √   
Open Communication within the 
Project Team and Ability to 
Address Issues. 
√   
 
 Control Projects 
The study used two wastewater construction projects that were underway as control 
projects for implementing the IPD principles. The projects are Final Site Work and 
Screening System Improvements. Both projects are located at 23200 SW 97th Avenue, 
Miami, Florida 33190.  
Contract S-863, Screening System Improvements for Plant 1 and Plant 2: 
Notice to Proceed date was issued on May 20, 2013 with a Final Acceptance date 
of December 6, 2014.  The contract cost at bid time for this project was $5,720,050. This 
project consisted of two grit facilities referred to as Plant 1 and Plant 2.  Each grit facility 
consisted of an east and a west grit chamber/flume for a total of four grit chambers/flumes. 
Construction included installation of four new Huber Screens, modifications and 
rehabilitation of all grit chambers and bypass channels, new construction of the screen 
channels with associated stop gates and sluice gates. In addition to construction of new 
Electrical Building, complete with all structural and architectural work, miscellaneous 
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items including HVAC system, building electrical services, Motor Control Center (MCC), 
panel boards, transformer, and installation of RTU panel were also provided.  
Contract S-810, Final Site Work: 
Notice to Proceed date was issued on March 15, 2013 with a Final Acceptance Date 
of April 6, 2014.  The contract cost at bid time for this project was $3,017,000. 
Construction under this contract included a main access gate, site drainage, catch basins, 
exfiltration trenches, complete site irrigation system, light poles and lighting, rough and 
fine grading with suitable fill, removal of on-site excess fill material, polymer system 
piping, asphalt overlay, and ground cover including sod, seed, and rock. Critical project 
parameters were collected by the research team for the control project, as summarized in 
Table 4-3.  
Table 4-3: Control Projects Parameters Summary 
 
i Project Parameter Final Site 
Work 
Screening 
System 
 1 Project Award Price $3,017,000 $4,858,774 
2 Project Total Actual Cost $3,119,826 $5,070,762 
3 Total Cost of Change Orders $254,115.27 $184,725.00 
4 Number of RFIs 10 25 
5 Notice to Proceed Date 3/15/2013 5/20/2013 
6 Actual Completion Date 4/17/2014 12/07/2014 
7 Project Scheduled Duration 399 days 562 days 
8 Cost of Errors and Omissions CO $18,107.91 $42,849.00 
9 Total Cost of Claims $0.00 $0.00 
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10 Cost of Owner’s CO $135,210.77 $72,766.67 
11 Cost of Field Rework $0.00 $0.00 
12 Average RFI Response Time 3 days 10.8 days 
 
IPD Implementation in Wastewater Control Projects 
Since the control projects were already under construction by the time the IPD 
principles were implemented, this imposed limitations on applying certain IPD principles 
to the project delivery. For instance, Early Involvement of all Parties, Pain and Gain Cost 
Sharing, Profit Pooling, Contingency Sharing, Building Information Modeling, and 
Jointly Developed Project Criteria need to be planned, designed, and agreed upon with 
the project participants during the design, bidding, and preconstruction phases.  Since 
design and bidding were already completed on the control projects, these IPD principles 
will not be applicable in this process.  
The IPD principles that can be practically applied are: 
1- Open Communication within the Project Team and Ability to Address Issues, 
2- Integrated and Collaborative Teams, 
3- Lean Principles, 
4- Co-location of Teams,   
5- Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations, 
6- Mutual Respect and Trust, 
7- Jointly Developed Project Target Criteria, and 
8- Collaborative Decision Making.  
67 
 
 The study applied these eight IPD principles in the two control projects and 
measured the KPIs of these projects. These principles can be applied because they do not 
require any design or preconstruction aspects to be set prior to construction. They can be 
implemented during construction after all parties meet each other and after all roles are 
assigned. The exceptions are Lean Principles and Jointly Developed Project Target 
Criteria, which were already included in the design phase of these projects. The 
implementation of selective IPD principles are illustrated in this section. 
1- Open Communication within the Project Team and Ability to Address Issues  
Essential team meetings and collaboration among project participants help in 
opening venues for more communication.  One weekly progress meeting is held 
each week with the contractor, consultants, and owners who are involved in the 
planning, coordination, and performance of work and who have the ability to 
address issues.  Discussions in weekly meetings include the progress of each 
element of current work, schedule revisions, milestone dates, and total contract 
time. Within three days after each meeting, the construction manager distributes 
copies of the minutes of the meeting, including a brief summary of progress of the 
work since the previous meeting, to all project participants.  
In addition to weekly meetings, the construction manager meets with the general 
contractors on a daily basis, regardless of the presence of any issues. These daily 
meetings are informal and are held in the engineer’s office, in the contractor’s 
office, or in the construction field. Daily construction issues and conflicts are 
addressed immediately rather than accumulating them to be discussed during the 
weekly meetings or to be issued as RFIs. Open communication through phone 
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conversations between the engineer and the general contractors are kept frequent 
as well. For example, the contractor would call to notify the engineer of any 
engineering documents requested by the Miami Dade Building Department 
officials. The engineer would also call the contractor requesting clarifications or 
supplemental information during the shop drawing review process to expedite its 
approval. This helps in addressing issues faster and conveying messages right on 
the spot. Whether issues are related to design or water utility operations, phone 
calls to different parties involved can expedite resolving problems and addressing 
issues.    
2- Integrated and Collaborative Teams  
The team is led in a collaborative manner, by having the project 
participants work as team members not as adversaries. This is accomplished by 
having a good relationship between the owner, engineer, and contractor.  The 
project manager for the Final Site Work Project was a Miami Dade Water and 
Sewer employee for 20 years.  He still maintains a good relationship with the 
owner, his previous employer.  Moreover, the project manager for the Final Site 
Work Project has performed several projects with the construction manager’s and 
engineer’s employer firm and has established a good working relationship.   
The project manager for the Screens Improvements Project has been building 
projects for Miami Dade Water and Sewer Department for over eight years and 
has established a good working relationship. Additionally, the construction 
manager has been involved in the design and construction management of several 
projects in which the same project manager for the Screens Improvements Project 
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was also involved.  The construction manager has been providing engineering and 
construction management services to Miami Dade Water and Sewer Department 
since 2006, and was able to build a good relationship with the owner.  The past 
experience on previous construction projects among the owner, engineer, 
construction manager, and contractors helped to promote a collaborative team 
environment and chemistry between the key project participants on the control 
projects.  
Integration and collaboration were also promoted by introducing social 
activities outside the workplace, including Halloween pumpkin carving, breakfast 
fundraising for breast cancer awareness, Thanksgiving lunches, Christmas 
lunches, an Easter egg decorating contest, and other activities.  All parties 
participated in these activities and helped in organizing the events.  These 
activities were essential in bringing people together and promoting friendship. For 
both control projects, the owner provided more staff time than in the traditional 
DBB process. These project participants were empowered to make decisions at 
meetings with the project participants.  
3- Lean Principles  
Lean principles were applied during the design process of these DBB 
projects and are focused on maximizing value and eliminating waste. Since the 
efficiency of the lean principles can be increased by adhering to the construction 
project schedule, monthly progress schedule updates were submitted for review 
and approval by the engineer. Three week "look ahead" schedules were also 
prepared in detail and reviewed weekly during the weekly progress meetings. A 
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sample of the three-week "look ahead" schedule is shown in Appendix A.  The 
process of eliminating waste, meeting or exceeding all project requirements, 
aiming on the entire value stream, and pursuing perfection in the execution of a 
construction project is a continuous process that will be monitored closely, and 
actions taken will be documented. For example, inspections will be made of 
existing equipment and products that need to be upgraded but can be saved to 
eliminate waste.  A log for documenting the waste elimination is shown in 
Appendix B.    
4- Co-location of Team  
Co-location increases opportunities for collaboration and innovation and 
help in meeting project goals and commitments.  On the control projects, this was 
achieved after the project was awarded to the contractors.  The owner provided 
space on the construction site to allow for approximately one acre of physical 
space for the owner, consultants, engineers, contractors, and subcontractors.  This 
space includes a 700 m2 pre-engineered metal building for the owner, engineers, 
and construction managers; 2,880 m2 of field office parking; and a 2,323 m2 of 
trailer city for contractors and subcontractors’ trailers, all in the same parcel of 
land. In addition to the engineers and contractors, the onsite team included 
schedulers, accountants, inspectors, state inspectors general, document control 
staff, safety officers, and auditors.  A site layout drawing and the office building 
interior drawing are shown in Appendix C. 
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5- Performance Evaluations  
Evaluation is useful to determine defects in a program and to provide 
information necessary to improve the current performance.  On both control 
projects, the owner used to fill a contractor’s and consultant’s performance 
evaluations once every four months. Also, the consultants evaluate their personnel 
yearly including engineers and construction managers.  Evaluations can help 
improve the project’s effectiveness and improve the program. Evaluation forms 
samples are shown in Appendix D.  
6- Mutual Respect and Trust 
For a successful IPD project, a level of trust needs to be developed among 
the project participants so that they will not be taken advantage of during the 
project. Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011) demonstrated through control 
projects that trust comes in two ways: preexisting trust and forced trust. Where 
preexisting trust does not exist, a set of tools and activities will need to be 
implemented to allow the project team members to acquire trust forcefully.  As 
previously mentioned in “Integrated and Collaborative Teams,” the owner, the 
consultant, and the contractors have repetitive work and good long-lasting work 
relationships from the previous projects. This assists tremendously in promoting an 
environment of mutual respect and trust among the key participants in the control 
projects. A key indicator of trust and respect is when there are changes and extra 
work needed on the projects and the contractors proceed with the changes prior to 
receiving executed change orders or documentation to assure the contractors that 
they will be compensated for the extra work.  
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7. Jointly Developed Project Target Criteria 
Carefully defining project performance criteria early in the design phase 
with the input, support, and acceptance of project participants ensures that 
maximum attention is paid to the project. For the control projects, Jointly 
Developed Project Criteria was planned and agreed upon with the project 
participants during the design and preconstruction phases.  During the execution 
phase, the construction manager held monthly meetings with the contractor, 
consultant, owner, and other stakeholders to monitor and update the jointly 
developed project target criteria. For example, the control projects were among 
other projects that were required to be in compliance with a Consent Order with the 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP). One of the main project 
target criteria was to meet the milestone dates and satisfy all other Consent Order 
requirements.  Structured jointly developed project criteria meetings were key in 
meeting those requirements.   
8. Collaborative Decision Making 
On the control projects, the construction manager formed a leadership team 
for decision-making purposes that included the contractor, consultant, owner, and 
other stakeholders. The team held monthly meetings and provided 
recommendations on decision-making priorities and activities and communication 
tools towards enhancing system efficiencies for the project. The team also assigned 
specific tasking to develop options for potential opportunities that could be 
beneficial for the project. 
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Results Comparison  
Results of the measured KPIs obtained from the control projects were compared 
with the KPIs data of past projects. 
1- Performance Evaluations with Regard to Cost 
 Cost overruns in the two control projects were compared with the past project’s 
data results. The researcher used to update a Cost Summary Log for the control projects 
on a monthly basis.  A sample of the Cost Summary Log is shown in Appendix E. 
Cost overrun during construction delivery is an important cost performance indicator.  
Equations 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3 are used for cost performance evaluations with regard to cost 
overrun performance during project delivery.  
Cost Overrun Performance: 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡                               (4-1) 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛 ∆ =
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − ∑ 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
        (4-2)                 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛 % =
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
× 100                      (4-3) 
2- Performance Evaluations with Regard to Time 
The construction schedule was reviewed monthly and the projects’ actual 
completion times were compared with the proposed schedule completion times.   
Time overrun during construction delivery is an important time performance indicator.  
Equations 4-4 and 4-5 are used for time performance evaluations with regard to time 
overrun performance during project delivery.  
Time Overrun Performance: 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛 ∆=
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒−∑ 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
                 (4-4) 
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𝑥3 = 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛 % =
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑥100           (4-5) 
where Actual Project Duration is calculated as the time span between the Notice to 
Proceed date and the date when all work has been completed. 
3- Performance Evaluations with Regard to COs 
The number of COs and COs’ cost amount obtained from the control projects 
were compared with the past project’s data results as a percentage value of the total 
project cost.  The control projects utilized CO Log that was updated weekly by the 
researcher. A sample of CO Log is shown in Appendix F.  
Equations 4-6, 4-7, and 4-8 are used for performance evaluations with regard to Change 
Orders.  
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 % =
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑥100     (4-6) 
Percent of changes that are owner requested: 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝐶𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 % =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝐶𝑂
∑  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑥100     (4-7) 
Percent of changes that are due to design errors and omissions: 
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐶𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 % =
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐶𝑂
∑  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑥100   (4-8) 
4- Request for Information (RFI) Evaluation:  
The number of RFIs obtained from the control projects was compared to those of 
past projects delivered using DBB. The control projects utilized RFI Log that was 
updated weekly by the researcher.  A sample of RFI Log is shown in Appendix G.  
RFI performance measures include two components: 
1- Number of RFIs, 
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2- Average RFI response time per unit price. 
Equations 4-9 and 4-10 are used for performance evaluations with regard to RFIs.  
𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
      (4-9) 
𝑅𝐹𝐼 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝐹𝐼 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
   (4-10) 
5- Field Rework: 
The number of post-completion construction defects at the control projects was 
compared with those obtained from the past project’s data results. The researcher used to 
update a Construction Defects Log for the control projects on a monthly basis.  A sample 
of the Construction Defects Log is shown in Appendix H. 
Defects performance measures were measured based on cost of field rework, which could 
be as a result of these four components: 
1- A design that fails to meet the Professional Standards,  
2- The failure of the contractor to execute the work in accordance with the plans 
and specifications.  
3- The failure of the contractor to execute the work in accordance with the 
acceptable standards of workmanship in the construction industry, and  
4- The improper installation of systems, equipment or materials that are of a 
lesser quality than required by the plans and specifications.  
Equation 4-11 is used for defects evaluations with regard to cost of rework.  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 % =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑥100   (4-11) 
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6- Construction Claims: 
Project claims cost obtained from the control projects was compared with those 
obtained from the past projects. The researcher used a Construction Claims Log for the 
control projects. A sample of the Construction Claims Log is shown in Appendix I. 
Construction claims measures was measured based on cost of claims which could be as a 
result of these six components: 
1- Cost escalation, 
2- Time for completion and construction delays, 
3- Changes in project scope, 
4- Geotechnical and site-related problems, 
5- Weather and force majeure conditions, and 
6- Negligence in both design and construction. 
Equation 4-12 is used for claims evaluations with regard to cost of claims.  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 % =
∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑥100    (4-12) 
Focus Group 
Focus Group Objective 
The questions asked during the focus group depended on the purpose of the group 
and the intended use of the results. The primary objective of focus groups is typically to 
collect opinions, beliefs, and attitudes of the participants. In this study, the main objective 
behind the use of a focus group is to assess the outcomes of implementing the IPD 
principles in water and wastewater projects. This is done primarily by comparing the 
results obtained from measured KPIs of the control projects with the KPIs obtained from 
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data collected from various water utility facilities owners of past projects that were 
delivered using DBB method in South Florida. The participants in the focus group, who 
are major players in the control projects, can help provide this study with a better insight 
into whether any improvements in measured KPIs can be directly correlated to the 
integrated IPD principles, or whether they are correlated to other coincidental factors 
specific to the control project.  
Type of Focus Group 
As discussed in the literature review section, there are three types of focus groups: 
exploratory, confirmatory, or a combination of both.  For this study, the focus group was 
to be confirmatory, because its main objective is to assess and confirm the findings of 
data analysis in comparing the performance of DBB project delivery.   
Focus Group Format 
The focus group for this study consulted stakeholders in the control projects to 
evaluate the comparison of KPI results of the dataset with the KPIs of the control 
projects. The focus group involved different types of stakeholders such as owners, 
engineers, consultants, and contractors. Two main criteria were established for 
participants’ selection: influence and experience in construction projects at Miami Dade 
South District Wastewater Treatment Plant (MD-SDWWTP), and to have been involved 
in the projects used for the control projects.  A secondary criterion is the years of 
professional industrial experience, which is a minimum of ten (10) years. 
The focus group of this research consisted of seven participants who were active 
participants during the design and construction of the wastewater projects at the MD-
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SDWWTP. An effort was made to form an overall sample that covers different sub 
domains of wastewater construction, such as design, construction, project management, 
planning, etc. 
A few days before the focus group meeting, the moderator communicated copies 
of the interview questions to the participants so that they might have time to prepare for 
answers.  
The target participants are shown in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4: Target Participants 
 
 Employment  Target Participants  
1  Client  Design Engineer  
2  Client  Construction Manager  
3 Consultant  Design Engineer  
4  Consultant  Construction Manager  
5  Contractor  Project Manager  
6  Contractor  Project Manager 
7 Contractor Scheduler 
 A location was selected to conduct the focus group meeting for this study that 
takes into consideration convenience for the participants and neutrality. This study 
convened one focus group session.  The focus group in this study was scheduled for one 
and a half hours, with flexible time allocation. According to Gibbs (1997) it is important 
to select a neutral location for the focus group sessions.   
Audio recordings were made to permit subsequent transcription. Direct quotations 
that seem important were written down. Immediately, following the focus group, notes 
were reviewed and information analyzed.  
The focus group session was structured as shown in Table 4-5. 
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Table 4-5: Focus Group Structure 
 
Item Description Duration Responsible 
1 Focus Group Introduction  5 min Moderator 
2 Purpose and Methodology of the Study 30 min Moderator 
3 Discussion Points  50 min All 
4 Ranking of IPD principles 5 min All 
    
Focus Group Discussions and Questions 
An introduction included in Appendix J was presented to the focus group. 
Participants signed Consent to Participate in Focus Group Study as part of the MD-
SDWWTP. A consent sample is presented in Appendix K.  Participants were provided 
with summary details of the research (Appendix L). The moderator provided a short 
presentation of the research and focus group discussion areas followed by self-
introductions.  Summary sheets were provided to enhance the participants’ understanding 
and to prompt discussion, as shown in Tables 4-6 and 4-7.  
 
Table 4-6: KPIs  
 
Item Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of Project 
1 Cost overrun as a percentage of the total project award price 
2 Change order cost as a percentage of total project cost 
3 Time overrun as a percentage of the original project schedule 
4 Number of RFIs per unit price  
5 
Errors and omissions change orders cost as a percentage of total cost of 
change orders 
6 Total claims cost as a percentage of the total project cost 
7 RFI response time per project cost  
8 Cost of field rework as a percentage of total project cost 
9 Owner requested change orders cost as a percentage of total cost of COs. 
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Table 4-7: IPD Principles Applied to DBB Projects in Treatment Plant Projects 
 
Item IPD Principles 
1 Open communication within the project team and ability to address issues 
2 Integrated and collaborative teams 
3 Lean principles 
4 Co-location of teams 
5 Performance evaluations 
6 Mutual respect and trust 
7 Jointly developed project target criteria 
8 Collaborative decision making 
Two discussion areas were conducted with the focus group:  
1- Effect of IPD principles on KPIs of water and wastewater projects delivered using 
DBB delivery method, and  
2- Ranking of IPD principles. 
A list of summarized discussion points is included in Appendix L. Participants were 
encouraged to engage in free discussion to express their opinions. The researcher 
documented the following: 
1- What was discovered and what was learned about the effects of IPD principles on 
the KPIs of DBB project delivery method from the point of view of the 
participants,  
2- Whether the focus group confirms the existence of a direct correlation between 
the implemented IPD principles and any possible improvements in measured KPIs 
of the control projects, and   
3- Evaluate the focus group interview process. What went well and what did not?  
Questionnaire included in Appendix M was distributed to the participants with the IPD 
principles implemented in the control projects listed.  Participants were asked to rank the 
IPD principles from one to five based on which they felt is most influential in improving 
81 
 
the KPIs.  Participants shared their experiences of the KPIs in the group. Their opinions 
and views were analyzed.  
PPR Model 
Chapter 6 discusses the development and implementation of the Project 
Performance Rating (PPR) model. The PPR is a comprehensive rating of performance for 
treatment plant projects and can be used to gauge the overall project performance.   
CORRELATION BETWEEN IPD PRINCIPLES AND PROJECT KPI  
Chapter 6 illustrates the regression analysis and the focus group were then utilized to 
determine the effect of each implemented IPD principle on various project KPIs. A 
guideline metric is developed that can significantly help utility owners aiming to predict 
how implementation of certain IPD principles can impact various project KPIs.
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CHAPTER 5                                                                                                         
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Data Collection 
Data Sample Size  
A comprehensive list of inventory of water and wastewater facilities in the South 
Florida region was compiled, and their performance data corresponding to the KPIs of this 
study were identified. To accomplish this task, several water utilities in South Florida were 
contacted in order to identify the population of water and wastewater projects executed in 
the past decade inside water and wastewater treatment facilities. Project performance data 
were collected for water utility construction projects selected from several water utilities 
in the South Florida geographic region. The population was found to be 60 projects of 
varying sizes completed between 2003 and 2015, and contracted and delivered using the 
traditional Design-Bid-Build (DBB) delivery method. Some projects had insufficient 
records with missing data with regard to one or more performance factor, and thus had to 
be excluded from the analysis. The remaining 43 projects were therefore chosen to make 
up the data population for this study and to compare with the data of the two control 
projects. This projects’ database included projects of varying, but somewhat uniformly 
distributed size. Seventeen projects analyzed for performance indicators were under $6M, 
16 were between $6M and $14M, and 10 were over $14M. 
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Water Treatment Facilities 
A. Miami-Dade County 
There are seven water treatment facilities in Miami-Dade. These facilities provide clean, 
potable water to the entire population throughout the county. The design capacity of the 
water treatment facilities is approximately 500 million gallons a day (mgd). Table 5-1 
summarizes these facilities’ capacities and locations.  
Table 5-1: Miami-Dade County WTP Locations 
 
Plant Name Design 
Capacity 
(mgd) 
Location 
Alexander Orr  217 Miami 
City of Homestead  16.7 Homestead 
City of N. Miami Winson Water Plant 9 North Miami 
Florida City  4 Florida City 
Hialeah-Preston  225 Hialeah 
Norwood Water Plant – N. Miami Beach 16 Miami Gardens 
South Miami-Dade WTP4  12 Miami 
 
B. Broward County 
There are 27 water treatment facilities in Broward County.  The design capacity of these 
facilities is 490 mgd.  Table 5-2 shows a summary of the water treatment facilities of 
Broward County. 
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Table 5-2: Broward County Water Treatment Plant (WTP) Locations 
 
Plant Name Design 
Capacity 
(mgd) 
Location 
Broward County 1A Water Treatment Plant  16 Lauderdale Lakes 
Broward County 2A Water Treatment Plant    40 Pompano Beach 
City of Coral Springs  16 Coral Springs 
City of Dania Beach Water Treatment Plant  3 Dania Beach 
City of Hallandale Beach  10 Hallandale Beach 
City of Lauderhill  16 Lauderhill 
City of Margate Water Treatment Plant  18 Margate 
City of Tamarac Utilities West  20 Tamarac 
Cooper City Utilities  7 Cooper City 
Coral Springs Improvement District  7.1 Coral Springs 
Davie Water Treatment Plant System I  3.4 Davie 
Davie Water Treatment Plant System III  4 Hollywood 
Deerfield Beach East Water Plant 16.8 Deerfield Beach 
Deerfield Beach West Water Plant  18 Deerfield Beach 
Ferncrest Utilities  1 Fort Lauderdale 
Fiveash Water Plant  75 Fort Lauderdale 
Hillsboro Beach Water Plant  2 Pompano Beach 
Hollywood Water Treatment Plant  61 Hollywood 
Miramar West Water Plant  7.5 Miramar 
North Springs Improvement District  6.8 Coral Springs 
Park City Water Treatment Plant–Sunrise #2  6 Fort Lauderdale 
Pembroke Pines Water Treatment Plant #2  18 Pembroke Pines 
Plantation Central Water Treatment Plant  12 Plantation 
Plantation East Water Treatment Plant  12 Plantation 
Pompano Beach Water Treatment Plant  50 Pompano Beach 
Sawgrass Water Treatment Plant–Sunrise #3  18 Sunrise 
Southwest (S. Broward) Water Treatment 
Plant  
2 Davie 
Springtree Water Treatment Plant–Sunrise #1  24 Sunrise 
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C. Palm Beach County 
There are 11 water treatment facilities in Palm Beach County.  The design capacity of 
these facilities is 320 mgd.  Table 5-3 shows a summary of these water treatment 
facilities.  
Table 5-3: Palm Beach County WTP Locations 
 
Plant Name Design 
Capacity 
(mgd) 
Location 
Lake Worth Utilities Authority 17.4 Lake Worth 
Riviera Beach WTP 17.5 Riviera Beach 
Boynton Beach City of 19.24 Boynton Beach 
Seacoast Utilities 23  
Water Treatment Plant No. 2  14.5  
Water Treatment Plant No. 3 30  
Water Treatment Plant No. 8 30  
Water Treatment Plant No. 9 27  
Glades Road 70 Boca Raton 
Southern Regional Water Reclamation 
Facility (WPB) 
47 West Palm Beach 
The City of Delray Beach Water 
Treatment Plant 
26  
Delray Beach 
 
Wastewater Treatment Facilities 
A. Miami-Dade County 
There are four wastewater facilities in Miami-Dade County with a total wastewater 
design capacity of 556 mgd.  The City of Homestead wastewater treatment facility 
provides wastewater service to 10,100 residential and non-residential customers. The 
three Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department (WASD) wastewater facilities provide 
direct sewer service to approximately 315,000 retail customers and 13 wholesale 
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customers. Table 5-4 shows a summary of the wastewater treatment facilities in Miami 
Dade County. 
Table 5-4: Miami-Dade County Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) Locations 
 
Plant Name Design 
Capacity 
(mgd) 
Location 
City of Homestead  6 Homestead 
WASD Central District WWTP 143 Virginia Key 
WASD North District WWTP 120 Miami 
WASD South District WWTP 287 Miami 
B. Broward County 
Broward County has 13 wastewater facilities, the total wastewater design capacity of 
which is 275 mgd. While Broward County does operate and provide sewer service to 
many areas, several municipalities operate their own facilities. Table 5-5 summarizes the 
wastewater treatment facilities and shows the location of each plant. 
Table 5-5: Broward County WWTP Locations 
 
Plant Name Design 
Capacit
y (mgd) 
Location 
Broward County N. Regional  84 Pompano Beach 
City of Margate East WWTP  5 Margate 
City of Margate West WWTP  5 Margate 
Cooper City Utilities  3.75 Cooper City 
Coral Springs Improvement District  8.33 Coral Springs 
Ferncrest Utilities, Inc.  0.6 Fort Lauderdale 
G.T. Lohmeyer Plant  55.7 Fort Lauderdale 
Hollywood Southern Regional WWTP  48.75 Hollywood 
Pembroke Pines WWTF  9.5 Pembroke Pines 
Plantation Regional WWTP  18.9 Plantation 
Sawgrass Regional WWTF–Sunrise #3  20 Sunrise 
South Broward (Southwest) WWTF  1 Davie 
Springtree Regional WWTF–Sunrise 
#1  
10 Sunrise 
Town of Davie WWTP  5 Davie 
87 
 
C. Palm Beach County 
 A total of 13 wastewater facilities operate in Palm Beach County, with a total wastewater 
design capacity of 171 mgd. Similar to Broward County, several municipalities operate 
their own facilities and provide sewer services to their areas. Table 5-6 shows the 
wastewater treatment facilities and their locations. 
Table 5-6: Palm Beach County WWTP Locations 
 
Plant Name Design 
Capacity 
(mgd) 
Location 
Boca Raton, City of - WWTP 17.5 Boca Raton 
Loxahatchee Env Control Dist WWTP 11 Jupiter 
South Central Regional WWTP 24 Delray Beach 
Seacoast Utilities PGAWWTP 12 Palm Beach Gardens 
East Central Regional WWTP 70 West Palm Beach 
Palm Beach County Southern Regional 
WWTP 
30 Boynton Beach 
Western Region WWTP 6.5 Belle Glade 
Scope of Data Collected 
Data for treatment plant projects were collected from water utilities in the three 
counties of South Florida; namely Palm Beach County, Broward County, and Miami 
Dade County. This study included a total of 43 projects selected from the total population 
of projects completed in the period of time spanning between years 2003 and 2015. The 
type of projects selected included construction projects inside water and wastewater 
facilities contracted and delivered using the traditional DBB delivery method. 
The projects completed between years 2003 and 2015 totaled 43 projects, 
hereafter referred to as the “dataset”, and were subsequently used for the analysis with 
control projects.  
88 
 
The researcher personally obtained the required data on the projects from 
different databases for the water utilities in South Florida. Statistical analysis was 
performed on the data in order to develop statistical measures, such as minima, maxima, 
averages, and standard deviations of grouped data. 
The performance of the construction projects in the dataset was compared to that 
of the two control projects delivered using the combined IPB and DBB approach. This 
was done through the comparison of KPIs identified earlier in Chapter 4, such as cost 
overrun %, time overrun %, total claims cost %, cost of field rework %, RFI response 
time per unit price, RFI per unit price and change order cost %, error and omissions CO 
cost %, and owner’s CO cost %. 
Figure 5-1 shows a graphical summary of the dataset categorized per award years, 
and notes the contract average amounts. For example, in 2008, seven projects were 
awarded, with a contract average base amount of $231M, an average contract base 
amount plus contingency of $262M, and an average actual amount paid to the contractors 
of $247M.  
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Figure 5-1: Number of projects and contract average value per award year. 
Data Sources 
Water utility construction projects data used in this research were obtained from 
several water and wastewater facilities in South Florida, including in-house documents 
and databases. The data from Broward County and Palm Beach County was in both hard 
copy and electronic formats.  
Miami Dade Water and Sewer Department (MDWASD) uses Proliance and 
SharePoint, which are intranet websites available for MDWASD’s personnel and 
approved users. Proliance and SharePoint include detailed and extensive construction 
projects data records. Construction projects started before 2006, however, were not 
available in Proliance or SharePoint.  
Proliance and SharePoint serve as the foundation of MDWASD’s project control 
tracking system (PCTS) operating on a single database. They include projects 
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information as well as search capabilities. Figures 5-2 and 5-3 are example output screens 
for typical Proliance and SharePoint searches, respectively.       
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Figure 5-2: Output from Proliance. 
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Figure 5-3: Output from Sharepoint.
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Project Performance Measures 
Overall and individual project performance of projects comprising the dataset 
were evaluated and compared to the performance of the control projects. This was done 
by comparing the project outcomes in several key areas that were determined in Chapter 
4 to constitute the KPIs of any construction project. Results of these comparisons are 
presented in the following sections.  
Project Categories 
The study categorized the projects by their total base contract value. Even though 
KPIs were normalized by the total project value to eliminate any bias introduced by the 
project size, such categorization would still add some value by providing insight into 
whether certain KPIs have any particular trends in large or small projects. The cost 
categories selected are as follows (cost in millions of dollars):   
- Base contract value: $0M–$1M, 
- Base contract value: $1M–$2M, 
- Base contract value: $2M–$6M, 
- Base contract value: $6M–$10M, 
- Base contract value: $10M–$14M, 
- Base contract value: $14M–$22M, 
- Base contract value: $22M–$40M, and 
- Base contract value: $40M–$120M. 
Figure 5-4 provides a summary of the categories, showing the total number and 
percentage of overall projects falling into each category of the dataset. For example, the 
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figure shows that for the base contract amount category between $2M and $6M, there are 
eight projects, which constitute 18.6% of the 43 projects in the dataset. Figure 5-4 shows 
the distribution of projects. 
 
Figure 5-4: Number and percentage of projects for specified range of contract value. 
Figure 5-4 shows that nearly 23.2% of the projects in the dataset were under $2M, 
nearly 19% of the projects were between $2 M - $6 M, nearly 21% of the projects were 
between $6M to $10M, nearly 25% of the projects were between $10M - $22M, and 
nearly 11% of the projects were over $22M. The average base contract value in the 
dataset was $12.8M, and the maximum was $117.5 M. 
 Performance Evaluation with Regard to Cost 
Project cost is of major interest as it shows the resource usage in economic terms. 
Another important aspect is cost predictability, which predicts whether the final overall 
cost is in line with the base contract amount (Swan and Khalfan, 2007). Following 
contract award, the bid price becomes the benchmark for cost control purposes. 
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Contractors are required to submit a cash flow schedule or schedule of values that the 
water utilities will use to assess project performance by comparing actual costs to the 
original base contract amount. At project completion, the final cost is compared to the 
original bid price to assess the project delivery performance in terms of any sustained 
cost overruns.  
It is very common for water related projects to experience cost overruns. While 
the causes of the cost overrun can be numerous, there is always a need to revisit how the 
estimate was originally established and identify any errors. This study analyzed the cost 
performance of the dataset projects at contract completion. Cost overruns, also referred to 
as cost growth, in the two control projects were compared with those of the dataset 
delivered using traditional DBB. Cost overrun during construction delivery is an 
important cost performance indicator.  Equations 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3 were used to obtain 
the numerical values of the KPIs for cost performance evaluation.  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠             (5-1) 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛 ∆ =
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − ∑ 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
              (5-2)                 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛 % =
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
× 100                 (5-3) 
The cost overrun results are presented in Figure 5-5 as percentages of the base contract 
amount. The average cost overrun percentage on traditional DBB projects of the dataset 
was 7.8%. The average cost overrun on the control projects of the two case studies was at 
3.9%.  The cost performance of the control projects is almost half that of the dataset 
projects delivered using traditional DBB.  
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Figure 5-5 shows a wide range of the cost overrun percentage for projects in the 
dataset. It also shows that almost all projects tend to exceed the original contract price. Of 
all projects in the dataset, 22% have a cost overrun of 10% or more. This reflects the high 
variance of the projects, for which the average cost overrun was 6.85% and the standard 
deviation was 1.03%. The columns in Figure 5-5 marked in yellow represent the cost 
overrun of the two control projects, which are at 3.41% and 4.36%, respectively. The data 
in Figure 5-5 shows two clear outliers, one with a 39% cost overrun, and the other with a 
negative 8% cost overrun. Such data outliers deserve an elaboration to the underlying 
reasons for uncommon cost overrun. The project with 43% cost overrun was a water 
treatment plant upgrade in the City of Fort Lauderdale. This contract’s base amount cost 
was $1.75M and the actual cost was $2.43M. Total change orders were $678,975.27 of 
which 85% ($578,158) were owner requested changes. The owner requested change 
order was rehabilitation of underdrains and filter media replacement for two large water 
filters, which was not part of the scope of work of this contract. The second project with 
negative 8% cost overrun was a wastewater treatment plant upgrade in Palm Beach 
County. This contract’s base amount cost was $1.18M and the actual cost was $1.06M. 
The reduction in total cost was due to three change orders that were initiated by the 
owner for deleted work and resulted in a total credit of $114,699. 
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Figure 5-5: Distribution of projects with respect to the cost overrun percentage. 
Figure 5-6 shows the cost overrun percentages for both projects of the dataset and 
the control projects, categorized according to the base contract amount categories 
discussed earlier. In examining all the categories of the base contract amount in Figure 5-
6, the average cost overrun can be seen to fluctuate between 6 and 9% for all categories 
except the second ($1M - $2M). The wider range observed in the second category is a 
direct consequence of the 39% cost overrun outlier project discussed in Figure 5-5. 
Removal of this outlier data point would result in a much narrower range that is between 
0 and 6.05%. While the average was reasonable, the range between the minimum and 
maximum cost overrun for every category was quite substantial. For example, the $2M - 
$6M category, which comprises 8 projects from the dataset and in which the control 
projects fall, had a minimum of 0.83% and a maximum of 15.76% cost overrun. The 
minimum and maximum figures represent the lowest and highest cost overrun incurred 
by projects. The cost overrun percentage for the control projects are shown to be at 
4.36% and 3.41%—well below the 5.54% average for their category, and the 7.2% 
overall for the entire dataset. 
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If the distribution of cost overrun amounts is examined by bid amount category, it is seen 
that the average amount of cost overrun is the highest for an original bid amount greater 
than $1M. It can be noticed that for base amounts less than $1M, the average cost overrun 
is lower than for those bid amounts greater than $1Mwith the exception of $22M - $40M 
range.  Only three projects of the dataset belonged to the $22M - $40M range, of which 
the cost overrun percentage range was between 2.94% and 7.55%. The project with 
2.94% cost overrun is a project for Miami Dade Water and Sewer Department, which 
included approximately $2M of fuel costs, in the base amount, for testing new generators 
and for filling the fuel storage tanks with 200,000 gallons of fuel for emergency cases 
such as hurricanes. The amount of fuel used was less than what was in the contract 
documents and there was no need to fill the fuel storage tanks, which resulted in a cost 
reduction of $1.16M or 3.3% cost reduction, thus resulting in a lower cost overrun than 
would be expected.  
 
Figure 5-6: Cost overrun percentages for specified contract base amount range. 
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Figure 5-7 compares the cost overrun averages of all projects in the dataset to the cost 
overrun percentage of the control projects.  
  
Figure 5-7: Comparison of cost overrun average of all projects to time overrun of 
control projects. 
 
The cost overrun measures the difference between the award cost and the actual 
cost of the projects divided by the number of projects, as is demonstrated in Equation 5-2.  
For the traditional DBB projects the average cost overrun was calculated to be at 
$936,147 while the average cost overrun for the control projects was calculated to be at 
$157,407 as shown on Figure 5-8. The control projects show an average cost overrun that 
is 83.2% lower than the traditional DBB projects of the dataset. This is an indication that 
the actual expenditure of the control projects was very close to the award cost in 
comparison to that of the dataset projects.   
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Figure 5-8: Comparison of average cost overrun of all projects to control projects. 
Performance Evaluations with Regard to Time 
Since time can be a critical factor for many clients, project duration is often of 
prime interest. However, schedule overruns may be an even more important issue. Time 
overrun, also referred to as time growth, during construction delivery is an important 
KPI. Time performance measurement can be established on the basis of a relationship 
among a number of project time variables, such as original contract duration and actual 
contract duration. The performance measure adopted in this study is the time overrun 
percentage, which measures the deviation of a project’s actual duration from the original 
contract duration.  Equations 5-4 and 5-5 are used to determine numerical values of the 
KPIs for time performance evaluation. 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛 ∆=
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒−∑ 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
                (5-4) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛 % =
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑥100                          (5-5) 
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where Actual Project Duration is calculated as the time span between the Notice to 
Proceed date and the date when all work has been completed. 
Figure 5-9 shows the time overrun as a percentage of the original project duration for 
both projects in the dataset and the control projects. The same figure shows a substantial 
range in the time overrun of completed projects and illustrates that most projects tend to 
exceed their original contract durations. Of all the projects in the dataset, 72.1% finished 
later than originally planned with 50% having a time overrun greater than 10%. Around 
9.3% of the projects finished sooner than originally planned. One of these projects was a 
Miami Dade Water and Sewer Department project with an engineer’s duration of 5.5 
years and base amount of $82M. This project included building four new clarifiers and 
was completed 153 days ahead of schedule. The engineer’s schedule on this project was 
over estimated and the contractor was able to sequence the construction activities in 
parallel and crashed activities by pouring large amounts of concrete at once.  Another 
$4.4M project with 2.5 years duration in Broward County was completed 39 days ahead 
of schedule.  The project’s scope of work entailed demolitions of existing ground storage 
tank and pump station; construction of a new 1.5 million gallon tank, service pumps, 
ammonia and hypochlorite system. This project had a -3.86% time overrun since the 
contractor was able to save time in building the tank using new construction techniques. 
The contractor used special wall forms, which allowed the casting of the walls faster than 
could be done by traditional methods. This reflects the high variance of the projects, for 
which the average time overrun was 22.2%, and the standard deviation was 34.99%.  The 
control projects had time-overrun percentages 0% and -0.71% and are shown in yellow in 
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Figure 5-9. Implemented IPD principles with DBB delivery method is shown to have a 
time performance superior to the traditional DBB delivery method. Figure 5-9 shows that 
the distribution of time overrun in the chosen categories is normal, and has a somewhat 
bell shape. 
 
Figure 5-9: Distribution of projects with respect to the time overrun percentage. 
To further analyze the time performance of the control projects, Figure 5-10 was used to 
show the variation of the average time overrun percentage in relation to the project base 
contract value categories defined earlier. For example, the $2.0M - $6.0M category has 
an average time overrun of 28.56%. The maximum time overrun percentage has 
substantially extreme values also, with an average of 122.2%. The control projects, which 
fall in the same category, had a time overrun percentage that is very close to the 
minimum overrun line for that particular category. A comparative analysis of cost and 
time overrun between the projects revealed interesting trends. The majority of the dataset 
projects experience time overrun and the overrun amounts vary and are dependent on the 
volume of contract. The distribution of time delays exhibits a wider range of variation. 
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This may be attributed to unforeseen conditions, error in the owner’s original contract 
time estimate, and/or management deficiencies.  
An interesting result was that longer contract duration and higher project cost are 
associated with a smaller time overrun. This finding seems rather surprising as longer 
contract duration and larger projects would typically be expected to have a greater time 
overrun due to the nature of complexity of these projects. It is possible that such 
unexpected finding was caused by correlation between the project duration and other 
variables, which could result in a greater time delay. It may be interesting to carry out 
further investigation of these trends, such as examining any existence of correlation 
between other variables.  
 
Figure 5-10: Time overrun percentages for specified contract base amount. 
The overall average time overrun percentage for all the projects in the dataset was 
at 23.3%.  Figure 5-11 compares the time overrun average of all projects in the dataset to 
the time overrun percentage of the control projects. 
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Figure 5-11: Comparison of time overrun average of all projects to time overrun of 
control projects. 
 
Another time performance measure is the average time overrun, which measures 
the difference between the scheduled time and the actual completion time of the projects, 
divided by the number of projects, as was shown in Equation 5-4. For the traditional 
DBB projects of the dataset, the average time overrun was calculated to be at 104.63 days 
while the average time overrun for the control projects was calculated to be negative 2.0 
days as shown in Figure 5-12.  
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Figure 5-12: Comparison of average time overrun of all projects to control projects. 
 
Table 5-7 shows the percentage of projects completed at different levels of time 
and cost overrun. For example, at 0% cost overrun (actual cost - base cost)/base cost, 
2.44% of the projects were completed within the bid price. At 0% time overrun (actual 
duration - bid duration)/bid duration, 34.15% of the projects were completed on time. No 
trends can be observed from this table and it can be concluded that there exists no 
relationship between the cost overrun and the time overrun for a specific overrun percent. 
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Table 5-7: Percentage of Projects at Different Levels of Time and Cost Overrun 
 
% Overrun % of Projects at 
Indicated % of Cost 
Overrun 
% of Projects at 
Indicated % of Time 
Overrun 
0% 2.44% 34.15% 
5% 34.15% 7.32% 
10% 39.02% 9.76% 
15% 17.07% 17.07% 
20% 4.88% 4.88% 
25% 0.00% 4.88% 
30% 0.00% 2.44% 
35% 0.00% 2.44% 
40% 2.44% 0.000% 
55% 0.00% 2.44% 
75% 0.00% 2.44% 
85% 0.00% 2.44% 
100% 0.00% 2.44% 
105% 0.00% 2.44% 
125% 0.00% 2.44% 
135% 0.00% 2.44% 
 
Figure 5-13 shows the number of projects completed at different levels of time 
and cost overrun. This graph is helpful to identify the projects with the same time and 
cost overrun at an indicated percentage.  For example, there are six projects that have 
approximately the same percent of time and cost overrun. Five of these projects had a 
percent overrun range between 5% and 10%, and one project fell in the 10% to 20% 
range. At 5% of both time and cost overrun, four projects, which is equivalent to 9.68% 
of the projects, experienced time and cost overruns. This figure is also significant to 
identify the projects with a certain successful limit of percent of both time and cost 
overrun. For example, if 5% time and cost overrun was considered a successful limit, 
then, seven projects (16.2% of all projects) were considered to have been successfully 
completed. 
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Figure 5-13: Comparison of percent time overrun to percent cost overrun per 
project. 
 
Performance Evaluation with Regard to Change Orders (CO)s 
Change orders (CO), commonly issued due to Request for Proposal (RFP), occur for 
many reasons on construction projects. These reasons share common characteristics and 
can be classified in common categories. In DBB projects, the causes of changes have 
been classified into five categories. According to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 
the U.S. Navy (National Research Council 1986), the categories into which the primary 
causes for changes fall are: 
- Design deficiencies (errors and omissions), 
- Criteria changes, 
- Unforeseen conditions, 
- Owner requested changes, and 
- Other categories. 
125.56%
4.72%
95.70%
83.00%
-3.86%-2.02%
0.00%
12.64%
8.16%
-2.29%
0.00%
1.78%
71.16%
-0.71%
10.68%
122.16%
4.99%
23.26%
0.00%
8.03%
19.32%
15.00%
104.11%
0.00%
8.25%
0.00%
27.74%
-7.62%
21.33%
8.78%
0.00%
14.09%
15.00%
11.01%
15.55%
51.52%
30.65%
0.00%
-20.00%
-10.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
110.00%
120.00%
130.00%
140.00%
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
C
o
st
 &
 T
im
e
 O
ve
rr
u
n
Projects
Cost Overrun Time Overrun
108 
 
The number and percentage cost of COs obtained from the control projects were 
compared with the corresponding KPIs of the traditional DBB projects of the dataset. The 
control projects utilized CO Logs that were updated weekly by the researcher. A CO Log 
is shown in Appendix F. Equations 5-6, 5-7, and 5-8 were used to determine numerical 
values of the KPIs with regard to change orders.  
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 % =
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑥100     (5-6) 
Percent of changes that are owner requested: 
 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝐶𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 % =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝐶𝑂
∑  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑥100                 (5-7) 
Percent of changes that are due to design errors and omissions: 
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐶𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 % =
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐶𝑂
∑  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑥100  (5-8) 
Figure 5-14 illustrates how the percent of total CO cost of projects varies in relation to 
the contract base amount categories. The average coefficient of variation was significant 
at 102%. In examining the categories of the base contract amount, the $2M - $6M range 
category had a minimum and maximum CO cost — as a percentage of the contract base 
amount — of 2.2% and 15.8%, respectively. The CO percentage costs for the control 
projects were, in comparison, at 3.6 and 8.1%. These values were respectively at the 
minimum and average percentage CO cost for the dataset projects in the same base 
contract value category. 
Figure 5-14 does not show a uniform trend of the percent of CO cost versus the 
contract base amount. This is due to the fact that COs are based on many variables that 
change with different projects. The most significant interactions of cost variables are the 
following: 
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1- Timing of the change order: Practically, the cost of change increases as the project 
moves toward completion (Chick, 1999); and 
2- Reason for the Change: As previously mentioned, there are several reasons for the 
owner to issue a change order.  
 Contractors may need to underbid projects to secure work in a competitive 
bidding environment. COs may be used to make up losses inherent in the bids.  The 
outlier project with 38.8% total CO cost was a water treatment plant upgrade in the City 
of Fort Lauderdale previously illustrated in the cost overrun in Figure 5-5. The cost 
overrun of this project was equal to the CO cost of $678,975.27. 
 
Figure 5-14: Total CO cost for specified contract base amount range. 
Table 5-8 lists some basic information about the overall average of the RFP 
percentage cost. 
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Table 5-8: Statistics of the CO Performance Measure 
 
Measure Average Standard 
Deviation 
Coeff. of 
Variation 
Minimum Maximum 
% Total CO 6.57% 6.75% 102.6% 0.0% 38.8% 
 
Rowland (1981) found that the amount of change orders increases with the 
increase in the contract size due to the complexity of larger projects. Rowland (1981) 
found that lack of effective communication channels in large projects, tend to increase the 
likelihood of a high number of change orders. In addition, the larger the gap between the 
low bid and the next low bid on a project, the greater the likelihood that a project will 
experience greater number of change orders. According to Rowland, when there is a low 
bid is significantly lower than the next low bid due to an error, the low bidder who has 
been awarded the project needs to take advantage of change orders to recover the losses.    
From another perspective, because the risks are higher in largest cost ranges, 
(above $22M), more care could be exercised during construction and planning phases, 
leading to a lower likelihood of cost overrun and time delays. Similarly, for the smallest 
cost ranges ($0M - $1M), because the projects are very simple in comparison to large 
complex projects, the CO cost percent tends to be lower.  
Figure 5-15 shows how the owner requested CO cost of projects as a percentage 
of the base contract amount varies in relation to the contract base amount categories. In 
examining the category ranges of the base contract amount, the $2M - $6M range had a 
minimum and maximum of 0.14% and 7.1% owner requested CO cost, respectively. The 
owner requested CO cost percentage for the control projects were at 4.5% and 1.9%, 
which are close to the average and the minimum percentages for the dataset projects in 
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the same base contract value category.  Figure 5-15 shows that the highest owner 
requested change orders were in $1M - $2M range with an average of 7.5%. The outlier 
project with 38.08% of owner requested CO cost was a water treatment plant upgrade in 
the City of Fort Lauderdale previously illustrated in the cost overrun in Figure 5-5 and 
Figure 5-14. Total change orders were $678,975.27 of which 85% ($578,158) were 
owner requested changes. As shown the average trend is not uniform across the contract 
base amount range due to the nature of variation of the conditions of each project. In 
water related projects, contracts that are less than $1 million are either simple 
rehabilitation projects, site preparation projects, or small pipeline projects.  In that $0M -
$1M range, projects are simple and straight forward such as coatings, making it limited 
for owners to implement additional scope of work. On the contrary, $1M - $2M range has 
the highest average percent of owner requested CO cost. The $1M - $2M range projects 
include rehabilitation and improvement projects to existing structures that are more 
complicated than the $0M - $1M range. In these types of projects, the onsite owner’s 
operations personnel who have the hands-on experience of working in these facilities and 
who were not involved in the design and planning phase of the project generate wish lists 
of changes that they would like to replace or add to the facilities. This rarely is the case in 
larger projects composed mostly of new structures and in which the owner’s wish list 
tends to be smaller and lean towards a smaller impact on the overall cost of the project.   
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Figure 5-15: Owner requested CO cost for specified contract base amount range. 
 
Figure 5-16 illustrates how the owner requested CO cost of projects as percentage 
of the total CO cost varies in relation to the actual expenditure cost.  Both control projects 
fell close to the minimum. Figure 5-16 shows that the average owner requested CO cost 
of projects as a percentage of the total CO cost does vary greatly among the contract 
actual expenditure cost range. Figure 5-16 is similar to Figure 5-15; however, the trends 
are sharper. Figure 5-16 also shows that the most frequent owner requested change orders 
were in $1M - $2M range with an average of 98.83%.  
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Figure 5-16: Owner requested CO cost for specified actual expenditure range. 
The researcher reviewed the COs of the dataset projects and assessed the COs 
related to errors and omissions. Omissions usually add value to a project. Instead of being 
included at the time of contract award, the building improvement that was omitted from 
the design documents is picked up by a change order. Design errors, on the other hand, 
are mistakes made by the designer that, when corrected, do not add to the greater value of 
the project. Figure 5-17 shows how the errors and omissions CO cost percentage of 
projects varies in relation to the contract base amount. In examining the categories of the 
base contract amount, the $2M - $6M category had a minimum and a maximum of 0.35% 
and 3.20% of error and omission CO cost, respectively. In comparison, the error and 
omission CO cost percentage for the control projects were at 0.88% and 0.60%, which 
are close to the average minimum for the dataset projects in the same base contract value 
category.  Figure 5-17 is the opposite of Figure 5-15 where the least frequent error and 
omission change orders were in the $1M - $2M range with an average of 0.75%. As 
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previously mentioned, the $1M - $2M range projects includes rehabilitation and 
improvement projects where the errors and omissions are limited since the design of such 
projects is simpler than most of the other contract ranges.  The narrow ranges of variation 
in the percent error and omission CO cost for projects in the $40M - $120M range, is 
because there were only two projects in that category, and both projects had close percent 
values.  
 
Figure 5-17: Error and omission CO cost for specified contract base amount range. 
 
Similarly, Figure 5-18 shows how the percent of errors and omissions CO cost of 
projects varied in relation to the actual expenditure cost. One of the control projects fell 
above the average, while the other very close to the minimum.  
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Figure 5-18: Error and omission CO cost for specified actual expenditure cost 
range. 
 
In Figure 5-19 the time overrun percentage is plotted against the total number of 
RFPs. Wide ranges of variation in time overrun percentages can also be observed when 
the time overrun percentage is plotted in relation to total number of RFPs, as was the case 
when plotted against the project base contract amount. When examining the ranges of the 
total number of RFPs, the time overrun percentage of the two control projects fell near 
the average minimum for projects in the dataset having the same range of RFPs.   
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number of RFPs versus time overrun. This is mostly due to the fact that RFPs are based 
on many variables that change with different projects such as: 
1- Time extensions granted when RFPs are owner requested; and 
2- Work stoppages, where it is not uncommon that the contractor has to stop the 
work when a change order is issued, thus increasing the time overrun.   
Since the cases stated above do not occur in every RFP, this would not have to result in 
an increase in the time overrun. On large projects, group leaders may pay special 
attention to prevent time overrun from exceeding larger rates.  
 
Figure 5-19: Time overrun for specified total number of RFPs. 
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ranges of total CO cost to contract base amount. This evaluation is shown in Figure 5-20. 
It can be seen from Figure 5-20 that in evaluating this KPI, the control projects had time 
overrun percentages of negative 0.89% and 0%, respectively. Both control projects thus 
have this KPI falling near or below the minimum average of the dataset projects in the 
same ranges.   
Similarly, Figure 5-21 illustrates how the time overrun percentage varies in 
relation to the specified percent range of total CO cost to actual paid amount. The time 
overrun percentage for the control projects again shows to be at or very near to the 
minimum averages of the dataset projects.  Projects with minimum percent range of total 
CO cost experienced the most time delay (an average of 53.15%). This can be attributed 
to small size projects with tight schedules where a small percent of CO can lead to higher 
levels of delay in the contract execution. Projects with the largest percent range of total 
CO cost experienced the least time delays due to their large projects’ size with long 
original projects durations. The zero time overrun value for projects with over 16% total 
CO cost was because there was only one project in that category, and that project did not 
experience any time delay. 
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Figure 5-20: Time overrun for specified percent range of total RFP cost to contract 
base amount. 
 
 
Figure 5-21: Time overrun to specified percent range of total CO cost to actual paid 
amount. 
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Figure 5-22 illustrates how the cost overrun percentage varies in relation to the 
specified percent range of total CO cost to contract base amount. The cost overrun 
percentages for both control projects were near the minimum calculated average for the 
dataset projects. The relationship between cost overrun and percent range of total CO cost 
to contract base amount, in Figure 5-22, shows a strong direct correlation, where an 
increasing cost overrun percentage value is directly related to an increased percent range 
of total CO cost of projects. A similar pattern is shown in Figure 5-23, in which cost 
overrun percentage increases with an increase in the percent range of total CO cost to 
actual paid amount. This trend is logical and expected given that cost overrun is mostly 
due to additional cost coming from COs. It can be observed from previous figures that the 
higher percentage of CO costs does not occur in large projects and these projects tend to 
have lower cost overrun percentages. Figure 5-23 also shows that the cost overrun 
percentage for the control projects was at or below the average minimums of the 
corresponding dataset categories.   
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Figure 5-22: Cost overrun to specified percent range of total CO cost to contract 
base amount. 
 
 
Figure 5-23: Cost overrun to specified percent range of total CO cost to actual paid 
amount. 
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The overall average number of RFPs for all the dataset projects was 24.8. Figure 
5-24 compares the overall average number of RFPs for all the dataset projects of the 
dataset to the number of RFPs of the control projects. The plot shows that the values of 
eight and 10 total number of RFPs recorded for the control projects fall well below the 
overall average number of RFPs in the dataset projects. 
 
 
Figure 5-24: Comparison of average number of RFPs of all projects to control 
projects. 
 
Request for Information (RFI) Evaluation  
In most Construction Documents, it is inevitable that the agreement, drawings, 
and specifications will not adequately address every single matter of the project. There 
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from the control projects was compared to those of the dataset projects. The control 
projects utilized RFI Logs that were updated weekly by the researcher. An RFI Log is 
shown in Appendix G.  
RFI performance measures include two components: (1) number of RFIs, and (2) average 
RFI response time. Equations 5-9 and 5-10 are used for performance evaluations with 
regard to RFIs.  
𝑅𝐹𝐼 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
      (5-9) 
𝐹𝐼 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝐹𝐼 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
    (5-10) 
Figure 5-25 illustrates how the number of project RFIs varies in relation to the 
contract base amount. In examining the categories of the base contract amount, the $2M - 
$6M range had a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 55 RFIs. The numbers of RFIs for 
the two control projects were 10 and 25, respectively. In comparison, the numbers of 
RFIs of the control projects fall between the minimum and the average of the dataset 
projects in the same particular cost range.  
It can be noted that the $10M - $14M range experienced a greater number of RFIs 
than the other ranges, with an average of 159 RFIs. The relationship between contract 
base amount and total number of RFIs, in Figure 5-25, shows a strong direct correlation, 
where a contract base amount value is directly related to an increased number of RFIs. 
Contract base amount range of $10M - $14M includes an outlier value, which is difficult 
to explain due to lack of adequate data to determine the cause of the RFIs. 
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Figure 5-25: Total number of RFIs by specified contract base amount range. 
The variation of the cost overrun percentage with respect to the number of RFIs is 
plotted in Figure 5-26. This plot is significant as it shows that the cost overrun percentage 
of any particular project has no apparent relation to the number of RFIs recorded for that 
same project. The cost overrun percentage for the control projects seem to fall 
somewhere midway between the average and the minimum trend lines of the dataset 
projects.  The average cost overrun rate varies between approximately 5.8% and 8.3%.   
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Figure 5-26: Cost overrun by specified total number of RFIs range. 
In Figure 5-27, the time overrun percentage is plotted against the number of RFIs. 
While wide ranges of variation in time overrun percentages can be observed when the 
overrun percentage is plotted in relation to number of RFIs, no direct correlation can be 
derived from this plot, and time overrun for a particular project does not seem to be the 
result of a large number of RFIs. It can be observed that the number of RFIs issued on 
any project is directly related to the size and the duration of a project.  However, a large 
number of RFIs is insufficient to support time overrun where they fail to provide an 
identifiable design defect or set of design defects. Many RFIs issued by the contractors 
are due to needed clarifications, lack of project communications, submittals related 
questions, and other unjustifiable RFIs. The control projects seem to fare well in this KPI 
when compared to the dataset. The time overrun percentage for the control projects fell 
very close to the minimum values of the dataset projects’ time overrun percentages.  For 
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example, in the 20 to 40 range, the time overrun percentage for the control project was at 
negative 0.89%, compared to the 24.5% average value for dataset projects with a similar 
number of RFIs.   
 
 
Figure 5-27: Time overrun specified total number of RFIs range. 
Another KPI for construction projects is how the RFI response time per unit price 
varies in relation to the contract base amount. Relevant data was obtained from 33 
projects where the RFI response time was available for this study. Figure 5-28 shows the 
RFI response time per unit price for the control projects and those of the dataset projects. 
The plot shows that the control projects fell below the average RFI response time per unit 
price value of the dataset. For example, in the $2M - $6M range category, the RFI 
response time per unit price for the control projects were at 2.12E-06 and 9.62E-07.  Both 
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27.95% 26.46% 21.65%
12.09%
49.07%
14.79%
3.34%
-2.29% -2.02% -3.86% 0.00% 0.00%
8.25%
-7.62%
125.56% 122.16%
104.11%
27.74%
95.70%
21.33%
12.64%0.00% -0.71%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
(0-20) (20-40) (40-85) (85-140) (140-190) (190-250) (250-380)
Ti
m
e
 O
ve
rr
u
n
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
No. of RFIs
Avg Time Overrun Min Time Overrun Max Time Overrun Control Projects
126 
 
contract base amount, in Figure 5-28, shows a strong direct correlation, where a contract 
base amount value is directly related to a decreased RFI response time per unit price. On 
large projects, managers expect a large number of RFIs and may make special efforts to 
better process the RFIs to avoid conflicts and delays. 
 
Figure 5-28: RFI response time per unit price by specified base amount cost range. 
 
Figure 5-29 shows how the number of RFIs per unit price varies in relation to the 
contract base amount. The RFI per unit price for the control projects fell below the 
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Both values were below the average of 6.31E-06, and one control value was below the 
minimum of 3.36E-06.  The average values plotted in Figure 5-29 show a declining trend 
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correlation is that projects become more complex as they become larger, so better 
management skills exist and more attention is paid. Larger projects have higher unit 
prices, and therefore the ratio of RFI/unit price would decrease according to the formula 
 𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
      (5-11) 
Even though more complex projects would be expected to have more RFIs, the ratio 
would decrease due to the greater actual project cost. 
 
Figure 5-29: RFI per unit price to specified base amount cost range. 
Figure 5-30 compares the values of the overall average RFI response time per unit price 
and the average number of RFIs per unit price for all dataset projects of the dataset to 
those of the control projects. In both comparisons, both control projects were far below 
the average values of the dataset projects, thus showing a superior performance when 
measured using these KPIs. 
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Figure 5-30: Comparison of average RFI response time per unit price and average 
RFI per unit price of all projects to control projects. 
 
The overall average number of RFIs for all of the dataset projects of the dataset 
was 82.  Figure 5-31 compares the overall average number of RFIs for all of the dataset 
projects to the number of RFIs of the control projects. The control projects were at 10 and 
25 total RFIs, and were thus far below the average values of the dataset projects. 
 
Figure 5-31: Comparison of average number of RFIs of all projects to control 
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Construction Claims 
Disputes often arise between subcontractors, contractors, and owners regarding 
the performance of the project. Expectations of owners, contractors, subcontractors, 
architects, engineers, or suppliers may not be realized, and disputes may arise at any time. 
Disputes frequently occur over the scope, timing and quality of actual work performed, 
and materials delivered. Project claims cost is an economic measure of such disputes. The 
cost of claims obtained from the control projects was compared with those obtained from 
the dataset projects. The researcher used a Construction Claims Log for the control 
projects. A Construction Claims Log is shown in Appendix I. 
Construction claims evaluation was measured based on cost of claims, which 
could be as a result of the following six components: 
1- Cost escalation, 
2- Time for completion and construction delays, 
3- Changes in project scope, 
4- Geotechnical and site-related problems, 
5- Weather and force majeure conditions, and 
6- Negligence in both design and construction. 
Equation 5-12 was used for the evaluation of the cost of claims KPI.  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 % =
∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑥100     (5-12) 
Figures 5-32 and 5-33 show how the cost of claims — as a total dollar amount and as a 
percentage of project base contract amounts, respectively — varies in relation to the 
contract base amount. In the $1M - $7M range category, the cost of claims for the control 
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projects were at $0.0, which is at the minimum of all the dataset projects in the same size 
category. 
The highest number of claims was in the $14M - $22M range. The next highest was the 
$10M - $14M range, and the third highest was the $22M - $40M range. The irregularity 
of the trends suggests that claims are not necessarily endemic to water related projects 
across the industry, but rather depend on the management of these projects. This finding 
indicates the significant impact that management and planning strategies can have on 
reducing or eliminating claims.   
 
Figure 5-32: Cost of claims to specified contract base amount cost range. 
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Figure 5-33: Comparison of percent of cost of claims to contract base amount cost 
range. 
 
Figure 5-34: Comparison of cost of claims to contract base amount of projects. 
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projects was 3.9%, while the average cost overrun of the dataset projects was almost 
double the amount (7.22%). The average cost overrun of control projects was $157,407.  
The average cost overrun of the dataset projects was a staggering $936,147. 
Time: The control projects also had a lower total time overrun during construction 
than the dataset projects. The average time overrun of the control projects was negative 
0.35%, while that of the dataset projects was 23.25%. The average time overrun of the 
control projects was negative 2 days, compared to an average time overrun for the dataset 
projects of 104.63 days. 
RFI: The control projects also had a lower total number of RFIs during 
construction than the dataset projects. The average number of RFIs of the control projects 
was 17.5 RFIs per project, while that of traditional DBB projects of the dataset projects 
was 81.7 RFIs.  
COs: The control projects also had better performance than the dataset projects in 
regard to total number of RFPs during construction. The average number of RFPs of the 
control projects was 9.0 per project, while the average number of RFPs of the dataset 
projects was 24.8 RFPs per project. However, the total normalized cost of COs was 
essentially the same. The delivery method does not therefore appear to affect the CO cost 
performance.   
Claims: The control projects had a lower claims cost than the dataset projects. The 
average claims cost of the control projects was 0.0%, while the average claims cost of the 
dataset projects was 4.9%. 
Figure 5-35 compares KPIs between the dataset and the control projects.  
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Figure 5-35: Comparison of KPIs between dataset and control projects. 
Obtaining Input from Project Participants 
The focus group conducted in this study included various stakeholders in the 
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owners, engineers, consultants, and contractors. Two main criteria were established for 
participants’ selection: (1) influence and experience in construction projects at Miami 
Dade South District Wastewater Treatment Plant (MD-SDWWTP), and (2) involvement 
in the projects used for the control projects. A secondary criterion used was the years of 
professional industrial experience, which was set at a minimum of 10 years. 
Two discussion topics were administered with the focus group:  
1. Effect of the implemented IPD principles on the KPIs of the control projects, and  
2. Ranking of said IPD principles in terms of their influence on the improvements. 
A questionnaire was designed and administered to the participants listing the IPD 
principles implemented in the control projects. The questionnaire included the following 
items: 
1- Participants were asked to rank the implemented IPD principles from 1 to 5 (1 
being the highest and 5 the lowest) based on their perception of how influential 
these principles were in improving the KPIs of the control projects.   
2- Participants were asked to indicate their opinions regarding certain project 
outcomes based on their experience with MD-SDWWTP control projects. These 
outcomes were: client satisfaction, change order costs, number of construction 
defects, number of RFIs, and working experience.  
3- Participants were asked to rank from 0 to 5 (0 being no effect and 5 being the 
most effect), the implemented IPD principles in the control projects according to 
their respective influence on each of the following aspects of the projects: open 
communication within the project team and ability to address issues, integrated 
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and collaborative teams, lean principles, co-location of teams, performance 
evaluations, and mutual respect and trust.  
The opinions and views of the participants were subsequently analyzed to draw 
conclusions. 
Focus Group Results 
Ranking of KPIs 
Table 5-9 shows the participants’ ranking of the IPD principles from 1 to 5 based 
on which they felt was most influential in improving the KPIs of the control projects. The 
overall final ranking is based on a quotient that is obtained by multiplying the rank that 
each participant assigned to a KPI by the number of participants who gave that ranking, 
and then adding them up for that KPI. In this sense, the item that receives the lowest 
quotient is the highest-ranked. 
Table 5-9: Ranking of the KPIs based on their Most Influence in Improving the 
Delivery Method. 
 
Rank KPIs Quotient 
1 Change Order Cost % 16 
2 Total Claims Cost % 17 
3 Time Overrun % 19 
4 RFI Response Time per Unit Price 23 
5 RFIs per Unit Price 25 
6 Total Cost of Field Rework % 26 
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Ranking of the Implemented IPD Principles in the Control Projects  
Figures 5-36 shows the ranking from 1 to 6 (1 being most effective and 6 being 
the least effective) ranking based on effectiveness in determining the success of a 
construction project.  
 
Figure 5-36: KPIs ranking based on effectiveness in determining the success of a 
construction project. 
Figure 5-37 shows the control projects’ characteristics based on the experience of 
the focus group participants with these projects.    
 
Figure 5-37: Characteristics based on experience with control projects. 
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Participants’ Opinions Concerning Outcomes of MD-SDWWTP Control Projects 
including Client Satisfaction  
The concept of quality is closely related to customer satisfaction, which has 
gradually been elevated in importance in the construction industry. Customer satisfaction 
is commonly described as a comparison between the customer’s pre-purchase 
expectations and their post-purchase perceptions. Hence, it involves the customer’s final 
feelings about whether the outcome provided a satisfying or dissatisfying experience 
(Forsythe, 2007). 
There are two main aspects of quality.  
1- Quality of end product, which has to do with the users’ satisfaction with the 
finished construction and is a critical success factor (Collins and Baccarini, 2004; 
Forsythe, 2007). It is also related to how the final product and its functions meet 
the contract specifications (Chan and Chan, 2004, Collins and Baccarini, 2004).  
2- Service quality during the construction process, which reflects the client’s 
perception of the process during which project participants interact to create the 
end product (Maloney, 2002, Forsythe, 2007).  
As part of the evaluation process, the focus group conducted with the wastewater utility 
(owner) representatives measured KPIs related to their satisfaction with the product 
received and the services rendered. Notes on the focus group meeting were handwritten 
and audio taped. Satisfaction levels, change order costs, number of construction defects, 
number of RFIs, and working experience were rated using the following scale: 
1= Strongly Agree, 
2= Agree, 
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3= Neutral, 
4= Disagree, or 
5= Strongly Disagree. 
The opinions of project personnel regarding the traditional DBB delivery method are 
based on personal experience. The opinions and experiences of project participants, 
whether they are owners, engineers or contractors are important. These participants 
contributed valuable information that is essential to the management and success of a 
program. Table 5-10 shows the participants’ responses. A total of six participants 
answered this question, and the values indicated represent the number of participants that 
selected that answer. For instance, all six participants strongly agreed that the 
implementation of IPD principles with DBB delivery method provided good client 
satisfaction with the product, good client satisfaction with the service, and better working 
experience. Only one participant rated the number of construction defects as Neutral.  
Table 5-10: Participants’ Opinions Concerning Characteristics of MD-SDWWTP 
Control Projects including Client Satisfaction 
 
Job Characteristics (1) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(2) 
Agree 
(3) 
Neutral 
(4) 
Disagree 
(5) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Good Client Satisfaction 
with the Product 
6     
Good Client Satisfaction 
with the Service 
6     
Change order costs were 
below average 
5 1    
Number of construction 
defects was below average 
5  1   
Number of RFIs was 
below average 
5 1    
Better working experience 6     
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CHAPTER 6                                                                                     
PROJECT PERFORMANCE RATING (PPR) MODEL AND CORRELATION 
BETWEEN IPD PRINCIPLES AND PROJECT KPI 
This chapter discusses the development and implementation of the Project 
Performance Rating (PPR) model. It also displays the correlation between the 
implemented IPD principles and the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The PPR is a 
comprehensive rating of performance for treatment plant projects and can be used to 
gauge the overall project performance.  Program planning, training, and effective 
implementation of the right project delivery method — accompanied with effective 
contract and program management — are essential to the success of construction 
projects. 
PPR Purpose 
Water and wastewater construction projects do not have well-established overall 
performance rating models. Treatment facilities are unique, highly complex, and 
normally require several performance dimensions to be considered successful. Generally, 
it is not sufficient to deem that a given project is successful assuming it is completed on 
time and within budget.  The same project could have suffered poor quality work and 
experienced major claims, which can ultimately affect the success rate. Project 
performance is a complex concept that cannot be measured by one performance factor.  It 
involves several factors and sub factors that need to be accounted for, some of which are 
qualitative metrics that do not have standards and are more difficult to measure.  An 
aggregate PPR plays an important role in combining the key performance factors of a 
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project into one number, rating, or score, which represents the performance of a given 
project. In this way, PPR facilitates the comparison of projects and can be used to provide 
a basis for improving future projects.  
 This chapter introduces a PPR model that can be applied to treatment plant 
construction projects, regardless of the project delivery system used. To effectively 
implement this model, the PPR is developed as a linear function of the various key 
performance indicators.  The overall project performance is determined through the 
combination of all the key performance indicators. In this sense, the PPR will be an 
effective tool that can be used to assist owners in scoring construction projects of 
treatment facilities.  The owner of a project can assess several performance factors, which 
this model combines to compute the overall performance index or success rating of the 
project.  A PPR model can be used in conjunction with a project rating scale, which can 
serve as a guide that owners can use to evaluate a project’s overall performance.  The 
flowchart in Figure 6-1 illustrates the model development process used in this study.     
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Success Criteria and Performance Factors 
The developed PPR model includes all the key factors and subfactors identified as 
being part of the performance rating.  Success Criteria (SC) are selected, such as 
KPI Mathematical 
Formulation 
KPI Scoring 
Mechanism 
Weighted Average 
Formula of SC and PF 
 
PPR Model      
 
Figure 6-1: Flowchart of model development process. 
Data Collection 
& Preparation 
Focus Group      
Identify KPI’s, Success Criteria (SC) 
and Performance Factors (PF) 
Model Application      
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Customer Satisfaction, and Project Cost and supplemented by a number of Performance 
Factors describing significant evaluation elements.  
The Performance Index is based on the success criteria with different weights 
assigned to each SC and PF. The model is designed in such a way as to allow the owner 
to use the weights of the SC and performance factors that reflect the level of importance 
of each SC and performance factor with respect to the specific facility being constructed. 
The PPR model is thus flexible in that it allows the respective weights of the SC and 
performance factor to be determined to fit the circumstances of each individual project 
and owner preferences.  
The relative significance of specific performance factor may change as 
construction activities headway from one evaluation period into the next. A list of 
performance evaluation criteria and factors is shown in Figure 6-2. They illustrate the key 
performance factors selected as evaluation factors.  
Figure 6-2 exhibits three levels:  
1- PI is the top level, 
2- SC is the second level that includes five criteria that the PPR combines, and 
3- Performance factor (PF) represents all the individual performance factors listed 
under each of the five SCs. 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
PPR Model 
 
 
 
Customer Satisfaction 
 A successfully managed and delivered project is one that results in 
customer satisfaction and repeat business. A project’s performance with respect to owner 
satisfaction can be measured by the number of claims resulting from that particular 
project. Claims are thus used as a critical performance factor for customer satisfaction 
since an owner is not likely to hire the same contractor in the future if the current project 
resulted in claims.  
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Figure 6-41: Flowchart of PPR model 
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Project Schedule  
 Project Schedule reflects the timely and efficient preparation, 
implementation, and closeout of tasks; meeting project milestones and contractual 
delivery dates; recovery from delays; and appropriateness of response to changes. Ontime 
completion of a project is an indicator of many successful aspects of the project delivery, 
such as efficiency and proper project management. A project’s performance with respect 
to schedule can be measured using time overrun as a critical performance factor.  
Project Cost 
A successfully managed and delivered project is one that gets completed on or 
under budget.  The main consideration when evaluating project cost is the measurement 
of the contractor's performance against the bid cost of the contract. Change orders 
typically alter the original contract amount, and cost overrun tracks costs incurred in 
excess of the contract amounts. Cost overrun and change order costs are thus used as 
critical PFs for project cost.   
Design Quality 
A good quality design typically includes detailed approach in design concepts, 
analysis, and detailed execution procedures, thoroughness and accuracy. A large number 
of RFIs and high errors and omissions cost indicate low quality of the design and 
construction documents.  Therefore, RFIs and error and omission costs are used as 
critical PFs for quality.  
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Early Involvement  
Early involvement of project participants — including the owner—promotes a 
well-developed relationship among project participants and is essential at all levels where 
decisions can be made and results achieved. Frequent and honest communication 
improves project efficiency through reduced RFI response time, improved labor relations, 
reduced owner requested change orders, and field rework through improved planning, 
organizing, and managing of all program elements. Early involvement helps to achieve 
and sustain a high level of communication and collaboration, thus resulting in 
recognizing critical problem areas and ensuring integrated operational efficiency. Error 
and omissions typically initiate change orders to pay for the correction needed due to 
poor design quality. 
Weighting of Success Criteria (SC) and Performance Factors (PF) 
In order to calculate the project performance index, the detailed performance 
evaluation structure of the PPR should indicate the relative priorities assigned to the 
various SC and PFs. Communicating relative priorities in this model is accomplished 
through the use of percentage weights.  The SC are considered substantial factors and the 
weights designating the proper importance to the SC are assigned by the owner.  All 
assigned weights for SC must total to 100%. 
The weights of the PFs are left as variables to be determined by the owner 
depending on the level of importance of each PF with respect to a specific facility. The 
relative importance of the factors as described by the weight of each PF should be 
designed to fit the needs of each owner.  For example, the number of change orders is 
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generally critical to the contract.  However, if an owner anticipates a larger number of 
change orders from expected unforeseen conditions due to the lack of record drawings, 
then the weight of such a PF can be adjusted to have a lower weight. This way, the 
expected high number of change orders is not indicative of an unsuccessful project. 
Conversely, change orders for another project, for the same or different owner, could be 
mostly unlikely and therefore, their PF weight is set higher by the owner.  The total of the 
PF weights for each PF totals 100% of the assigned weight for that factor as shown in the 
example below in Table 6-1. The actual weights assigned to SC and PFs used in actual 
projects may be different from those shown in this example. 
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Table 6-1: Weighing of SCs and Example PFs 
    
Success Criteria (SC) 
/Performance Factor (PF) 
 Assigned Weight  
Customer Satisfaction  25%  
 Claims  100% 
Project Schedule   21%  
 Time Overrun  100% 
Project Cost   20%  
 Cost Overrun  50% 
 CO Cost  50% 
Design Quality  18%  
 Error & Omission CO  60% 
 RFI   40% 
    
Early Involvement  16%  
 RFI Response Time  20% 
 Owner Requested CO 
Field Rework 
 20% 
60% 
KPIs 
Standards or criteria for PFs need to be developed for measuring performance, 
assessing effectiveness, and calculating the PI. Quantitative performance measurement 
standards, also known as objective performance standards, are based on well-defined 
parameters for measuring performance.  KPIs are used whenever the given performance 
can be precisely or finitely measured and are not a substitute for judgment (Tufte, 1983). 
The KPIs used in this model that can be quantitatively measured are:  
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- Total Claims Cost %, 
- Time Overrun, 
- Cost Overrun %, 
- Change Order Cost %, 
- Errors and Omissions Cost %, 
- RFI per Unit Price, 
- Owner Requested Changes %, 
- RFI Response Time per Price, and  
- Total Cost of Field Rework %. 
The means and standard deviations of the dataset were then computed for each of the 
nine KPIs, as summarized in Table 6-2. 
Table 6-2: KPI Mean and Standard Deviation of the Dataset 
KPI 
Mean (μj) Standard 
Deviation (σj) 
Range 
Cost Overrun % 7.38 6.59 0.00 to 38.84 
Change Order Cost % 5.83 5.40 -10.77 to 27.98 
Time Overrun % 23.25 34.51 -7.62 to 125.56 
RFIs per Unit Price1 16.40 33.88 2.03 to 166.11 
Errors and Omissions Cost % 27.68 25.23 0.00 to 100.00 
Total Claims Cost % 4.85 14.21 0.00 to 69.30 
RFI Response Time per Unit Price1 6.13 14.85 0.00 to 66.47 
Total Cost of Field Rework % 0.93 0.058 0.72 to 1.11 
Owner Requested Changes % 55.08 35.29 0.00 to 116.09 
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Scoring Mechanism  
For any given project, the developed PPR model combines five SC into one score for 
that project. These five SCs are: 
- Customer Satisfaction,  
- Project Schedule,  
- Project Cost,  
- Design Quality, and 
- Early Involvement.  
The computed PI is based on the scores of the five SC, along with the different 
weights assigned to each. The advantage of using a linear model lies in its simplicity and 
the fact that it allows for the easy modifications of the PFs. The project performance 
rating does not depend on the IPD principles; it depends on the SC in this model, which 
are calculated as the weighted averages of their respective PFs. The SC scores are 
combined and normalized before they are introduced to the weighted average equation. 
The score for each of the five SC also include many PFs, for instance, Project Cost 
includes the Cost Overrun and the Change Order Cost as shown in Figure 6-2. Since the 
KPIs used in this study have various units, values for different factors cannot be simply 
added together, such as cost and time.  
KPIs Mathematical Formulation and Normalization  
For KPIs, a standardization method is used that can transform any set of numbers to 
their equivalent values on the standard normal distribution. The standardization proposed 
by Kreyszig (1979) is used in this study.  This method uses the expression shown in 
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Equation 6-1 to transform a number X of a population into its equivalent standardized 
value Z by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the population 
(Kreyszig, 1979). 
𝑍 =
𝑋−𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛
𝑆𝑡.𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
                                                                                            (6-1) 
Where X is a KPI value.   
One main advantage of such standardization is that a Z value calculated as shown 
in Equation 6-1 is centered around zero. Positive values indicate above average 
performance and negative values indicate below average performance, while zero 
indicates the average project performance regarding the specific KPI. Therefore, the 
measurement units of the standardized values are the number of standard deviations (N) 
above or below the average. For instance, a Z value of 3 for a specific KPI of a project 
means that the project was three standard deviations above the average project 
performance for that specific KPI.  Using the standardized value Z of a KPI, a 
performance score equation was developed in this study to calculate the performance 
score for that particular KPI using the expression developed in Equation 6-2. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
10(−𝑍+𝑁)
2𝑁
  and –N ≤ Z ≤ N                                                      (6-2) 
A performance score of zero is assigned to a PF whose Z value is greater than or 
equal to N; a performance score of 10 over 10 is assigned to a PF whose standardized Z 
value is less than or equal to the negative number of standard deviations (-N).  Table 6-3 
summarizes the performance scoring mechanism for the PFs.  It is important to note that 
above average performance score value for these PFs is an indication of bad project.  This 
includes the following factors: Cost Overrun, Time Overrun, Change Order Cost, Owner 
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Requested CO, Errors and Omissions CO, Claims, Field Rework, RFI, and RFI Response 
Time. For example, an above average value for cost should result in a low performance 
score. Hence, the performance score values are obtained in Equation 6-2 by multiplying Z 
by -1 to reflect the correct score of the factors.  
 
  Table 6-3: KPI Standardization 
KPI Standardized 
Z Score (Z) 
Performance Score 
Z > N 0 
Z < -N 10 
-N ≤ Z ≤ N 10 ×
(−𝑍 + 𝑁)
(2𝑁)
 
*N is the number of standard deviations 
In this study, the KPI values for the entire construction sector under consideration 
are assumed to follow a normal distribution. The normal distribution has 99.7% of the 
area under curve falls within a distance of = ±3 standard deviations (SD) from the mean. 
In other words, 99.7% of values are less than three standard deviations (3SD) away from 
the mean. 95.4% of the area under the curve falls within a distance of = ±2 SD from the 
mean and 68.2% of values are less than one standard deviation (±1) away from the mean 
value. This is illustrated in Figure 6-3.  
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Figure 6-3: Normal distribution density curve. 
These percentages of the area of the normal density curve correspond to 
confidence levels, with 95% being the most commonly used confidence level in research 
and applied practice. A 90% confidence level means one time in 10 an outlier will be 
found. Since the number of standard deviation and the Z value were defined as N and Z, 
respectively, the range of Z would be –N ≤ Z ≤ N.  Table 6-4 shows the confidence levels 
for typical values of N.  
Table 6-4: Confidence Level   
N Confidence Level                  
(Area of normal density curve) 
1 68.2% 
1.28 80.0% 
1.645 90.0% 
1.96 95.0% 
2 95.4% 
2.58 99.0% 
3 99.7% 
 
A higher N value increases the performance score of the PF for a positive value of 
Z and decreases the performance score of the PF for a negative value of Z. For example, 
consider a project where the claims PF is to be calculated.  In the case where N=1 and 
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Z=-0.26, it yields a PF performance score = 6.3.  For the same project, when N=2 and 
Z=-0.26, the calculated PF performance score is 5.7. Also for the same project, and when 
N=3 and Z=-0.26, it yields PF performance score of 5.4. Since the Z value in this 
example was negative, the performance score decreased as the value of N increased. 
Since some of the PFs have positive Z value and some have negative Z value, changing 
the N value has no major effect on the overall performance rating of a project.  Choosing 
a value for N is thus subjective and should be determined by the owner depending on the 
project. For example, an owner might choose a value of N=2 for projects exceeding $10 
M and N=3 for projects equals to or less than $10M. Other owners might choose a value 
of N=2 for complex projects and N=3 for simple projects, such as rehabilitation projects. 
However, for PPR purposes, the value of N does not significantly affect the final rating 
score. A value of N=2, corresponding to the commonly used 95.4% confidence interval, 
is a typical value that is therefore used for the PI formula.  
The following example demonstrates how the performance score is calculated 
using Equation 6-2. Suppose two standard deviations will be used for a certain project, 
then N=2.  
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Table 6-5: KPI Standardization with 3 Standard Deviations 
KPI Standardized Z Score 
(Z) 
Performance Score 
Z > 2 0 
Z < -2 10 
-2 ≤ Z ≤ 2 10 ×
(−𝑍 + 2)
(4)
 
 
The Performance Score is evaluated based on a variable scale from 0 to 10; zero being a 
low performance score, 5 being average, and 10 being good. Table 6-6 shows the various 
cases of the Z value. Figure 6-4 shows the linear relationship that exists between the 
Performance Score and Z for different values of N. For different values of N Figure 6-4 
shows that Z is constrained in an interval between +N and -N.  For example, selecting 
N=1 for PF resulted in Z values which vary from +1 to -1 for the same PF.  Figure 6-4 
also shows that a higher N value increases the Performance Score of the PF for a positive 
value of Z and decreases the performance score of the PF for a negative value of Z. For 
example, consider N=2 and Z=-1.1for a PF, the Performance Score for that same PF=7.8.  
For N=3 and Z=-1.1, the Performance Score = 6.9.    
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Figure 6-4: Comparison of Performance Score of Z. 
The KPIs were then computed, followed by the standardized value, Z, for each KPI, 
and the PF scores based on a value of N=2, as summarized in Table 6-6. 
Table 6-6: Control Projects KPIs and PFs Scores 
  Final Site Work Screening System 
j PF KPI Z Score KPI Z Score 
1 Cost Overrun 3.41 % -0.60 6.51 4.36% -0.46 6.11 
2 Change Order Cost 8.15 % 0.43 3.93 3.64% -0.40 6.01 
3 Time Overrun 0.00 % -0.67 6.68 -0.7% -0.69 6.68 
4 RFIs 3.21 -0.39 5.97 4.93 -0.34 5.85 
5 Errors and Omissions CO 7.13 % -0.81 7.04 23.20% -0.18 5.44 
6 Claims 0.00 % -0.34 5.85 0.00% -0.34 5.85 
7 RFI Response Time 0.96 -0.35 5.87 2.13 -0.27 5.67 
8 Field Rework 0.00 % -16.03 10.00 0.00% -16.0 10.00 
9 Owner’s CO 53.21 % -0.05 5.13 39.39% -0.44 6.11 
*Based on a value of N=2 
0
10
10×((−𝑍𝑗+𝑁)/2𝑁)
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 S
co
re
 a
j
Z-Score Zj
N=2
156 
 
Scoring Computation of KPIs and SC for PPR 
The dataset of 43 projects was used to compute the means and standard deviations 
of the KPIs.  Forty-three projects of the dataset were analyzed for key performance 
indicators and the normalized means and standard deviations of the nine KPIs were 
computed. The remaining two projects are control projects with IPD principles 
implemented in their project delivery. For all nine PFs for each project of the dataset, the 
standardized Z values and the performance scores were computed using Equations 6-1 
and 6-2, respectively. The scoring computation for each of the five SC is illustrated in the 
following subsections.  
SC No. 1: Customer Satisfaction 
For the purpose of the PPR development, one KPI is used for quantifying 
Customer Satisfaction related to a specific project. This KPI is total claims cost as a 
percentage of the total project cost. This is a very important KPI for Customer 
Satisfaction since an owner is not likely to hire the same company in the future if the 
current project resulted in claims.  Based on the level of importance for assessing 
Customer Satisfaction, the weight for Claims PF is a variable that is selected by the 
owner depending on the project’s needs. 
For the used dataset, the normalized mean value for Claims cost is 4.85% of the 
total project cost, and the standard deviation is 14.21.  The Total Claims Cost % KPI is 
standardized to obtain its respective Z value. After this standardization, a performance 
score is computed using Equation 6-2.   
The equation for the performance score of Customer Satisfaction SC is thus 
expressed as shown in Equation 6-3: 
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Customer Satisfaction=𝜔i×
10×[-
(Total Claims Cost%-4.85)
14.21 +N]
2×N
 
(6-3) 
ωi is the user-assigned weight for the Claims PF  
SC No. 2: Project Schedule 
The performance score for the Project Schedule SC is based on Time Overrun 
Percentage.  This selected KPI reflects timely and efficient preparation, implementation, 
and closeout of tasks, meeting key program milestones and contractual delivery dates, 
recovery from delays, and appropriateness of response to changes. For the dataset used, 
the normalized mean for Time Overrun is 23.25% and the standard deviation is 34.51.  
Time Overrun is standardized as shown in Equation 6-4. 
 The equation for the performance score of PS is expressed in Equation 6-4. 
Project Schedule=𝜔i×
10×[-
(Time Overrun%-23.25)
34.51 +N]
2×N
 
(6-4) 
where 
ωi is the user-assigned weight for Time Overrun 
Equation 6-4 is essentially used to calculate the performance score of a project with 
respect to its schedule.  
 SC No. 3: Project Cost  
Project Cost includes the ability to control and adjust the project contract costs and 
cost reductions through value engineering and process methods.  The main consideration 
when evaluating Project Cost is the measurement of the contractor's performance against 
the bid cost of the contract.  Construction cost performance is relatively easy to track 
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because project teams keep useful records of several cost items for different project 
phases. Two KPIs are used to quantify the cost performance score:  
1- Cost Overrun Percentage, and  
2- Change Order Cost Percentage of total cost.  
The normalized mean for Cost Overrun is 7.38% and the standard deviation is 6.59. 
The normalized mean for Change Order Cost is 5.83% and the standard deviation is 5.40.  
The standardized Z value for each of the two PFs is formulated separately in the 
expression for the performance score of the Project Cost SC shown in Equation 6-5. 
Project Cost= 𝜔i×
10 × [- (
Cost Overrun%-7.38
6.59 ) +N]
2N
+𝜔j×
10 × [-(
Change Order Cost%-5.83
5.40 )+N]
2N
 
 
(6-5) 
where ωi is the user-assigned weight for Cost Overrun and ωj is the user-assigned weight 
for Change Order Cost.  Equation 6-5 is used to calculate a project’s performance score 
with respect to its cost. 
SC No. 4: Design Quality 
A good design typically includes detailed approach in design concepts, analysis, and 
detailed execution procedures, thoroughness and accuracy. A good design is also based 
on meeting technical requirements for design, performance and processing, reliability, 
and adequate design reviews. Two KPIs are used to quantify the design quality 
performance score.  The two-project quality KPIs used are:  
1- Errors and Omissions Cost Percentage, and 
2- Number of RFI per Unit Price. 
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Error and Omission cost amounts are measured based on cost percentages relative to total 
construction costs. The normalized mean for Errors and Omissions Cost Percentage is 
27.68% and the standard deviation is 25.23.  The normalized mean for Number of RFI 
per Unit Price is 16.40 per million dollars and the standard deviation is 33.88 per million 
dollars.  The standardized Z value for each of these KPIs is formulated separately in the 
expression for the performance score of the design quality SC shown in Equation 6-6. 
𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  𝜔i ×
10 × [− (
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 & 𝑂𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡% − 27.68
25.23 ) ∓ 𝑁]
2𝑁
+ 𝜔j ×
10 × [−(
𝑅𝐹𝐼 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 16.40
33.88 ) ∓ 𝑁]
2𝑁
 
 
(6-6) 
where 
ωi is the user-assigned weight for Errors and Omissions Cost  
ωj is the user-assigned weight for RFI  
The Number of RFI per Unit Price is in RFI per million dollars. 
SC No. 5: Early Involvement 
Effective communications among project participants is essential at all levels 
where decisions can be made and results achieved. Frequent and honest communication 
improves labor relations, planning, organizing, and managing all program elements.   
Management actions are needed to achieve and sustain a high level of early involvement.  
Collaboration and communication help to recognize critical problem areas and ensure 
integrated operation efficiency.    
The Early Involvement performance score comprises three KPIs: 
1- RFI Response Time per Price, 
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2- Owner Requested Change Cost Percentage, and 
3- Total Cost of Field Rework Percentage. 
The normalized mean for RFI Response Time per Price is 6.13 days per million dollars 
and the standard deviation is 14.85.  The normalized mean for Owner Requested Change 
Cost Percentage is 55.08% and the standard deviation is 35.29.  The normalized mean for 
Field Rework Percentage is 0.93% and the standard deviation is 0.058.  The performance 
score for Early Involvement is expressed in Equation 6-7.  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝜔𝑖 ×
10 × [− (
𝑅𝐹𝐼 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 6.13
14.85 ) + 𝑁]
2𝑁
+ 𝑤𝑗 ×
10 × [− (
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟  𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡% − 55.08
35.29 )]
2𝑁
+ 𝑤𝑘 ×
10 × [− (
𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘% − 0.93
0.058 )]
2𝑁
 
 (6-7) 
where      ωi is the user-assigned weight for RFI Response Time  
ωj is the user-assigned weight for Owner Requested Change Cost  
ωk is the user-assigned weight for Field Rework  
  
Performance Index (PI) Formula 
The PI is a linear weighted sum of the five SCs. Owners can apply the PPR model 
to their water and wastewater construction projects, and the project’s performance can be 
rated relative to the 43-project dataset compiled for this study. There are also no 
restrictions on the use of data values outside the range of the dataset collected to build 
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this model. For instance, in the dataset, the range of Total Claims Cost Percent is 0%–
69%, however a value of 75%, which is outside the dataset range, can still be used in the 
PPR model. 
After obtaining the weights and the performance scores of all the SCs, weighted 
scores can be calculated.  The weighted scores for the five SCs are then combined into 
the PPR model using Equation 6-8. 
𝑃𝐼 = (𝜔1 × 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + (𝜔2 × 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒) + (𝜔3 × 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) +
(𝜔4 × Design Quality) + (𝜔5 × Communication& 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)                      (6-8) 
ω1 is the user-assigned weight for Customer Satisfaction 
ω2 is the user-assigned weight for Project Schedule 
ω3 is the user-assigned weight for Project Cost 
ω4 is the user-assigned weight for Design Quality 
ω5 is the user-assigned weight for Early Involvement 
Tables 6-7 and 6-8 present a numerical example showing how the SC 
performance scores and the PI are calculated for a sample project.  
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Table 6-7: Weighted PF Score Computation 
Performance  
Factor (PF) 
(a)  
PF Score 
(b)   
PF Assigned  
Weights 
(c)  
Weighted PF Score 
(a)x(b) 
Claims 10 
(Excellent) 
1.0 10 
  
Total for Customer 
Satisfaction 
10 
Time Overrun 7.5 1.0 7.5   
Total for Project Schedule 7.5  
Cost Overrun 5.0 .80 4 
CO Cost 2.5 .20 0.5   
Total for Project Cost 4.5  
    
Error & Omission 
Cost 
5.0 .60 3 
RFI  2.5 .40 1.0   
Total for Design Quality 4.0  
RFI Response Time 2.5 .20 0.5 
Owner Requested 
Changes 
Field Rework 
5.0 
 
5.0 
.20 
 
0.6 
1.0 
 
3.0   
Total for Early 
Involvement 
4.5 
*Weighted PF Scores are calculated as follows: [PF Score x Assigned Factor Weight] = 
Weighted PF Scores. For example, for Claims: [10 x .50] = 5. 
 
Table 6-8: Total Weighted Success Criteria Score Computation 
Weighted  
Factor 
SC Score  x  
SC Assigned  
Weight  
=  
Total Weighted 
SC Score  
Customer 
Satisfaction 
10 x .24  = 2.4 
Project Schedule 7.5 x .22 = 1.65 
Project Cost  4.5 x  .20  =  0.9 
Design Quality 4.0 x .18 = 0.72 
Early 
Involvement 
3.75 x .16 = 0.6  
     6.27 (Satisfactory) PI 
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PPR Model Application   
The PPR Model application can be achieved by running several model simulations and 
comparing the results amongst each other values of various simulations with having 
generalized knowledge about these projects. Model application is described in the 
following section. 
Control Project Model Simulation 
The PPR Model will be assessed to be valid if its output matches the “real” output 
within some specified range of accuracy. Two wastewater construction projects are used 
as control projects for implementing the model and verifying its output as compared with 
the actual results.  The first control project (CP1) is Final Site Work and the second 
control project (CP2) is Screening System Improvements at Miami Dade Water and 
Sewer Department. The control projects are described in Chapter 4 of this study.   
It is important to note that the control projects were completed, and the SC and PF 
scores were calculated per the equations described in this PPR Model.  The PPR Model 
simulation is run for 10,000 trials on each control project in order to obtain a mean rating 
value for each of the control projects. The PPR Model simulation is also run for 10,000 
trials on the 43 projects of the dataset to get a mean rating value for the entire dataset. In 
each simulation run, various values of the user defined weights of the SCs and PFs are 
randomly selected using Monte Carlo simulation in excel in order to simulate different 
owner preferences.  Tables 6-9 to 6-13 show a sample of the PI calculations of CP1 for 
five simulation runs with the weights chosen for each SC and PF in each run.   
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Table 6-9: PPR Simulation No. 1  
 
 
Table 6-10: PPR Simulation No. 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SC PF
(a) 
Weight
(b) 
Score
(c) 
Weighted 
Score      
(a)x(b)
(d)        
Score        
∑(c)
(e)      
Weight
(f)     
Weighted 
Score  
(d)x(e)
(g)        
PI      
∑(f)
Customer 
Satisfaction
Claims 1.0 5.57 5.57 5.57 0.24 1.34
Project 
Schedule
Time Overrun 1.0 6.12 6.12 6.12 0.21 1.29
Cost Overrun 0.9 6.00 5.40
CO Cost 0.1 4.28 0.43
Errors & Omissions Cost 0.9 6.36 5.72
RFI per Unit Price 0.1 5.65 0.56
RFI Response Time per Unit 
Price
0.1 5.58 0.56
Owner Requested Changes 0.1 5.09 0.51
Field Rework 0.8 10.00 8.00
0.17
Design Quality
Early 
Involvement
6.461.13
1.54
6.29
9.07
0.18
Project Cost
PF SC
1.170.205.83
SC PF
(a) 
Weight
(b) 
Score
(c) 
Weighted 
Score      
(a)x(b)
(d)        
Score        
∑(c)
(e)      
Weight
(f)     
Weighted 
Score  
(d)x(e)
(g)        
PPR      
∑(f)
Customer 
Satisfaction
Claims 100% 5.57 5.57 5.57 15% 0.84
Project 
Schedule
Time Overrun 100% 6.12 6.12 6.12 15% 0.92
Cost Overrun 90% 6.00 5.40
CO Cost 10% 4.28 0.43
Errors & Omissions Cost 90% 6.36 5.72
RFI per Unit Price 10% 5.65 0.56
RFI Response Time per Unit 
Price
20% 5.58 1.12
Owner Requested Changes 20% 5.09 1.02
Field Rework 60% 10.00 6.00
6.98
Early 
Involvement
8.13 32% 2.60
Design Quality 6.29 26% 1.63
PSF PF
Project Cost 5.83 17% 0.99
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Table 6-11: PPR Simulation No. 3  
 
 
Table 6-12: PPR Simulation No. 4  
 
 
 
 
 
SC PF
(a) 
Weight
(b) 
Score
(c) 
Weighted 
Score      
(a)x(b)
(d)        
Score        
∑(c)
(e)      
Weight
(f)     
Weighted 
Score  
(d)x(e)
(g)        
PPR      
∑(f)
Customer 
Satisfaction
Claims 100% 5.57 5.57 5.57 18% 1.00
Project 
Schedule
Time Overrun 100% 6.12 6.12 6.12 21% 1.29
Cost Overrun 90% 6.00 5.40
CO Cost 10% 4.28 0.43
Errors & Omissions Cost 90% 6.36 5.72
RFI per Unit Price 10% 5.65 0.56
RFI Response Time per Unit 
Price
15% 5.58 0.84
Owner Requested Changes 15% 5.09 0.76
Field Rework 70% 10.00 7.00
6.59
Early 
Involvement
8.60 24% 2.06
Design Quality 6.29 17% 1.07
PSF PF
Project Cost 5.83 20% 1.17
SC PF
(a) 
Weight
(b) 
Score
(c) 
Weighted 
Score      
(a)x(b)
(d)        
Score        
∑(c)
(e)      
Weight
(f)     
Weighted 
Score  
(d)x(e)
(g)        
PPR      
∑(f)
Customer 
Satisfaction
Claims 100% 5.57 5.57 5.57 15% 0.84
Project 
Schedule
Time Overrun 100% 6.12 6.12 6.12 15% 0.92
Cost Overrun 70% 6.00 4.20
CO Cost 30% 4.28 1.29
Errors & Omissions Cost 70% 6.36 4.45
RFI per Unit Price 30% 5.65 1.69
RFI Response Time per Unit 
Price
10% 5.58 0.56
Owner Requested Changes 10% 5.09 0.51
Field Rework 80% 10.00 8.00
7.19
Early 
Involvement
9.07 32% 2.90
Design Quality 6.15 26% 1.60
PSF PF
Project Cost 5.49 17% 0.93
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Table 6-13: PPR Simulation No. 5  
 
 
The average PI of the 10,000 simulation runs for each control project and the 
dataset using the PPR model are summarized in Table 6-14. 
Table 6-14: PPR Simulation Output Summary 
 CP1 CP2 Dataset 
Average PI 5.95 6.00 5.04 
 
Figure 6-5 is a graphical representation of the results of 100 simulation runs.  
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Score        
∑(c)
(e)      
Weight
(f)     
Weighted 
Score  
(d)x(e)
(g)        
PPR      
∑(f)
Customer 
Satisfaction
Claims 100% 5.57 5.57 5.57 13% 0.72
Project 
Schedule
Time Overrun 100% 6.12 6.12 6.12 12% 0.73
Cost Overrun 70% 6.00 4.20
CO Cost 30% 4.28 1.29
Errors & Omissions Cost 90% 6.36 5.72
RFI per Unit Price 10% 5.65 0.56
RFI Response Time per Unit 
Price
15% 5.58 0.84
Owner Requested Changes 15% 5.09 0.76
Field Rework 70% 10.00 7.00
6.83
Early 
Involvement
8.60 34% 2.92
Design Quality 6.29 25% 1.57
PSF PF
Project Cost 5.49 16% 0.88
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Figure 6-5: Average PI for 100 simulation runs. 
Model Simulation Results and Conclusions 
The average PPR Model results of the two control projects (CP1 = 5.95 and CP2 
= 6.00) are higher than the average PPR results of the dataset (Dataset = 5.04) by 18% 
and 19%, respectively.  This implies that the two control projects performed better than 
the average of the dataset projects, and it can therefore be concluded that the use of 
certain applicable IPD principles in the DBB delivery method leads to noticeable 
improvement in the performance of water and wastewater treatment plant projects 
compared to the traditional DBB delivery method.  This improvement is also reflected in 
the KPIs comparison between the control projects and the dataset in Chapter 5, which 
also showed that implementing certain applicable IPD principles can be highly beneficial 
to DBB delivery method in water related public projects. The study also demonstrated 
through the focus group that implementing selective IPD principles improves project 
performance indicators such as cost, schedule, disputes, and owner’s satisfaction.  
The average PI of the dataset is equal to 5.04.  This score is consistent with the 
literature, which has shown the traditional DBB approach to have several shortcomings 
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and pertinent issues, and in need of improvement in order to keep up with the water 
utility owners’ demands and expectations.       
The focus group participants strongly agreed that the use of certain IPD principles 
in the traditional DBB method improved client satisfaction with the product and client 
satisfaction with the service and improved the working experience. The focus group 
participants also attributed most KPI improvements to the implemented IPD principles.   
The two control projects scored close on their performance ratings: 5.95 for CP1 
and 6.600 for CP2.  This can be attributed to two main reasons: (1) the fact that both 
projects were executed for the same owner, were managed by the same consultant, and 
followed the same principles; and (2) the standardization process of the KPIs in which the 
standard deviation of the KPI dataset used has an inverse effect on the range of 
performance scores for different projects. In other words, the higher the standard 
deviation of the population used, the narrower the range of performance scores output of 
the model.  
 Figure 6-6 shows the KPI values of the control projects and the dataset. For each 
KPI, the values of the two control projects are different yet close. This can be attributed 
to the standardization process, which depends on the standard deviation value of the 
dataset. For instance, owner’s CO % KPI has values of 53.2% for CP1 and 39.4% for 
CP2, resulting in a range of 13.8%.  This 13.8% difference constitutes a small percentage 
of roughly 11% of the dataset range, which is 116%. This results in the performance 
scores of the two control projects to be close (5.1 for CP1 and 5.7 for CP2) as shown in 
Figure 6-7.        
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Figure 6-6: Comparison between KPI values of control projects and dataset. 
On the contrary, Change Cost % PF score of the control projects (8.2% for CP1 
and 3.7% for CP2) differ by only 4.5% and yet resulted in a high score difference of (4.3 
for CP1 and minus 5.7 for CP2) 1.4 due to the small dataset KPI values range of 38.7%. 
It can thus be stated that a large difference in the KPI values does not necessarily lead to 
a large difference in PF scores of projects using the PPR model. The variation in scores is 
inversely related to the standard deviation of the dataset KPI values. For the control 
projects, since the KPI values differ only by a small margin compared to the dataset 
range, the corresponding PF scores thus came out to be close.   
  
3.41
0.00
8.15
53.21
7.13
0.00
3.21
0.96
4.36
-0.71
3.64
39.39
23.20
4.93 2.13
0.00
-50.00
-25.00
0.00
25.00
50.00
75.00
100.00
125.00
150.00
175.00
Cost
Overrun %
Time
Overrun %
Change
Cost %
Owner's
CO %
Errors &
Omissions
CO %
Total
Claims
Cost %
RFI per
Unit Price
(x10-6)
RFI
Response
Time per
Unit Price
(x10-6)
Field
Rework %
CS-1 CS-2 Dataset Min. Dataset Max. Dataset Avg.
170 
 
 
Figure 6-7: Comparison between PF scores of control projects and dataset. 
Given the uniformity in project size distribution and large number of randomly 
selected projects included in the dataset, it can be considered to be representative of the 
entire water and wastewater construction market, and the resulting PPR model can be 
readily implemented to water and wastewater construction projects anywhere in the 
United States.   
Correlation between IPD Principles and KPIs 
The study demonstrated that implementing IPD principles to projects delivered 
using DBB delivery method improves the performance score of such projects. The IPD 
principles were not included in the PPR model because the IPD principles have a direct 
relationship with the KPIs. In other words, the performance score of KPI is indirectly 
dependent on the score of the IPD.  In order to predict how improving the implementation 
of certain IPD principles can impact the performance score of a project, the links between 
IPD and KPIs are investigated as part of this study.  
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Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) Principles  
IPD principles are qualitative or subjective performance standards, which rely on the 
evaluator's opinions and impressions of performance quality, but not depend on personal 
bias or intuitive feeling (Platoon, 1990). The IPD principles used in this study are:  
1- Mutual Respect and Trust,  
2- Lean Principles, 
3- Integrated and Collaborative Teams, 
4- Collaborative Decision Making,  
5- Co-location of Teams, 
6- Jointly Developed Project Target Criteria,   
7- Open Communication with the Project Team and Ability to Address Issues, and  
8- Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations.   
IPD Principles Scoring Mechanism 
A measuring scale that was developed by Azhar (2014) and that varies from zero 
to 10 is used for each of the selected IPP principles.  In this scale a zero means that the 
IPD principle was not implemented in a project and a ten means it is fully implemented. 
Following are tables illustrating the scores for each of the IPD principles. (Azhar, 2014) 
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Table 6-15: Scoring Mechanism for Open Communication 
Score for Open Communication 
10 7.5 5 2.5 0 
Communicatio
n flow is 
formally open 
and direct, 
frequency of 
meetings is 
high 
Communicatio
n 
flow is 
informally 
open, 
frequency 
of meetings is 
high 
Communicatio
n 
flow is 
formally 
open and 
direct, 
frequency of 
meetings is low 
Communicatio
n 
flow is 
restrictive 
and routes 
through long 
transmission 
chain, 
frequency 
of meetings is 
high 
Communicatio
n 
flow is 
restrictive 
and routes 
through long 
transmission 
chain, 
frequency 
of meetings 
 
 
Table 6-16: Scoring Mechanism for Integrated and Collaborative Teams 
Score for Integrated and Collaborative Teams 
10 7.5 5 2.5 0 
Goals are 
aligned 
and interaction 
between the 
participants is 
open 
Goals are 
aligned 
but interaction 
between the 
participants is 
partially open 
Goals are not 
aligned but the 
interaction 
between the 
participants is 
open 
Goals are not 
aligned but the 
interaction 
between the 
participants is 
partially open 
Goals are not 
aligned and 
there 
is a physical 
disconnect 
between the 
participants 
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Table 6-17 Scoring Mechanism for Mutual Respect and Trust 
Score for Mutual Respect and Trust 
10 7.5 5 2.5 0 
Trust-building 
workshops 
were 
conducted 
during 
the project 
phases, team 
has 
high prior 
working 
experience and 
trust 
competence 
was considered 
as 
selection 
criteria 
Trust-building 
workshops 
were 
conducted 
during 
the project 
phases, team 
has 
high prior 
working 
experience and 
trust 
competence 
was not 
considered as 
selection 
criteria 
Trust-building 
workshops 
were 
not conducted 
during the 
project 
phases, team 
has 
medium prior 
working 
experience and 
trust 
competence 
was considered 
as 
selection 
criteria 
Trust-building 
workshops 
were 
not conducted 
during the 
project 
phases, team 
has 
medium prior 
working 
experience and 
trust 
competence 
was not 
considered as 
selection 
criteria 
Trust-building 
workshops 
were 
not conducted 
during the 
project 
phases, team 
has 
no working 
experience and 
trust 
competence 
was not 
considered as 
selection 
criteria 
 
 
Table 6-18: Scoring Mechanism for Jointly Developed Project Target Criteria 
Score for Jointly Developed Project Target Criteria 
10 7.5 5 2.5 0 
When input is 
taken from all 
key 
participants, 
and also all 
participants are 
involved in 
devising 
project 
target criteria 
All key 
participants 
provide input 
while final 
project 
target criteria 
are developed 
by owners, 
A/E, and 
contractor 
When input is 
taken from 
owners, A/E, 
and 
contractor, and 
also same 
participants 
develops 
project 
target criteria 
When input is 
taken from 
owners, A/E, 
and contractor 
while project 
target criteria 
are set by 
only owners 
and/or A/E 
Project target 
criteria are 
based 
on inputs of 
owners and/or 
A/E, without 
consulting 
from 
other project 
participants 
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Table 6-19: Scoring Mechanism for Collaborative Decision Making 
Score for Collaborative Decision Making 
10 7.5 5 2.5 0 
When input is 
taken from all 
key 
participants, 
and 
also all 
participants are 
involved in 
decision 
making 
When all key 
participants 
provide input 
while final 
decision 
makers 
are owners, 
A/E, 
and contractor 
When input is 
taken from 
owners, A/E, 
and 
contractor, and 
also same 
participants are 
involved in 
decision 
making 
When input is 
taken from 
owners, A/E, 
and 
contractor 
while 
decision 
makers 
are either only 
owner/A/E or 
contractor 
When major 
decisions are 
made on sole 
discretion of 
either 
owners/A/E 
or contractor, 
without input 
from other 
project 
participants 
 
Table 6-20: Scoring Mechanism for Lean Principles 
Score for Lean Principles 
10 7.5 5 2.5 0 
Project 
includes Lean 
Construction 
Design (value 
engineering to 
reduce cost), 
Lean 
Production 
Management 
(stable 
schedule with 6 
week look 
ahead and 
constraints 
) and Lean 
Construction 
Supply 
(reliable 
material 
deliveries and 
reliable 
workforce) 
Project 
includes lean 
construction 
design (value 
engineering to 
reduce cost) 
and Lean 
Production 
Management 
(stable 
schedule with 6 
week look 
ahead and 
constraints)  
Project 
includes lean 
construction 
design (value 
engineering to 
reduce cost), 
and Lean 
Construction 
Supply 
(reliable 
material 
deliveries and 
reliable 
workforce) 
Project 
includes one of 
the three lean 
principles: 
Lean 
construction 
design, or Lean 
Production 
Management 
or Lean 
Construction 
Supply 
Project does 
not include 
lean 
construction 
techniques and 
principles 
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Table 6-21: Scoring Mechanism for Co-location of Teams 
Score for Co-location of Teams 
10 7.5 5 2.5 0 
When all key 
participants are 
located onsite 
and also all key 
participants are 
dedicated full 
time 
When all key 
participants are 
located onsite 
and also all key 
participants are 
not dedicated 
full time 
When owner, 
engineer, and 
contractor are 
located onsite 
and are 
dedicated full 
time 
When owner, 
engineer, and 
contractor are 
located onsite 
and are not 
dedicated full 
time 
When 
contractor is 
located onsite 
and is 
dedicated full 
time while 
owner or 
engineer are 
not located 
onsite 
 
Table 6-22: Scoring Mechanism for Performance Evaluations 
Score for Performance Evaluations 
10 7.5 5 2.5 0 
When all key 
participants are 
evaluated, and 
the owner 
receives 
evaluation 
When owner 
evaluates all 
key 
participants, 
and owner is 
not evaluated 
When owner 
evaluates 
Engineer and 
contractor only 
When owner 
evaluates 
contractor only 
No evaluations 
  
In this section, the links connecting IPD principles to KPIs are discussed and 
identified. The major findings from the focus group helped in developing the links 
between IPD and KPI.  
Inputs from Focus Group 
The focus group, mentioned earlier, for this research was utilized at different 
stages during the model development.  The second meeting with the focus group helped 
bridge the knowledge gap with regard to identifying the individual links between the IPD 
principles and the KPIs. 
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 Figures 6-8 through 6-16 show the ranking from 0 to 5 (0 being no effect and 5 
being the most effect) of the IPD principles as per their respective influence on each KPI. 
Based on the results, it is clear that individual KPI improvements can be attributed to 
various IPD principles.   
 
  Figure 6-8: Effect of IPD principles on reduced percentage cost overrun. 
 
 
Figure 6-9: Effect of IPD principles on reduced percentage time overrun. 
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Figure 6-10: Effect of IPD principles on reduced percentage cost of CO. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-11: Effect of IPD principles on reduced percentage cost of error and 
omissions. 
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Figure 6-12: Effect of IPD principles on reduced percentage cost of owner’s CO. 
 
 
Figure 6-13: Effect of IPD principles on reduced number of claims. 
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Figure 6-14: Effect of IPD principles on reduced number of RFIs. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-15: Effect of IPD principles on reduced time to respond to RFIs. 
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Figure 6-16: Effect of IPD principles on reduced amount of field rework. 
In Figure 6-8, the highest percentage selected with scores 4 and 5 is Open 
Communication within the Project Team and Ability to Address Issues, with a score of 
83.3%. This means that 83.3% of the focus group participants indicated that the reduced 
percentage of cost overrun is attributed to Open Communication within the Project Team 
and Ability to Address Issues. 
 In Figure 6-9, the improvement in the KPI related to time overrun has been 
justifiably related to most of the IPDs.  This means that the focus group participants could 
not narrow down the IPD principles that can reduce the percentage of cost overrun. The 
improvement related to cost of change orders is justifiably related to Integrated and 
Collaborative Teams, as shown in Figure 6-10, where 83.3% of the focus group 
participants selected scores 4 and 5.  
As shown in Figure 6-12, 83.3% of the focus group participants related Reduced 
Percentage Cost of Owner’s CO to Integrated and Collaborative Teams. In Figure 6-13, 
83.3% of the focus group participants indicated that reduced number of claims is 
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attributed to Open Communication within the Project Team and Ability to Address 
Issues. 
The improvement related to reduced time to respond to RFIs is attributed to Co-
Location of Teams, as can be seen from Figure 6-15. In Figure 6-16, the highest 
percentage selected with scores 4 and 5 for reduced amount of field rework is attributed 
to Collaborative Decision Making with a score of 83.3%.   
Figure 6-17 summarizes the links between the IPD principles and the KPIs based 
on the focus group findings.  
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within the Project 
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Figure 6-17: Links between IPD principles and KPIs identified by focus group. 
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Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis was applied on the variables of KPIs and IPDs that are linked 
per Figure 6-17 to try to develop a prediction model that can predict certain KPI scores 
from their related IPD principles. The regression model is developed to help owners 
predict how improving the implementation of certain IPD principles can impact the 
performance score of their related KPIs.  The regression analysis of the links as identified 
by the focus group revealed interesting results and thus regression analysis was applied to 
all the possible links between the KPIs and IPDs to show for each KPI which IPD 
principles will affect it and at what level.  This will be a worthwhile tool for owners to 
have and to help them determine which IPD principles to implement to improve a 
specific KPI.  The means of the dataset were then computed for each of the nine IPD 
principles, as summarized in Table 6-23.  The IPD scores for the control projects are 
summarized in Table 6-24. 
Table 6-23: IPD Principles Score Means of the Dataset  
IPD Principles Mean Score 
Open Communication within Project Team & Ability to Address 
Issues  
3.69 
Integrated and Collaborative Teams 0.34 
Lean Principles 1.48 
Co-Location of Teams 4.49 
Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations 1.92 
Mutual Respect and Trust 1.82 
Jointly Developed Project Target Criteria                        0.51 
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Collaborative Decision Making 1.3 
 
Table 6-24: Control Projects IPD Principles Scores 
IPD Principles IPD Score 
Control 
Project 1 
Control 
Project 2 
Open Communication within Project Team  7.5 7.5 
Integrated and Collaborative Teams 7.5 7.5 
Lean Principles 7.5 5.0 
Co-Location of Team 7.5 5.0 
Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations 5.0 5.0 
Mutual Respect and Trust 5.0 5.0 
Jointly Developed Project Target Criteria  
Collaborative Decision Making 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
Variable Sensitivity 
Regression analysis provides the correlation of determination (R2) that represents 
how accurately the regression model represents the existing data. R2 determines the 
proportion of the variation in the response variable explained by changes in the 
independent, categorical variable.   
 The p-value is used to identify the level of significance of the variables; small p-
values indicate the statistically significant variables.   
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Variable Correlations  
For numerical variables, correlation coefficients indicate the degree of association 
between variables.   Correlation coefficients can range from -1 to +1.  Larger coefficient 
values, either positive or negative, indicate a stronger linear association between 
variables.  Coefficient values of zero indicate no association between variables.  Positive 
coefficients indicate that the independent variable and response variable vary in the 
same direction (positive sloped line); negative coefficients indicate the independent 
variable and response variable vary in opposite directions (negative sloped line).   
Correlation between Cost Overrun and Open Communication with the Project 
Team and Ability to Address Issues  
The resulting regression equation is a polynomial 3rd degree and is displayed in 
Equation 6-18. 
𝑦 = 0.0023𝑥3 − 0.0819𝑥2 + 0.9882𝑥 + 2.6966                                        (6-18) 
Where 𝑥 is the score of Open Communication with the Project Team and Ability 
to Address Issues (Independent variable) 
𝑦 is the score of Cost Overrun (Dependent variable) 
Figure 6-18 shows the polynomial regression curve between Cost Overrun and 
Open Communication with the Project Team and Ability to Address Issues. 
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Figure 6-18: Polynomial regression curve between cost overrun and open 
communication with the project team and ability to address issues. 
The two red data points in Figure 6-18 represent the two control projects and the 
black data points represent the dataset.   
Based on the results of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), the predictor 
variable shows a high level of significance because the p-value is 0.000.  The R2 value 
provides an explanation of the proportion of variation in the dependent variable due to a 
change in the independent variable.  The R2 value of 0.8652 is high and it indicates that 
86.5% of the variation in the dependent variable is predictable from the independent 
variable. The regression analysis reports the Pearson correlation coefficient, R, for the 
numerical variable to be 0.930. This indicates a strong association with the response 
variable. Based on the results of this analysis, it is observed that the independent 
variable, Open Communication with the Project Team and Ability to Address Issues, 
displays a statistically significant effect on the prediction of Cost Overrun.  The result of 
the polynomial regression equation can be used by water utilities to predict Cost 
Overrun score in a rather simple but yet accurate way. 
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The resulting regression analysis, equations, and correlations between the IPDs 
and KPIs are shown in Tables 6-25 through 6-38.   
Table 6-25: Polynomial Regression Curves between Open Communication with the 
Project Team and Ability to Address Issues and KPIs 
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Table 6-26: Correlation between Open Communication with the Project Team and 
Ability to Address Issues and KPIs 
KPIs R2 Effect Analysis 
Cost Overrun 0.865 Strong 
Regular status meetings typically include 
reviewing project cost reports and detailing 
project cost estimates to help overcome major 
cost obstacles. This explains the strong effect 
of Communication and Ability to Address 
Issues on Cost Overrun. 
Cost of CO 0.523 Weak 
Regular status meetings include detailed review 
of CO cost reports, which help in reducing the 
CO costs when reviewed by stakeholders of 
different backgrounds.  This effect is moderate 
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because changes in the scope, especially when 
they are related to unforeseen conditions or 
design deficiencies, cannot be avoided.  
Cost of Field 
Rework 
0.264 No 
Field Rework is typically caused by inadequate 
project supervision, inadequate design 
specifications, lack of proper inspection by the 
designer, and other factors. Open 
Communication and Ability to Address Issues 
is expected to have an effect on this KPI, 
however the dataset shows no effect. 
Cost of Error 
& Omissions 
CO 
0.186 No 
Since Open Communication and Ability to 
Address Issues was not implemented during the 
design phase, it had no effect on Cost of Error 
& Omissions CO.  
Cost of 
Claims 
0.154 No 
No correlation exists because Open 
Communication and Ability to Address Issues 
does not provide the ability to resolve disputes 
at a large scale 
Cost of 
Owner's CO 
0.073 No 
No correlation exists because Open 
Communication and Ability to Address Issues 
does not limit the owner from issuing change 
orders due to their preferences during 
construction.  
Time Overrun 0.037 No 
Open Communication and Ability to Address 
Issues cannot eliminate the main factors of time 
overrun such as design errors and omissions, 
environmental and site conditions, resources 
availability, severe weather conditions, or 
client driven delays.  
Number of 
RFIs 
0.037 No 
Since Open Communication and Ability to 
Address Issues was not implemented during the 
design phase, contract documents can be 
incomplete, conflicting, or erroneous, thereby 
requiring revisions and clarifications to be 
provided by the designers.    
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Table 6-27: Polynomial Regression Curves between Lean Principles and KPIs 
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Table 6-28: Correlation between Lean Principles and KPIs 
KPIs R2 Effect Analysis 
Time Overrun 0.284 Weak 
Lean Principles focus on adhering to the 
construction project schedule.  Monthly 
progress schedule updates result in a more 
detailed schedule that clearly show all schedule 
activities and contribute in reducing Time 
Overrun.  The effect is weak because Lean 
Principles cannot eliminate the other factors of 
Time Overrun such as design errors and 
omissions, environmental and site conditions, 
severe weather conditions, or client driven 
delays. 
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Cost of Field 
Rework 
0.126 No 
Monthly progress schedule updates result in a 
detailed schedule that clearly shows all the 
activities that must occur during that specific 
time frame. This detailed look ahead schedule 
assists in reducing Cost of Field Rework. 
However, the relationship is weak because 
Field Rework is caused by other factors such as 
inadequate project supervision, inadequate 
design specifications, and lack of proper 
inspection by the designer.  
Time to 
Respond to 
RFIs 
0.094 No 
Lean Principles focus on adhering to the 
construction project schedule to maximize value 
and eliminate waste.  Therefore, Lean 
Principles have no effect on Time to Respond 
to RFIs. 
Cost Overrun 0.059 No 
Lean Principles are not expected to have no 
effect on Cost Overrun. 
Cost of Error 
& Omissions 
CO 
0.059 No 
Lean Principles focus on maximizing value and 
eliminating waste.  They are not expected to 
have effect on Cost of Error & Omissions CO.  
Number of 
RFIs 
0.050 No 
Lean Principles focus on maximizing value and 
eliminating waste.  They are not expected to 
have effect on Number of RFIs. 
Cost of CO 0.031 No 
Lean Principles focus on maximizing value and 
eliminating waste.  They are not expected to 
have effect on Cost of CO. 
Cost of 
Claims 
0.028 No 
Lean Principles focus on maximizing value and 
eliminating waste.  They are not expected to 
have effect on Cost of Claims.  
Cost of 
Owner's CO 
0.019 No 
Lean Principles focus on maximizing value and 
eliminating waste.  They are not expected to 
have effect on Cost of Owner's CO. 
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Table 6-29: Polynomial Regression Curves between Co-Location of Teams and KPIs 
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Table 6-30: Correlation between Co-Location of Teams and KPIs 
KPIs R2 Effect Analysis 
Time to 
Respond to 
RFIs 
0.974 Strong 
Co-location of Teams is a strategic approach to 
using the benefits of face-to-face interactions 
to build team relationships, improve 
communications, and resolve issues. Since the 
team members are present onsite, they can 
respond to RFIs and provide information more 
efficiently.  
Number of 
RFIs 
0.548 Weak 
Contract documents can be incomplete, 
conflicting, or erroneous, thereby requiring 
revisions and clarifications to be provided by 
the designers.  Due to Co-Location of Teams, 
face-to-face interactions some clarifications 
can be provided on the spot without the need to 
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submit RFIs. The effect is moderate because 
some clarifications will have to be documented 
in RFIs.   Co-Location of Teams might have a 
strong effect on this KPI if it was implemented 
during design.   
Time Overrun 0.172 No 
Co-location of Teams is expected to increase 
productivity and therefore reduce Time 
Overrun.  However, it cannot eliminate other 
factors of time overrun such as design errors 
and omissions, environmental and site 
conditions, resources availability, severe 
weather conditions, or client driven delays.  
Cost of CO 0.126 No 
Changes in the scope, especially when they are 
related to unforeseen conditions or design 
deficiencies, cannot be avoided. Co-location of 
Teams is not expected to have an effect on this 
KPI. 
Cost of 
Claims 
0.092 No 
A low number of claims on a project reflects 
good team approach to project gains and 
losses, and effective communication lines. Co-
location of Teams would not necessarily 
provide insight into the team’s ability to 
resolve disputes before escalating to claims.  
Poor communication lines exist within poorly 
managed co-located teams.    
Cost Overrun 0.085 No 
Co-location of Teams does not necessarily 
promote regular status meetings for reviewing 
project cost reports and detailing project cost 
estimates to help overcome major cost 
obstacles.  
Cost of Field 
Rework 
0.081 No 
Field Rework is typically caused by inadequate 
project supervision, inadequate design 
specifications, lack of proper inspection by the 
designer, and others. Co-location of Teams is 
not expected to have an effect on this KPI. 
Cost of 
Owner's CO 
0.074 No 
No correlation exists because Co-Location of 
Teams does not limit the owner from issuing 
change orders due to their preferences during 
construction. Co-Location of Teams might 
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have an effect on this KPI if it was 
implemented during design.  
Cost of Error 
& Omissions 
CO 
0.011 No 
Co-location of Teams was not implemented 
during design; therefore, it has no effect on 
Cost of Error & Omissions CO.  
 
Table 6-31: Polynomial Regression Curves between Collaborative Decision Making 
and KPIs 
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Table 6-32: Correlation between Collaborative Decision Making and KPIs 
KPIs R2 Effect Analysis 
Cost of Field 
Rework 
0.788 Strong 
The influence of several different stakeholders 
helps to ensure that the decisions made are ones 
that consider the input of all the stakeholders 
present around the table.  This eliminates the 
activities that have to be done more than once 
in the field and creates a strong effect on this 
KPI.  
Cost Overrun 0.302 Weak 
Stakeholders are able to leverage the 
experience of all the parties represented and 
have the potential to reduce Cost Overrun. 
Cost of CO 0.301 Weak 
Stakeholders are able to leverage the 
experience of all the parties represented and 
have the potential to reduce CO costs.  
However, changes in the scope, especially 
when they are related to unforeseen conditions 
or design deficiencies, cannot be avoided.  
Cost of 
Claims 
0.086 No 
When team members are constantly at 
crossroads over key points, they would not be 
able to resolve disputes before escalating to 
claims. A low number of claims on a project 
reflects good team approach to project gains 
and losses, and effective communication lines.  
Cost of Error 
& Omissions 
CO 
0.072 No 
Since Collaborative Decision Making was not 
implemented during the design phase, it had no 
effect on Cost of Error & Omissions CO.  
Cost of 
Owner's CO 
0.069 No 
No correlation exists because Collaborative 
Decision Making does not limit the owner from 
issuing change orders due to their preferences 
during construction.  
Time to 
Respond to 
RFIs 
0.057 No 
When more people need to be consulted before 
a decision can be made, Time to Respond to 
RFIs is extended.  Collaborative Decision 
Making does not reduce Time to Respond to 
RFIs, yet it might increase it. 
Number of 
RFIs 
0.048 No Since Collaborative Decision Making was not 
implemented during the design phase, contract 
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documents can be incomplete, conflicting or 
erroneous, thereby requiring revisions and 
clarifications to be provided by the designers.    
Time Overrun 0.042 No 
When more people need to be consulted before 
a decision can be made, the project lead times 
are extended to facilitate this extra consultation.  
Collaborative Decision Making does not reduce 
Time Overrun yet it might increase it.  
 
 
Table 6-33: Polynomial Regression Curves between Project’s Staff Performance 
Evaluation and KPIs 
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Table 6-34: Correlation between Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations and KPIs 
KPIs R2 Effect Analysis 
Cost of CO 0.628 Weak 
Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations 
includes ratings for cost effectiveness and 
efficiency and budget compliance, which give 
contractors a push to reduce the CO, costs.  
However, changes in the scope, especially 
when they are related to unforeseen 
conditions or design deficiencies, cannot be 
avoided.  
Cost of Claims 0.441 Weak 
This correlation exists because Project’s Staff 
Performance Evaluations includes ratings for 
cooperation, teamwork, and relationships. 
The effect is weak due to other factors such 
as lack of effective communication lines. 
Cost Overrun 0.339 Weak 
Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations 
includes ratings for cost effectiveness, 
efficiency, and budget compliance, which 
give contractors a push to reduce the Cost 
Overrun.   
Cost of Error 
& Omissions 
CO 
0.095 No 
Since Project’s Staff Performance 
Evaluations was not implemented during the 
design phase, it has no effect on Cost of Error 
& Omissions CO.  
Time Overrun 0.067 No 
Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations 
includes ratings for adherence to schedule, 
which expects to have an effect on this KPI.  
Since Project’s Staff Performance 
Evaluations was not implemented during 
design, it cannot eliminate design errors and 
omissions, or client driven delays, therefore 
no effect is derived.  
Cost of Field 
Rework 
0.051 No 
Field Rework is typically caused by 
inadequate project supervision, inadequate 
design specifications, lack of proper 
inspection by the designer, and other factors. 
Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations is 
expected to have an effect on this KPI, but the 
dataset does not show it.   
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Number of 
RFIs 
0.017 No 
Since Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations 
was not implemented during the design phase, 
it does not have an effect on the Number of 
RFIs.   
Cost of 
Owner's CO 
0.013 No 
No correlation exists because Open 
Communication and Ability to Address Issues 
because it does not limit the owner from 
issuing change orders due to their preferences 
during construction.  
Time to 
Respond to 
RFIs 
0.011 No 
Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations is 
not expected to expedite the Time to Respond 
to RFIs because it is not typical for Time to 
Respond to RFIs to be a factor of the 
Project’s Staff Performance Evaluations.  
 
Table 6-35: Polynomial Regression Curves between Jointly Developed Project 
Target Criteria and KPIs 
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Table 6-36: Correlation between Jointly Developed Project Target Criteria and 
KPIs 
KPIs R2 Effect Analysis 
Cost of Field 
Rework 
0.305 Weak 
Field Rework is typically caused by inadequate 
project supervision, inadequate design 
specifications, lack of proper inspection by the 
designer, and others. Jointly Developed Project 
Target Criteria is not expected to have an effect 
on this KPI, however the dataset shows a weak 
effect. There is no enough data for Jointly 
Developed Project Target Criteria to analyze 
this effect. 
Time to 
Respond to 
RFIs 
0.077 No 
There is not enough data for Jointly Developed 
Project Target Criteria to analyze these effects. 
 
Cost of Error 
& Omissions 
CO 
0.073 No 
Cost Overrun 0.040 No 
Time Overrun 0.023 No 
Cost of CO 0.022 No 
Cost of 
Claims 
0.019 No 
Number of 
RFIs 
0.017 No 
Cost of 
Owner's CO 
0.005 No 
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Table 6-37: Polynomial Regression Curves between Mutual Respect and Trust and 
KPIs 
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Table 6-38: Correlation between Mutual Respect and Trust and KPIs 
KPIs R2 Effect Analysis 
Cost of CO 0.617 Weak 
Mutual Respect and Trust promote openness, 
honesty, shared values, and ethics, which can 
help in reducing the cost of CO.  However, the 
effect is moderate because in some projects, 
the number of changes that are related to 
unforeseen conditions or design deficiencies is 
high and could not be avoided.  
Cost of 
Claims 
0.360 Weak 
This relationship exists because Mutual 
Respect and Trust promotes honesty, 
openness, flexibility, and problem solving. 
Absence of trust incurs dysfunctional 
environment and toxic culture and militant 
stakeholders.  
Cost Overrun 0.332 Weak 
Mutual Respect and Trust promote openness, 
honesty, shared values, and ethics, which can 
help in reducing the Cost Overrun.  However, 
the effect is weak because Mutual Respect and 
Trust cannot overcome the major cost 
obstacles that are related to unforeseen 
conditions or design deficiencies.   
Cost of Field 
Rework 
0.109 No 
Field Rework is typically caused by 
inadequate project supervision, inadequate 
design specifications, lack of proper 
inspection by the designer, and other factors. 
Mutual Respect and Trust is not expected to 
have an effect on this KPI. 
Time 
Overrun 
0.107 No 
Mutual Respect and Trust cannot eliminate the 
main factors of time overrun such as design 
errors and omissions, environmental and site 
conditions, resources availability, severe 
weather conditions, or client driven delays.  
Time to 
Respond to 
RFIs 
0.023 No 
Mutual Respect and Trust is not expected to 
expedite the Time to Respond to RFIs because 
it has no control on the communication means 
with the RFI reviewers.  
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Cost of 
Owner's CO 
0.012 No 
No correlation exists because Mutual Respect 
and Trust does not limit the owner from 
issuing change orders due to their preferences 
during construction.  
Cost of Error 
& Omissions 
CO 
0.010 No 
Mutual Respect and Trust is not expected to 
have an effect on Cost of Error & Omissions 
CO that are due to design deficiencies and 
errors.  
 
Results and Conclusions 
The regression analysis reaffirmed the findings by directly correlating the 
improvements in the KPIs of the control projects to the implemented IPD principles. The 
regression results identified the individual links between the IPD principles and the KPIs 
that they affected. The regression results indicated that most KPI improvements have 
been attributed to various individual IPD principles. The improvement in the KPI related 
to time overrun has been justifiably related to most of the IPDs.   
Regression analysis applied on the KPIs and IPDs resulted in a KPI score 
prediction model that uses as input the IPD implementation score of a project. The 
correlation is classified in two categories: (1) Strong Effect with R2 values greater than 
0.70, and (2) Low Effect with R2 values less than 0.70.  The applied regression analysis 
results demonstrated the following: 
1. Open Communication with the Project Team and Ability to Address Issues 
displays a statistically significant effect on the prediction of Cost Overrun. The 
resulting regression equation is 𝑦 = 0.0004𝑥3 − 0.0657𝑥2 + 1.2205𝑥 + 1.902.  
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Where 𝑥 is the score of Open Communication with the Project Team and Ability 
to Address Issues and 𝑦 is the score of Cost Overrun.  
2. Co-Location of Teams displays a statistically significant effect on the prediction 
of Time to Respond to RFIs. The resulting regression equation is 𝑦 =
0.0378𝑥3 − 0.6204𝑥2 + 3.2786𝑥 + 0.3153.  Where 𝑥 is the score of Co-
Location of Teams and 𝑦 is the score of Time to Respond to RFIs.  
3. Collaborative Decision Making displays a statistically significant effect on the 
prediction of Field Rework Cost.  The resulting regression equation is  𝑦 =
0.0237𝑥3 − 0.3081𝑥2 + 1.8079𝑥 + 3.7705.  Where 𝑥 is the score of 
Collaborative Decision Making and 𝑦 is the score of Field Rework Cost. 
4. Since only four out of 45 projects implemented Integrated and Collaborative 
Teams, no sufficient data is available to form the regression. Therefore, the effect 
of Integrated and Collaborative Teams could not be determined on any KPI. 
The regression model developed can help owners predict how improving the 
implementation of certain IPD principles can impact the performance score of their 
related KPIs.  The model shows that implementing certain IPD principles improves the 
performance score of a DBB project.   
 Figure 6-19 displays the links between IPD Principles and KPIs as identified by 
the regression analysis results. 
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Figure 6-19: Links between IPD Principles and KPIs identified by regression 
analysis. 
Input from Focus Group 
The focus group, mentioned earlier, was also utilized at the final stages during the 
model development.  The last meeting with the focus group helped in acknowledging the 
individual links between the IPD principles and the KPIs displayed in Figure 6-19.  The 
focus group noted that the established links have common sense.  The focus group 
participants were generally in agreement with the findings that were obtained through the 
regression analysis.  
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Guideline Metric 
A guideline metric was developed as a tool to assist owners and contractors who are 
willing to improve particular KPIs of their treatment plant projects. This tool, shown in 
Figure 6-20, allows the user to choose which IPD principle to implement in a project in 
order to improve the score of a particular KPI. This tool also demonstrates the different 
levels of IPD implementation and their corresponding pre-desired percentage of 
improvement in the score of a particular KPI. The level of improvement designated in this 
metric is measured with respect to the average KPI score of the dataset. The optimal 
combination of implementation levels for the IPD principles are: 
Open Communication – Level 3,  
Co-location of Teams – Level 4, and  
Collaborative Decision Making – Level 3.  
This combination will achieve the most cost-efficient improvement in Cost Overrun, RFI 
Response Time, and Cost of Field Rework KPIs.   
212 
 
 
Figure 6-20: IPD Implementation guideline metric. 
 
 
 
Project KPI IPD 
Principle  
 
 
 
Open 
Communication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co-location of 
Teams 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collaborative 
Decision Making 
IPD Level* 
 
 
Improvement 
in KPI 
 
 
 
0% 
26% 
44% 
43% 
4% 
18% 
18% 
76% 
35% 
61% 
100% 
100% 
Cost Overrun 
RFI Response 
Time per 
Unit Price 
Total Cost of 
Field Rework 
L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
*IPD implementation level L1 corresponds to a measuring scale of 2.5 as defined by Azhar (2014) 
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Regression analysis between the various IPD scores and the PI scores was 
performed to determine which IPD principle is most influential on the PI of a project.  All 
results showed similar R-square values and the highest was for Lean Principles with R-
square value of 0.1767 a shown in Figure 6-21. 
 
Figure 6-21: Regression analysis between PI and Lean Principles scores. 
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CHAPTER 7                                                                                                    
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
As the world strives to achieve more development, the construction industry is 
becoming more and more an important and large sector of the world economy. The 
performance of the construction industry is affected by clients, contractors, consultants, 
stakeholders, regulators, national economies, and others. This research aimed at assessing 
how incorporating certain IPD principles in the commonly used DBB delivery method for 
water utilities major capital projects can improve the performance rating of the project. 
The study implemented applicable IPD principles to control projects at the Miami Dade 
Water and Sewer Department and collected relevant data. The research used 
comprehensive project data from several water utility facilities relevant to the current 
project delivery and procurement process of actual construction projects. The study 
showed, by the use of two control projects, that implementing some IPD principles can be 
highly beneficial to DBB delivery method in water related public projects. The study also 
demonstrated that a strong relationship exists between implementing selective IPD 
principles and project KPIs.  
Eight IPD principles were implemented in the two control wastewater projects, 
and KPIs of these projects were measured and compared to KPIs of a dataset comprised 
of 43 completed projects in the same geographic region of South Florida. These specific 
IPD principles were selected because they do not require any design or preconstruction 
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aspects to be set prior to construction. They can be implemented during construction 
after all parties meet each other and after all roles are assigned.  
Results comparison for the various KPIs yielded the following conclusions: 
1- Performance Evaluation with Regard to Cost 
The control projects had lower average percent cost overrun during construction 
than the dataset projects. The average cost overrun of the control projects was $157,407 
(3.9%). The average cost overrun of the dataset projects was $1,021,650 (7.5%).  
2- Performance Evaluation with Regard to Time 
The control projects had a lower average time overrun percentage during 
construction than the dataset projects. The average time overrun of the control projects 
was -0.06 (-0.45%), compared with 101.77 (21.9%) average time overrun for the 
dataset projects.  
3- Performance Evaluation with Regard to COs 
The number and cost of COs obtained from the control projects were compared 
with those of DBB projects as a percentage value of the total project cost. The control 
projects had a lower total number of RFPs during construction than the dataset projects. 
The average number of RFPs of the control projects was 9.0. The average number of 
RFPs of the dataset projects was 25.1. However, the total percentage cost of COs was 
essentially the same. The delivery method did not appear to affect CO cost performance.   
4- Request for Information (RFI) Evaluation 
The number of RFIs obtained from the control projects was compared to those of 
past projects delivered using DBB. The control projects had a lower total number of RFIs 
during construction than the dataset projects of similar size and nature. The average 
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number of RFIs of the control projects was 17.5, while the average number of RFIs of 
dataset projects was 106.1.  
5- Construction Claims 
The control projects had a lower claims cost as a percentage of contract amount 
than the dataset projects. The average claims cost of the control projects was 0.0%, 
compared to an average claims cost of 5.1% for the dataset projects. 
A focus group session that was conducted with the control projects personnel, 
who were experienced participants in water utility construction projects, reaffirmed the 
findings by directly correlating the improvements in the KPIs of the control projects to 
the implemented IPD principles.  
PPR Development 
A comprehensive Project Performance Rating (PPR) model was developed and 
implemented, combining key performance indicators identified by the study. The PPR 
model was developed in order to integrate key performance indicators and to highlight 
improvements on overall project performance of DBB projects by incorporating IPD 
principles.  The PPR model allowed for the comparison of overall performance of 
projects delivered using DBB project delivery methods. The model showed projects 
delivered using the IPD principles with DBB method to have a significant increase in 
performance.  
 The performance of the control projects was superior when compared to that of 
the dataset projects based on nine different performance factors (PF) categorized in five 
success criteria: Customer Satisfaction, Project Schedule, Project Cost, Design Quality, 
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and Early Involvement. A number of KPIs were developed to quantify those PFs based 
on critical project performance data. Using a dataset comprised of 43 actual water and 
wastewater projects delivered using DBB, an algorithm was developed and presented for 
computing a single-number performance index for a project. The algorithm leaves room 
for users to customize the model in a way to satisfy their specific preferences with regard 
to the relative importance of each success factor and success criterion. Two control 
projects — managed by the research team and delivered by infusing a number of IPD 
principles into the traditional DBB delivery method—were used to demonstrate the use of 
the PPR model.  The PPR Model rated the two control projects to have better 
performance than the dataset projects by a factor of 1.19.  The PPR Model therefore 
shows that implementation of IPD principles to improve the delivery of the control 
projects.   
 The average PI of the dataset correlated to traditional DBB approach as shown in 
literature review where it has a few shortcomings and pertinent issues. This study 
provides owners and contractors of treatment facilities with a simple-to-use model for 
assessing the success of a project relative to database of past projects delivered using the 
traditional DBB delivery method. The implementation of IPD principles in the delivery 
of the project resulted in performance improvement in all success factors, with the 
exception change order cost which had a decline in its performance score. While the 
performance index varied with the choice of different user-assigned weights, all five 
simulation runs of the PPR model showed the implemented IPD principles to have a 
positive effect on the project performance. While the model was developed based on a 
dataset limited to a specific geographical region, the uniformity in project size 
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distribution and large number of selected projects included in the dataset renders the PPR 
model applicable to water and wastewater construction projects at large.  
Correlation between IPD and KPI 
Although the construction industry has a generally positive perception of IPD, the 
correlation between IPD and project KPIs has been overlooked thus far. This study 
investigates the correlation links between various IPD principles and performance 
indicators through a statistical regression analysis of a large dataset representing actual 
water-related public projects. A two-way ANOVA test was conducted on the KPIs and 
IPD scores and results revealed significant correlations between only some IPD 
principles and certain project KPIs.  The regression equations developed provide an easy 
way to predict the performance score of various project KPIs given different IPD 
implementation levels. Cost Overrun score of DBB projects can be predicted using Open 
Communication with the Project Team and Ability to Address Issues (OCPTAAI) score, 
Time to Respond to RFIs score can be predicted using Co-Location of Teams (CLT) 
score, and Cost of Field Rework score can be predicted using Collaborative Decision 
Making (CDM) score. The control projects performed noticeably better than average, 
despite the major limitations that prevented the implementation of the full array of IPD 
principles, during the design and construction phases. The major regression results 
summary indicates the following: 
1- Open Communication with the Project Team and Ability to Address Issues 
displays a statistically significant effect on the prediction of Cost Overrun. The 
resulting regression equation is 𝑦 = 0.0004𝑥3 − 0.0657𝑥2 + 1.2205𝑥 +
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1.902; with R2 = 0.8652. Where 𝑥 is the score of Open Communication with the 
Project Team and Ability to Address Issues and 𝑦 is the score of Cost Overrun.  
2- Co-Location of Teams displays a statistically significant effect on the prediction 
of Time to Respond to RFIs. The resulting regression equation is 𝑦 =
0.0378𝑥3 − 0.6204𝑥2 + 3.2786𝑥 + 0.3153; with R2 = 0.9739. Where 𝑥 is the 
score of Co-Location of Teams and 𝑦 is the score of Time to Respond to RFIs.  
3- Collaborative Decision Making displays a statistically significant effect on the 
prediction of Field Rework Cost.  The resulting regression equation is 𝑦 =
0.0237𝑥3 − 0.3081𝑥2 + 1.8079𝑥 + 3.7705; R2 = 0.7885.  Where 𝑥 is the 
score of Collaborative Decision Making and 𝑦 is the score of Field Rework 
Cost. 
The regression equations developed provide an easy way to predict the 
performance score of various project PFs given different IPD implementation levels.  
The developed guideline metric provides an easy method for owners to predict the 
performance score of various projects KPIs given different IPD principles implementation 
levels, as well as the ability to identify which IPD tools to implement in their project 
delivery in order to improve certain aspects of the project performance. It is important to 
note that the implementation of Open Communication and Collaborative Decision Making 
requires a simple effort and planning compared to Co-Location of Teams. Co-Location of 
Teams will be efficient only on large size projects due to the preplanning and large costs 
associated with it.  
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Recommendations 
While this study has achieved its aim and research objectives, several issues 
remain to be addressed in future studies. The following issues are recommendations 
related to obtained results. 
1- Training Programs 
It is recommended that human resources be developed in the water related 
construction industry through proper and continuous training programs that address the 
performance of construction projects. These programs can be implemented by offering 
effective and efficient training courses in DBB delivery method that leads to the success 
of construction projects. Water utilities shall establish a continuous IPD learning plan for 
training purposes by using internal and external resources. Training shall ensure that all 
team members are comfortable with the methodology and with their commitment to the 
project. These courses shall focus on training on IPD principles and making the projects’ 
personnel aware of the benefits of implementing IPD principles in the overall success of 
the water related projects from all aspects. 
2- Owners 
Achieving successful transitioning to DBB delivery method with the 
implementation of selective IPD principles is crucial. A successful transition requires 
efforts from owners to have the procurement ability and the right personnel to implement 
IPD.  
 All managerial levels should be equipped with effective decision-making 
capabilities. Owners shall emphasize continuous coordination and good relationships 
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between project participants, which are required through the project’s life cycle in order 
to solve problems and improve project performance. Owners shall have the authority to 
replace an entity, a group, or individuals who are not cooperating and do not fit as part of 
the construction group. Owners pose the most influence on the degree of collaboration 
they receive on their projects. This influence comes early in projects in the form of their 
procurement and contracting process. The owners have to be involved for the IPD 
principles implementation with DBB delivery method to be successful, rather than 
shifting the risks to the other project stakeholders. Project participants need to build 
confidence in each other in order to overcome the cultural barriers through the help of the 
owners. In IPD projects, the elements of trust must be taken to a higher level for the 
delivery to be a success. 
3- Engineers and Contractors 
Contractors and engineers are recommended to minimize waste rate through 
project implementation in order to improve cost performance. They should be more 
interested in collaborating with the owners and to have a good relationship in order to 
solve problems and improve project performance. 
4- Future Research 
Further research should be conducted regarding implementing more IPD 
principles to traditional DBB project delivery in public projects. Public projects should 
implement more IPD principles for more improvements in KPIs, and governments should 
find ways to incorporate certain IPD principles through legislation. More research is 
needed to investigate how to best allow the early involvement of all parties in public 
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projects in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Furthermore, additional research is 
needed to study the ways pain and gain cost sharing can be implemented in public 
projects and how non-owner participants can place their costs at risk. 
 Further research should also be conducted to verify the following: 
- The relationship between IPD adoption and construction cost, 
- The effect of IPD adoption on labor productivity, 
- The effect of IPD adoption on the workload of employees, 
- The effect of IPD adoption on contractor profits, 
- Public law modifications requirements, and 
- Contractual risk and insurance allocation terms. 
Further research is also needed to better understand the relationships among IPD 
principles and KPIs in public and private projects. Research including the implementation 
of IPD principles during the design phase is essential to reveal additional useful links 
with the KPIs. This will be worthwhile in order for owners to know the important 
explanatory variables to which they must pay close attention in order for their projects to 
be completed to their acceptable level of quality and satisfaction. Owners will be able to 
decide to what level they should use IPD procurement method in order to obtain the 
desired results. 
4- Limitations 
 While the PPR model is well structured and includes a wide array of performance 
variables, it however does not account for the effects of certain factors which are external 
to the projects themselves, and are of a different nature than the performance measures 
223 
 
that are being assessed. Such factors include recession, inflation, weather conditions, and 
complexity level of projects.   
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APPENDIX A 
Three-Week Look Ahead Schedule 
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APPENDIX B 
Waste Elimination Log    
       
       
       
Project Name:  Screens Systems Improvements      
Job No. S-863      
       
       
Item 
No. Description of Work Quantity Date 
Cost 
Saving RFP No. 
Allowance 
Account No. 
001 
42" Stainless Steel Rectangular Butterfly 
Valves are in good condition and do not 
need to be replaced. 
2 8/13/2013 41,000 2 N/A 
002 
Existing coatings in grit chamber tanks are 
in good condition and no new coatings will 
be needed. 
11,000 SF 10/16/2013 330,000 N/A 17,18,19,20 
003             
004             
005             
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APPENDIX C 
Pre-Engineered Office Building 
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Site Layout 
238 
 
APPENDIX D 
Employee Performance Evaluation 
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MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA 
Capital Improvements Information System 
Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department 
Contractor/Consultant Evaluation 
 
Contract:  
Contract Name 
 
Award Amount 
Contract Type 
 
Contractor/Consultant: 
                                                                                                                                                         . 
Evaluator ID:                                          Date:                                              Period:                     .      
 
Rating*  
 4 3 2 1 N/A Criteria 
1-      Schedule – Quality of schedule and adherence to schedule 
resulting in timeliness and minimizing delay to the owner and 
community  
2-      Cost effectiveness and efficiency – Budget compliance and 
value of work 
3-      Vision - Design – Concepts or adhere to criteria. 
4-      Cooperation – Teamwork and relationship with owner, subs 
and suppliers. 
5-      Coordination – Ability to organize, schedule and complete 
tanks in adherence to the schedule. 
6-      Accuracy and Technical Skills – Cost estimating, scheduling, 
shop and other drawings, plans, manuals, project 
documentation and conflict resolution. 
7-      Completeness – Compliance with contract documents, 
permits, Codes and standards 
8-      Responsiveness – Timely, clear and concise responses to 
owner comments and correspondence 
9-      Commitment – Intangibles and contribution to project 
success 
10-      Personnel – Quality and dedication of project staff 
11-      Management – Leadership ability 
12-      Quality – Work performed correctly the first time  
Overall Performance Average: __ 
 
Documentation that supports this evaluation and Contractor’s/Consultant’s comments can be 
obtained by contacting: _______________ 
 
Evaluation Reviewed by:      Supervisor        Division Chief          Assistant Director      Director 
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The method of delivery of this evaluation to Contractor/Consultant:       Certified Mail        Hand      
Email        Fax               
(Unresponsive Performance by contractor/consultant requires 2 delivery methods, one MUST 
be Certified Mail.) 
Evaluation delivered to _____________ 
 
*Rating Key 
 
4   Superior performance – Exemplary quality, no intervention required – project completed on 
time or early at or below budget with no change orders or amendments other than owner 
requested changes. 
3   Satisfactory performance – Minor errors noted, addressed with timely corrective action. 
2   Guarded performance – Errors and Omissions documented in writing with timely corrective 
action. 
1   Unresponsive performance documented in writing without timely corrective action. 
N/A. No Information.  
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APPENDIX E 
Cost Summary 
 
         
 
         
  Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department 
 
S-810 Payment Application Summary     
       
Total Contract 
Amount:   $3,651,280.00     
     Paid to Date  Total Remaining 
Contingency 
Allowance  $301,700.00  0.00 301,700.00 
Dedicated 
Allowance  $332,580.00  0.00 332,580.00 
General  $582,421.00  143117.50 43,303.50 
Area A  $371,421.00  7,900.00 363,521.00 
Area B  $495,189.00  26,000.00 469,189.00 
Area C  $563,723.00  58,000.00 505,723.00 
Area D  $286,823.00  0.00 286,823.00 
Area E  $313,187.00  0.00 313,187.00 
Area F  $202,118.00  0.00 202,118.00 
Area G  $202,118.00  0.00 202,118.00 
Total  $3,651,280.00  235,017.50 3,416,262.50 
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APPENDIX F 
CO Log 
  Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department 
Project Name:  Screens Improvement   
 
Job No. S-863     
        
Status:  O = Open, C = Closed       
        
RFP 
No. Description Prepared by 
Issue Date 
(Engineer) 
Reply Date 
(Contractor) Status Comments 
Full Size 
Drawings 
Provided 
Cost 
001 
Plant 2 West Grit 
Chamber Concrete 
Coatings 
EA/JA 6/7/2013 10/14/2013 O 
With CH2 and 
HandS 
N/A 
 
002 
Rectangular 
Butterfly Valves 
EA/JA 8/13/2013 8/18/2013 O Approved N/A 
 
003 
Structural 
Modifications at 
Plant 2 Grit 
Chamber 
EA/JA 9/17/2013   O   
Yes (CAD 
Pending) 
 
004 
Electrical Building 
Civil and 
Structural 
Modifications 
EA/JA 9/20/2013   O   
Yes (CAD 
Pending) 
 
005 
Electrical Conduits 
in Corrosive 
Locations 
EA/JA 10/15/2013   O   N/A 
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APPENDIX G 
RFI Log 
 
      
Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department 
    
Project No. S-863 
Project Name:         Screens Improvement 
RFI No. Subject 
Received 
Date 
Contractor 
Requested 
Due Date 
Response 
Sent 
Status Reviewer 
CONST0001 MCC Bus Duct Tie at Plant 1 05/29/2013 06/06/2013 06/10/2013 c JFA 
CONST0002 Door #30101C Plant 1 Electrical Bldg 06/18/2013 07/02/2013 06/25/2013 c JFA 
CONST0003 Added Construction Joint at 3'-9" Slab 06/25/2013 07/03/2013 07/23/2013 c JFA 
CONST0004 Construction of 16'x22" Beams Below Bypass 
Flumes 
06/25/2013 07/03/2013 07/10/2013 c EA 
CONST0004S Drawing Request in Response to RFI 004 07/24/2013 07/31/2013 07/30/2013 c JFA 
CONST0005 Relocation of HVAC Ducts  06/25/2013 07/03/2013 07/03/2013 c EA 
CONST0006 Elevation of Trench Bottom 07/16/2013 07/16/2013 07/30/2013 c JFA 
CONST0007 RBV Placement at Plant 2 and Bi-Directional Testing 07/16/2013 07/16/2013 07/30/2013 c JFA 
CONST0007A RBV Placement at Plant 2 and Bi-Directional Testing 07/30/2013 - 08/26/2013 c JFA 
CONST0008 Clarification to RFI No. 003 07/18/2013 07/25/2013 07/23/2013 c JFA 
CONST0009 Clearance for Screens 07/18/2013 07/25/2013 08/06/2013 c JFA 
CONST0010 Note 8, Drawing 601-S-06 07/18/2013 07/25/2013 08/06/2013 c JFA 
CONST0011 Mix Design of Concrete 07/19/2013 07/26/2013 07/31/2013 c JFA 
CONST0012 Conflict with Beam Below Bypass Channel @ Plant 2 07/30/2013 08/05/2013 07/31/2013 c DZM 
CONST0012A Conflict with Beam Below Bypass Channel @ Plant 2 07/30/2013 08/06/2013 07/31/2013 c DZM 
CONST0013 Conflict with Concrete Base Under Bypass Channel 
@ Plant 2 
07/31/2013 08/07/2013 08/21/2013 c JA 
CONST0014 Two Dimensions on Rebar Drawings 08/19/2013 08/26/2013 09/03/2013 c JA 
CONST0015 Conduit Spacing 08/21/2013 08/28/2013 08/25/2013 c JA 
CONST0016 Ball and Check Valves at Booster Pumps 08/21/2013 08/28/2013 09/06/2013 c JA 
CONST0017 Piping at Screen's SV 08/21/2013 08/28/2013 09/05/2013 c JA 
CONST0018 Gates Bulkhead Conflict with Screens 08/26/2014 ASAP 09/09/2013 c JA 
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APPENDIX H 
Construction Defect Log 
 
         
 
         
  Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department 
Project Name: Screens Improvement   
 
Job No. S-863     
       
Status:  O = Open, C = Closed       
Defect No. Description Noticed by Corrected by Status Cost 
 
 
Comments 
001      
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APPENDIX I 
Construction Claims Log 
 
         
 
         
  Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department 
Project Name: Screens Improvement   
 
Job No. S-863     
       
Status:  O = Open, C = Closed       
Claim No. Description 
Issue Date  
(Contractor) 
Reply Date 
(Engineer) Status Settled 
 
 
Cost 
001      
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APPENDIX J 
Focus Group Introduction 
 
Good morning and welcome. Thanks for taking the time to join our discussion about the 
wastewater projects at Miami Dade South District Wastewater Treatment Plant (MD 
SDWWTP). My name is Elie G. Andary, and I will serve as the moderator for today’s 
focus group discussion. Assisting me is Marie Bennett. The purpose of today’s discussion 
is to get information from you about the effect of IPD principals on the DBB delivery 
method of the two construction projects at MD SDWWTP. You were invited because you 
have worked on these projects.  There are no right or wrong answers to the questions I am 
about to ask. Please feel free to share your point of view even if it differs from what 
others have said. If you want to follow up on something that someone has said, or you 
want to agree, disagree, or give an example, feel free to do that. Don’t feel like you have 
to respond to me all the time. Feel free to have a conversation with one another about 
these questions. I am here to ask questions, listen, and make sure everyone has a chance 
to share. We’re interested in hearing from each of you. So if you’re talking a lot, I may 
ask you to give others a chance. And if you aren’t saying much, I may call on you. We 
just want to make sure we hear from all of you. Feel free to get up and get more 
refreshments if you would like. 
Marie and I will both be taking notes to help us remember what is said. We are also audio 
recording the session to avoid missing any of your comments. No names will be included 
in any reports.  
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APPENDIX K 
Consent to Participate in Focus Group Study as Part of the Miami Dade South 
District Wastewater Treatment Plant (MD SDWWTP) 
 
The purpose of the group discussion and the nature of the questions have been explained 
to me. 
I consent to take part in a focus group about my experiences at the construction projects 
at MD- SDWWTP. I also consent to be audio-recorded during this focus group 
discussion. 
My participation is voluntary. I understand that I am free to leave the group at any time.  
The information that I provide during the focus group will be grouped with answers from 
other people so that I cannot be identified. 
___________________________________  
Please Print Your Name and Date 
___________________________________ 
Please Sign Your Name 
___________________________________ 
Signature Date 
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APPENDIX L 
Focus Group Questions and Discussion Points 
 
The study applies six IPD principles in conjunction with DBB in two construction projects 
at the Miami Dade South District Wastewater Treatment Plant (MD-SDWWTP). The 
performance of the projects was measured in terms of key performance indicators, such as: 
dollar amount of change orders (COs) as a percentage of total project cost, total number of 
Request for Information (RFIs) normalized by project size, construction delays as 
percentage of original project duration, defects, client satisfaction with the product, client 
satisfaction with the service, and construction claims.  
Question No. 1 (Opening question): Would you please introduce yourself and tell us how 
long you have been working in the water and wastewater industry. 
Question No. 2 (Transition question): What do you think of the contribution of IPD to 
DBB at the MD-SDWWTP projects and how would you describe your experience? 
Question No. 3 (Key question): How would you characterize the effect, if any, of IPD 
principles on the construction schedule and total duration at MD-SDWWTP projects? 
Positive, negative, or no effect? 
Question No. 4 (Key question): How would you characterize the effect, if any, of IPD 
principles on the amount of change orders at MD-SDWWTP projects? Was the effect a 
relative increase, decrease, or no effect? 
Question No. 5 (Key question): How would you characterize the effect, if any, of IPD 
principles on the number of RFIs at MD-SDWWTP projects? A reduction, an increase, or 
no effect? 
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Question No. 6 (Key question): How would you characterize the effect, if any, of IPD 
principles on the owner’s satisfaction at MD-SDWWTP projects? 
Question No. 7 (Key question): How would you characterize the effect, if any, of IPD 
principles on the construction defects and claims at Miami Dade South District Treatment 
Plant projects? 
Question No. 8: (Ending question): Is there anything we should have talked about, but did 
not? 
At the end of the discussion, the main issues that were discussed during the session will 
be summarized and main points of agreement confirmed.  
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APPENDIX M 
Focus Group Questionnaire 
 
1) Please rank the KPIs from 1 to 6 based on which you felt was most effective in 
determining the success of a construction project, with 1 being the most effective 
and 6 being the least effective.   
Rank KPIs 
 Change orders amount as a percentage of total project cost (COs) 
 Number of Request for Information (RFIs) 
 Construction duration 
 Number of construction defects 
 Client satisfaction with the product and services 
 Number of construction claims 
 
2) Please indicate your opinion concerning the following characteristics based on your 
experience with MD-SDWWTP control projects. 
Job Characteristics 
(1) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(2) 
Agree 
(3) 
Neutral 
(4) 
Disagree 
(5) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Good client satisfaction 
with the product 
     
Good client satisfaction 
with the service 
     
Change order costs was 
below average 
     
Number of construction 
defects was below average 
     
Number of RFIs was below 
average   
     
Better working experience      
 
 
253 
 
3) Please rank from 0 to 5 (0 being no effect and 5 being the most effect), the 
implemented IPD principles in the control projects as per their respective 
influence on each of the following aspects of the projects. 
 
IPD Principle 
Ranking of the Effect of IPD Principles on Changes in KPIs 
Reduced 
Percentage 
Cost 
Growth 
Reduced 
Percentage 
Time 
Growth 
Reduced 
Percentage 
Cost of 
RFP 
Reduced 
Percentage 
Cost of 
Claims  
Reduced 
Number 
of RFIs 
Open 
Communication 
within the Project 
Team and Ability to 
Address Issues 
     
Integrated and 
Collaborative 
Teams 
     
Lean Construction 
Techniques and 
Principles 
     
Co-location of 
Teams 
     
Performance 
Evaluations 
     
Mutual Respect and 
Trust 
     
 
 
4) Please rank the performance factors from 1 to 6 based on which you feel is most 
effective in measuring the project success of a construction project, with 1 being 
the most effective and 6 being the least effective.    
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Rank PFs 
 Project Schedule 
 Early Involvement 
 Customer Satisfaction 
 Project Cost 
 Design Quality 
 Project Staff Performance Evaluation 
 
5) Based on your experience, if MD-SDWWTP control projects were to be graded, 
please indicate your opinion concerning the following performance factors and 
their effect on the final score. 
Performance Factors 
(1) 
Excellent 
(2) 
Very 
Good 
(3) 
Good 
(4) 
Fair 
(5) 
Poor 
Project Schedule 
     
Early Involvement 
     
Customer Satisfaction 
     
Project Cost 
     
Design Quality 
     
Project Staff Performance 
Evaluation 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
VITA 
ELIE G. ANDARY 
Born, Lebanon 
1995-2000  B.E. Civil Engineering  
Lebanese American University  
Byblos, Lebanon  
 
2001-2003 M.S. Construction Management  
University of Florida  
Gainesville, FL  
 
2003-2007   Principal Engineer 
Hazen and Sawyer 
Hollywood, FL 
  
2007    Licensed Professional Engineer P.E.  
License No. 67503  
Florida Board of Professional Engineers  
 
2008-2013    Senior Principal Engineer  
Hazen and Sawyer 
Hollywood, FL  
 
2011-2019   Doctoral Candidate   
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida  
 
2014-2017   Associate   
Hazen and Sawyer 
Hollywood, FL 
 
2018-2019   Senior Associate   
    Head of Construction Management in the South East 
Hazen and Sawyer 
Hollywood, FL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
256 
 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 
Muszynski, L., Chini, A., Andary, E.  Nondestructive Testing Methods to Detect Voids in 
Bonded Post-Tensioned Ducts. Transportation Research Board, pp. 135, September 
2003.   
Andary, G.E., (April, 2003). Nondestructive Testing Methods to Detect Voids in Bonded 
Post-Tensioned Ducts. Paper presented at The Fourteenth Annual Graduate and 
Professional Forum, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.  
Abi Shdid, C. and Andary, E., Improving the Delivery Process of Water and Wastewater 
Treatment Plant Public Projects through the use of IPD Principles: A Case Study.  Water 
Environment Federation, Utilities Management Conference, 2015, pp. 1-11(11) San 
Diego, California, February 23-27, 2016. 
 
Abi Shdid, C., Andary, E., Chowdhury, A. and Ahmad, I., Project Performance Rating 
Model for Water and Wastewater Treatment Plant Public Projects.  Journal of 
Management in Engineering, ASCE. Vol 35, Issue 2 March 2019. 
 
Andary, E., Abi Shdid, C., Chowdhury, A. and Ahmad, I., An IPD implementation 
Guideline Metric for Water and Wastewater Treatment Plant Projects. Journal of 
Engineering, Construction, and Architectural Management.  In review. 
 
 
 
 
 
